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The chapter deals with the ICJ and human rights. It argues that, while the Court is not and will never be a specialised human rights court, it has a significant role in the protection and development of human rights. The author explains some structural obstacles and impediments to the engagement of the Court with human rights, and then offers some instances of substantial incorporation of human rights into the fabric of general international law through interpretation and legal concepts encompassing international community interests. The chapter suggests that structural disengagement in the sense of norms allowing only States to litigate before the Court does not impede substantial incorporation which may depend on other factors, including the changing attitudes of the ICJ judges and lawyers before the Court.
The chapter deals with the role of the ICJ in the development of international law from both a doctrinal and a practical perspective. It considers concrete examples of the way in which the Court’s judgments and opinions have had an influence on the development of international law, and it concludes that the Court has in practice had a significant impact on the development of international law, even though that goes beyond its core mandate.
The chapter considers the ICJ’s contribution to the law of State responsibility, looking back to the Court’s contribution to the codification of that law by the ILC: looking at the Court’s current attitude to the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility; and looking to the future, addressing one of the main challenges facing the Court in this field, that of multilateral disputes. The author concludes that the Court has been an important player in this field of international law, and it has made a significant contribution to vesting the ILC Articles with the authority they have today. According to this chapter, the Court has an important role to play going forwards in the growth and development of community interest litigation for the enforcement of erga omnes obligations.
Throughout the years, various legal concepts have emerged that recognize that more than two states (in the form of one duty-bearer and one right-holder) may be involved when it comes to the performance of an international obligation, and that this can have relevant implications for treaty and responsibility relations. In this respect one may think of concepts such as obligations erga omnes, interdependent obligations and jus cogens. This chapter explores and analyses the way in which the international law of obligations, through these concepts, has addressed legal relations that involve more than simply one duty-bearer and one right-holder. By doing so, the chapter aims to illustrate the limits but also the B1:L9
One of the fundamental problems with the TPNW is that the five officially recognized nuclear-weapons states – Russia, the United States, China, France and the United Kingdom, collectively the NWS – and four other states who possess nuclear weapons – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – have boycotted the Treaty negotiations and refused to sign or ratify it. Despite moves toward neo-universalism, this leaves an important gap in the TPNW legal framework, because it does not directly bind the NWS and it seems unlikely that these NWS will join the Treaty or be bound under opinio juris. One way to remedy this problem and fill the legal gap is to appeal to an existing set of legal obligations found in international jurisprudence to which NWS are already bound. Specifically, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has highlighted that states owe obligations erga omnes – toward all – that derive from other international laws, legal principles and conventions.
The TPNW represents an unprecedented departure from current practice in that it is the first multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons. It is supported by 122 nations, representing a sizable contingent of the world’s population spanning various geographical divides. Although not celebrated by all nations, and vehemently opposed by nuclear-weapon states, its adoption at the UN General Assembly in July 2017 marks a fundamental departure from the status quo regarding armament matters. The primary purpose of this book was to examine the TPNW within the broader legal, diplomatic and political context in relation to the existing nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament framework in international law, exploring the influence of the Treaty from various perspectives and its potential impact on the nuclear architecture as it stands today.
This chapter analyses the contribution of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to interpreting and developing rules and principles of international human rights law aimed at ensuring basic protection of individuals. First, the chapter puts into perspective the place of the ICJ within the larger framework of international adjudication and enforcement of human rights norms. Then, the chapter turns to the institutional possibilities and limitations of the Court in engaging in the process of interpreting and developing human rights norms, discussing both advisory proceedings and contentious cases. The analysis addresses all three procedural stages in contentious cases, namely preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Third, the chapter analyses the contribution of the Court to clarifying procedural, substantive and institutional issues concerning the understanding and implementation of key human rights norms. In analysing the case law of the Court, it is important to distinguish between cases involving bilateral disputes with human rights aspects and cases involving matters of general concern for the international community as a whole.
Constitutionalism – Kadi ruling of EU Court of First Instance – Erosion of ‘total’ constitutional order by reallocation of public power – Constitutional vision challenge of networks approach – Emerging human rights hierarchy – Rudimentary international value system – Ius cogens and erga omnes – Barcelona Traction – Core human rights elements – Enforcement through regional and domestic courts – Review of Security Council resolutions
It has to date not been examined in-depth what correlative rights and obligations the breach of an erga omnes obligation or an erga omnes right may entail. In his Separate Opinion in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, Judge Weeramantry devotes one section to the legal consequences of the involvement of erga omnes obligations in inter partes judicial procedures. This editorial analyses the relevant parts of Judge Weeramantry's Separate Opinion and explores the impact it may have on future litigation involving erga omnes issues.
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