Search

3 results

Next Generation Eu: Legal Structure and Constitutional Consequences
Federico FABBRINI
Journal:

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies / Volume 24 / December 2022

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

23 August 2022, pp. 45-66

Print publication:

December 2022
- Article
- - You have access
  - Open access
- PDF
- HTML
- Export citation
The article examines the legal structure and constitutional consequences of ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU)—the innovative recovery fund that the European Union (EU) established to address the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The article sheds light on the complex normative constellation that was used to erect NGEU, and explains how this was satisfactorily done within the existing Treaty framework, by resorting to current legal bases. At the same time, however, the article underlines the profound constitutional consequences that NGEU has on the EU's architecture of economic governance. To this end, the article contrasts the strategy chosen to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic to that embraced to tackle the euro-crisis a decade ago, and concludes emphasising how NGEU significantly contributes to the federalisation of the EU, endowing its fiscal union with a fiscal capacity analogous to that of other federal regimes.

5 - The Emergent Centralized Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism
from Part II
Brady Gordon
Book:

The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism

Published online:

07 April 2022

Print publication:

14 April 2022, pp 203-215
- Chapter
- - Get access
    
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
    
    Log in Register
- Export citation
Summary

Chapter 5 opens for Part II of the book with the task of taxonomy, classifying the emergent post-crisis EU fiscal architecture from the perspective of fiscal federalism theory in order to determine what it demands from the EU legal order to ‘work’. Chapter 5 finds that, from the perspective of fiscal federalism theory, the EU has sunk the cornerstones of a highly centralized model of ‘proto-fiscal union’ that is far more apt to unitary states than any of the other federations touched upon in this book. At its core, the new model supplants a legal pillar of fiscal sovereignty and market discipline (an entrenched ‘no-bailout’ law) with a legal feature of unitary states: centralized financial assistance and legal governance of fiscal policy. Chapter 5 evaluates the demands this places on the European legal order, and provides directions for the remainder of the analysis of Part II.

Brady Gordon
Published online:

07 April 2022

Print publication:

14 April 2022
- Book
- - Get access
    
    Buy a print copy
    
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
    
    Log in Register
- Export citation
This book bridges the study of European constitutionalism with the study of 'fiscal federalism' – the subfield of public economics concerned with structuring public finances between different levels of government in federal states. On one axis, this book delves into European Union and Member State constitutional law from all EU Member States in order to investigate and identify the existence of permanent constitutional boundaries that will impinge upon the selection of proposed models for EU fiscal federalism. On the second axis, this book engages the study of fiscal federalism in order to determine which institutional configurations known to that field remain legally and economically implementable within those boundaries. It provides a far-reaching investigation of which models of fiscal federalism are compatible with the constitutional boundaries of the European legal order.