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Policymakers in the EU have debated whether the digital economy may benefit from the introduction of data ownership and data access rights. The chapter asks whether and how the concepts of data ownership and data access rights may serve the goal of establishing an adequate free flow of data in the digital single market.
It first maps the policy goals contained within the EU’s Digital Single Market Strategy and then analyzes how data ownership – understood as a property right – may serve the implementation of this strategy.
The conclusion is that data ownership is unlikely to further the establishment of an adequate free flow of data. Therefore, the chapter examines whether ownership, understood as control over personal data, is a viable alternative to the property rights approach.
As a final step, the question is examined if, and under what circumstances, access rights to data already exist, or should be introduced, to allow individuals and businesses to use both personal and non-personal data.
Differences in the relative weight accorded to policy goals have resulted in a diversity of domestic rules governing cross-border flows of information, especially when it relates to personal data, and a diversity of approaches to govern the use of AI in both private and public law contexts.
Against this backdrop, the chapter first provides an overview of the state of the art in international trade agreements and negotiations on issues related to AI, and in particular the governance of cross-border data flows.
In doing so it juxtaposes the EU and the US approaches and demonstrates that the key public policy interests behind the dynamics of digital trade negotiations on the EU’s side are privacy and data protection.
Second, building on the divergent EU and US approaches to governing cross-border data flows, and the EU policy priorities in this respect in international trade negotiations, the chapter argues that the set of EU public policy objectives weighted against the benefits of digital trade in international trade negotiations, especially with a view to AI, should be broader than just privacy and data protection.
The systematic protection of persons at sea remains flawed. This problem has become even more acute during the Covid-19 pandemic when port closures have caused an unprecedented humanitarian crisis at sea. This article looks at the impact of port closures on the rights of persons at sea and considers how international law can protect those rights. While persons at sea are afforded significant rights protections in international law, the rights and duties of States often clash, with the result that persons at sea can find themselves in something of a legal vacuum. In order to address this problem, this article argues that the various rights and duties of States must be interpreted and applied in a way that fully recognises the rights of persons at sea.
There is a broad consensus that global electronic commerce needs the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade rules to govern it. The current mandate of the WTO is merely to examine the various trade-related aspects of e-commerce. Nevertheless, in recent years, some WTO members have put forward a proposal to begin negotiations for global e-commerce rules which was impeded due to the differing positions of developed and developing members. This paper examines the positions of the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China on the e-commerce multilateral rules negotiation issues. It then takes a look at the prospect of the WTO being able to reach an agreement on e-commerce. The analysis shows that the United States and the European Union have varying views on consumer privacy, information protection, and internet taxation. Although Japan sides with the United States on these issues and China is on the same page as the European Union regarding consumer privacy, China holds a different position from the United States and the European Union on the other two matters. China is not making commitments on data localization, free data flow, and forced transfer of source codes. Therefore, the outlook of the current e-commerce talks is not favorable for concluding WTO e-commerce agreements.
While the firm-level distributional consequences of market liberalization are well understood, previous studies have paid only limited attention to how variations in domestic institutions across countries affect the winners and losers from opening up to trade. We argue that the presence of coordinated wage-bargaining institutions, which impose a ceiling on wage increases, and state-subsidized vocational training, which creates a large supply of highly skilled workers, generate labor market frictions. Upward wage rigidity, in particular, helps smaller firms weather the rising competition and increasing labor costs triggered by trade liberalization. We test this hypothesis using a firm-level data set of European Union countries, which includes more than 800,000 manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2014. We find that, for productive firms, gains from trade are 20 percent larger in countries with liberal market economies than they are in coordinated market economies. Symmetrically, less productive firms in coordinated market economies experience significantly smaller revenue losses compared to liberal market economies. We show that both the presence of an institutionalized wage ceiling and the availability of subsidized vocational training are key mechanisms for reducing the reallocation of revenue from unproductive to productive firms in coordinated market economies compared to liberal market economies. In line with our theory, we find that wages and employment in liberalized industries increase differentially across both types of labor markets. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that trade liberalization triggers a differential demand for redistribution at the individual level across different labor markets, which is in line with our firm-level analysis.
After the financial crisis of 2008, the European Union (‘EU’) not only increased its substantial legislation regarding financial services, but also built up a strong and unified system of financial market supervision. In particular, central surveillance authorities were created. These were given far-reaching competences with regard to substituting dysfunctional national authorities or players in the financial services sector. The three European Economic Area (‘EEA’) and European Free Trade Association (‘EFTA’) States—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—participate in the EU's internal market through their membership of the EEA. In order to continue participating on an equal footing in the internal market for financial services and to honour their duty to maintain homogeneity, the EEA EFTA States also had to incorporate the new institutional setup regarding financial services supervision. This obligation, however, in particular relating to certain intrusive powers of the new surveillance authorities, collided with some constitutional reservations, above all of the two Nordic EEA EFTA States. This article will show how these conflicting aims could be merged into a system that on the one hand guarantees the unified overall approach needed for strengthened surveillance of the internal market for financial services, and on the other hand safeguards certain constitutional reservations of the EEA EFTA States. It also looks at how third countries that do not (fully) participate in the internal market, such as the United Kingdom and Switzerland, are likely to be treated in this context by the EU.
This chapter suggests that that the similarities in approaches to internationalization lead to convergence across higher education systems, actual practices and governance arrangements also show continued divergence. By adopting a cultural / phenomenological approached as part of the world society theory perspective (Meyer et al., 1997), this chapter aims to provide a cultural rather than a functional explanation for the remarkable degree of convergence, while not losing sight of divergence. Taking this cultural perspective to both frame and explain the proliferation of the internationalization discourse in higher education — and the resulting convergence and divergence — has, to the best of our knowledge, not been done before in the academic literature. To further our understanding of the internationalization discourse and the implications for governance of higher education, we ask the following research question: how can the rationales and practices underpinning the internationalization of higher education be understood from a world society perspective? To answer this question, we first outline the world society theory. We then highlight patterns of convergence, followed by signs of divergence, in rationales and practices.
This prologue sets the scene by introducing the book’s main thesis that during the debt crisis, in particular, the years 2010-2012, the European Union has gone through a constitutional transformation. The transformation is characterised by a broadening of the currency union’s conception of stability. Its key manifestations are financial assistance for distressed member states and government bond purchases by the European Central Bank. The transformation can be understood through the lens of solidarity as this makes it possible to conceptualise the unity between the member states and to analyse how political leaders managed to uphold this unity during the crisis. And ultimately, it allows for an understanding of why instead of approving the transformation in Pringle and Gauweiler on the merits, the ECJ should have done so through silence.
In their fight against the debt crisis, the European Union and its member states took measures that have profoundly changed the euro. It now differs fundamentally from when it was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. Surprisingly, this change has come about with hardly any formal amendment to the Union's 'basic constitutional charter', the Treaties. How, then, to understand it? This book argues that the constitution of the EU has transformed, which occurs when constitutions change without amendment. The transformation is characterized by a broadening of the currency union's stability conception from price stability to also financial stability. Using solidarity as a lens, the book conceptualises the unity of the member states and analyses how this was preserved during the crisis. Subsequently, it explains how that changed the currency union's set-up and why the European Court of Justice could not turn against the change in Pringle and Gauweiler.
This article focuses on the relationship between Alevis and the Turkish and German states. It does so by examining the Turkish Alevi Opening (2009–2010) and the German Islam Conference (2006–present), two unprecedented official platforms aimed at improving Alevis’ political participation. The study asks why such state-sponsored initiatives came into existence in Turkey and Germany, and why the German Islam Conference has proven more successful from the perspective of Alevis. It argues that even though the diffusion of EU norms and pressure from transnational advocacy networks have increased awareness regarding the Alevi issue, domestic factors have been more salient in the emergence and outcome of these initiatives in both countries.
International organizations are becoming increasingly powerful. Today, they affect the lives of individuals across the globe through their decisions and conduct. Consequently, international organizations are more capable of violating the human rights of individuals. But how can they be held to account for such violations? This book studies the procedural mechanisms that may hold international organizations to account for their human rights violations. It establishes a general framework for identifying, analyzing, and assessing the accountability mechanisms of international organizations. This general framework is then applied to three distinct cases: the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy missions, refugee camp administration by the UNHCR, and detention by the International Criminal Court. The overall conclusion is that none of the existing accountability mechanisms across the three cases fulfill the normative requirements set out in the general framework. However, there are significant variations between cases, and between different types of accountability mechanisms.
In this chapter I apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the first case study, namely the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy missions. This case study focuses on two such mission in particular: NAVFOR Atalanta and EULEX Kosovo. The structure of both missions and their potential for human rights violations is discussed, before turning to the applicable accountability mechanisms. These include the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Ombudsman, domestic courts, and EULEX Kosovo’s Human Rights Review Panel. The overall assessment is that the accountability mechanisms applicable to CSDP missions are insufficient.
This chapter analyses the alternative scenarios of how a multilateral investment court could come about, including an assessment of existing international frameworks that are likely to host that institution (e.g. the WTO, OECD, ICSID and UNCITRAL). The author argues that the EU’s active engagement in the field could fall victim to its own success – if it ever becomes successful, that is. If the proposed ICS turns out to be effective, efficient and accepted as more legitimate than investor-state arbitration, it might in fact inhibit the efforts of establishing a multilateral investment court. Alternatively, the increasing use of these instruments could result in a creeping multilateralization, creating a quasi-multilateral network of treaty-centred investment courts, a shrine to Western neoliberal values. A glimpse of hope, on the other hand, might come as a spin-off effect of current developments, should existing frameworks such as ICSID, UNCITRAL and the WTO rise to the occasion.
Chapter 6 deals with the final motion relating to a treaty, ie its destruction (phthora). To this effect, the chapter starts with an examination of withdrawal from a treaty, even when no such withdrawal clause exists, and the possibility of revocation of a notification of withdrawal. This last one rose to prominence with Brexit and the Wightman cases. The situation is further complicated by the fact that anomalous situations can also occur where termination or suspension may be required. Chapter 6 does not examine only the existing grounds of termination/suspension under the VCLT, but also certain grounds that despite not being included in the VCLT have been argued to provide additional, customary law-based grounds for termination/suspension. Two kinds of motion are examined in this context: i) the motion between the VCLT and non-VCLT alleged grounds for termination/suspension, ie the connections, near identity and in some cases suggested absorption of one ground by another; and ii) the motion between, on the one hand, the grounds for termination/suspension, as a subset of treaty law, and, on the other hand, other sets of rules such as State responsibility.
Chapter 5 brings the reader to the far north to examine the importance of self-determination for Inuit in trading disputes on seals and seal products. Michael Fakhri and Madeleine Redfern focus on how the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization used trade law to construct an Indigenous exemption including a European-imposed determination of Indigenous identity for the purpose of trade in a manner that limits Inuit political and economic options and works against their rights. This chapter emphasizes the importance of Indigenous people continuing to assert their sovereign power and claims for self-determination not just through international law but, more specifically, through international trade law.
This article re-examines the theories of recognition and non-recognition in the context of the evolving framework of the European Union (EU)’s trade and investment relations with Taiwan from legal and international relations perspectives. Notwithstanding its one-China policy, the EU has developed a pragmatic approach to engaging Taiwan under bilateral consultations and World Trade Organization negotiations that have built the foundation for the bilateral investment agreement (BIA). The article argues that since the 1980s, the EU has accorded diverse forms of recognition to Taiwan and the BIA will buttress the process. To substantiate the contention, the article systemically explores the political and trade policies of European states and EU institutions in line with their strategies toward cross-strait relations.
By deciphering the new momentum that has galvanized the European Commission’s strategy towards the EU-Taiwan BIA, the research sheds light on the implications of European Parliament resolutions and the EU’s investment talks with China. The structure and impact of the BIA are also analysed in light of EU investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Hence, the findings contribute to the interdisciplinary study of international law and international relations and enhance the understanding of the EU’s Asia-Pacific trade and investment agreements.
While policy attention is understandably diverted to COVID-19, the end of the UK's post-Brexit ‘transition period’ remains 31 December 2020. All forms of future EU−UK relationship are worse for health than EU membership, but analysis of the negotiating texts shows some forms are better than others. The likely outcomes involve major negative effects for NHS staffing, funding for health and social care, and capital financing for the NHS; and for UK global leadership and influence. We expect minor negative effects for cross border healthcare (except in Northern Ireland); research collaboration; and data sharing, such as the Early Warning and Response System for health threats. Despite political narratives, the legal texts show that the UK seeks de facto continuity in selected key areas for pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and equipment [including personal protective equipment (PPE)], especially clinical trials, pharmacovigilance, and batch-testing. The UK will be excluded from economies of scale of EU membership, e.g. joint procurement programmes as used recently for PPE. Above all, there is a major risk of reaching an agreement with significant adverse effects for health, without meaningful oversight by or input from the UK Parliament, or other health policy stakeholders.
This chapter provides a concise overview of European competition policy, with a focus on financial services. The chapter first defines competition and describes the objectives of EU competition policy, i.e. maintaining competitive markets and a single market in the EU. The ultimate goal of competition is to offer consumers a greater choice of products and services at lower prices (i.e. to enhance consumer welfare). The second part of the chapter analyses the economic rationale for competition policy by examining the difference between a perfectly competitive market and a monopoly. The third part of the chapter elaborates on the four tools of EU competition policy. The fourth part of the chapter discusses a framework for investigating the abuse of dominance
In the century after Reconstruction in the U.S., Jim Crow laws installed a caste system that tenaciously separated whites and “coloreds”; poll taxes, literacy tests, fraud, and intimidation suppressed the black vote; and peonage, chain gangs, and convict leasing conscripted African Americans and poor whites into hard labor. For Roma in Europe, the EU’s eastern enlargement failed to create genuine protections at the local and national levels.
In the bipolar world of the Cold War era, power shifts that might have impacted the international system were generally regulated to the context of US-USSR summits and negotiations, with decisions taken at the super-power level cascading down to the lower strata of the power pyramid. International crises and ways to resolve them were shaped by the ability of superpowers to balance each other and exercise control over the players in their own pole.
The end of the Cold War shook the pyramidal relationship networks of that era’s static balance of power, paving the way for new equations and balances of power. In a sense, the stances and power rivalries of the global powers within this dynamic network of relationships during the post-Cold War earthquakes have laid the seismic substructure for the systemic earthquake that rumbles on today. The movements these countries have undergone within themselves during this process and their attempts to adapt to the new era have had a direct impact on the direction and force of the tides and turbulence in the international system.
In the fourth chapter the characteristics of the multiple powers system shaped by the response of global powers (US, EU, Russia and China) to these earthquakes are analysed.