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Can formal innovation make a direct contribution to the affective power of prose fiction? Do the kinds of linguistic deformation characteristic of a certain strand of modernism lend themselves to the depiction, and evocation in the reader, of emotion? These questions are raised with particular force by a number of recent Irish novels, which can be seen as taking up the challenge posed by Joyce in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. Three such novels are the focus of this essay: Eimear McBride’s A Girl is a Half-Formed Thing, Kevin Barry’s Beatlebone, and Mike McCormack’s Solar Bones. Short passages are discussed in order to demonstrate that the innovative linguistic devices in these novels – McBride’s fragmented stream-of-consciousness tracing of the traumatic events in a young woman’s life, Barry’s comic invention of an episode in John Lennon’s career, and McCormack’s unpunctuated, spatially arranged meditation – all enhance rather than reduce their emotional impact.
In this Introduction I begin by considering the interdisciplinary development of affect theory, and how it has been seen as splitting into two camps: that of the ‘cognitivists’, who see affect as involving emotion and cognition, and that of the ‘noncognitivists’ who don’t. I argue for a concept of literary affect that is neither strictly cognitivist nor noncognitivist. Through readings of Spinoza, Sylvan Tomkins, and Deleuze I show how they provide the basis for developing such a concept of affect, and I go on to develop a literary aspect to it through readings of a range of literature, criticism, and theory, including works by Longinus, Milton, Edmund Burke, Denise Riley, T. S. Eliot, Raymond Williams, William S. Burroughs, Virginia Woolf, and Lyn Hejinian. After giving examples of how a concept of literary affect is useful for reading texts, I outline the rationales of this book’s three sections while indicating how the sections’ chapters complement each other.
The dominant conceptions of emotional intelligence can be categorized into “ability” models and “mixed” models. Ability models view emotional intelligence as a construct related to other intelligences and consisting of a set of mental abilities whereas mixed models view emotional intelligence as a blend of standard personality traits and various abilities. In this chapter, we review these models of emotional intelligence, including the measures associated with each, and provide a brief summary of the debate between ability models and mixed models. Narrowing in on the ability conception of emotional intelligence, we then discuss its behavioral and neural correlates, development, and malleability, as well as a school-based intervention designed to promote these skills. We conclude with an exploration of possibilities for the emotional intelligence research landscape in the next thirty years.
International relations (IR) has witnessed an emerging interest in neuroscience, particularly for its relevance to a now widespread scholarship on emotions. Contributing to this scholarship, this paper draws on the subfields of affective neuroscience and neuropsychology, which remain largely unexplored in IR. Firstly, the paper draws on affective neuroscience in illuminating affect's defining role in consciousness and omnipresence in social behavior, challenging the continuing elision of emotions in mainstream approaches. Secondly, it applies theories of depth neuropsychology, which suggest a neural predisposition originating in the brain's higher cortical regions to attenuate emotional arousal and limit affective consciousness. This predisposition works to preserve individuals’ self-coherence, countering implicit assumptions about rationality and motivation within IR theory. Thirdly, it outlines three key implications for IR theory. It argues that affective neuroscience and neuropsychology offer a route toward deep theorizing of ontologies and motivations. It also leads to a reassessment of the social regulation of emotions, particularly as observed in institutions, including the state. It also suggests a productive engagement with constructivist and poststructuralist approaches by addressing the agency of the body in social relations. The paper concludes by sketching the potential for a therapeutically-attuned approach to IR.
There is controversy over the extent to which the new International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) diagnosis of complex posttraumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) is distinct from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This study aimed to conduct the first investigation of distinctive neural processes during threat processing in CPTSD relative to PTSD.
This cross-sectional functional magnetic resonance study included 99 participants who met criteria for PTSD (PTSD = 32, CPTSD = 28) and 39 trauma-exposed controls. PTSD was assessed with the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS). CPTSD was assessed with an adapted version of the International Trauma Questionnaire. Neural responses were measured across the brain while threat or neutral faces were presented at both supraliminal and subliminal levels.
During supraliminal presentations of threat stimuli, there was greater bilateral insula and right amygdala activation in CPTSD participants relative to PTSD. Reduced supraliminal right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation and increased subliminal amygdala and insula activation were observed as common dysfunction for both CPTSD and PTSD groups relative to trauma controls. There were no significant differences in terms of subliminal presentations and no differences in functional connectivity. Dissociative responses were positively associated with right insula activation (r = 0.347, p < 0.01).
These results provide the first evidence of distinct neural profiles of CPTSD and PTSD during threat processing. The observation of increased insula and right amygdala activation in CPTSD accords with the proposal that CPTSD is distinguished from PTSD by disturbances in emotion regulation and self-concept.
focuses on economic decision making and the role that cultural-historical artefacts (such as religious beliefs) may play in this everyday aspect of life. It brings together anthropological approaches with studies of decision making in psychology and cognitive science. The main example is of decisions about risky, but potentially profitable, fishing trips made from Taiwan.
Chapter Two examines the psychology of anger, its expected effects on behavior, and the prevalence of anger in political messaging. Drawing on different traditions in social psychology, this chapter breaks down the distinct attitudes underlying the emotion of anger, and I provide a theoretical account of why the emotional sentiment of resignation cultivated among African Americans inhibits the emergence of anger as this group surveys the political environment. I investigate a range of campaign messages and speeches from political elites over the years to highlight the why’s and how’s behind elites’ attempts to activate various emotions within the intended public—specifically anger. I conduct emotion discourse analyses of these messages in order to identify the emotional sentiments that are cultivated and reinforced within primarily white and black audiences. The chapter begins the exploration of the racial divide in the activation of political anger by surveying trends from the open-ended findings from the original survey experiment titled the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.
This chapter reviews the basics of cognition, showing how old ideas about learning as storehouses of information, standing at the ready to address problems, have given way to much more complex notions about how our brains make meaning of information by attaching it – or not – to existing mental models. Meaning-making is not only vital to our survival as a species but also presents a challenge to our cognitive development. How we change our mental models is known as transformative learning, arguably the most important theory on adult learning in the last half-century.
In this chapter, we describe intervention efforts aimed at promoting maintenance behaviors in romantic relationships and the factors that influence these initiatives. We highlight current cultural forces surrounding clinical and educational practices, the definitions and theories that inform interventions to sustain and enhance partners’ maintenance behaviors, and important considerations for increasing the effectiveness of these interventions. The interventions featured in our review focus on enhancing positive aspects of relationships or mitigating threat to relationship maintenance processes within the cultural context of contemporary relationships. Suggestions for advancing the field include further research on the relevance of specific maintenance strategies and theories of change across the life course, the influence of cultural context and resilience on maintenance processes, unintended consequences of relationship maintenance interventions, and the evaluation process for interventions promoting maintenance behaviors.
Human rights advocates continue to use shaming as a central tool despite recognizing its declining effectiveness. Shame is indeed a potent motivator, but its effects are often counterproductive for this purpose. Especially when wielded by cultural outsiders in ways that appear to condemn local social practices, shaming is likely to produce anger, resistance, backlash, and deviance from outgroup norms, or denial and evasion. Shaming can easily be interpreted as a show of contempt, which risks triggering fears for the autonomy and security of the group. In these circumstances, established religious and elite networks can employ traditional normative counter-narratives to recruit a popular base for resistance. If this counter-mobilization becomes entrenched in mass social movements, popular ideology, and enduring institutions, the unintended consequences of shaming may leave human rights advocates farther from their goal.
Transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation (tVNS) is a promising therapeutic option for major depressive disorder (MDD) in adults. Alternative third-line treatments for MDD in adolescents are scarce. Here we aimed to assess the effects of acute tVNS on emotion recognition in adolescents with MDD.
Adolescents (14–17 years) with MDD (n = 33) and non-depressed controls (n = 30) received tVNS or sham-stimulation in a cross-sectional, case–control, within-subject cross-randomized controlled trial, while performing different tasks assessing emotion recognition. Correct responses, response times, and errors of omission and commission on three different computerized emotion recognition tasks were assessed as main outcomes. Simultaneous recordings of electrocardiography and electro dermal activity, as well as sampling of saliva for the determination of α-amylase, were used to quantify the effects on autonomic nervous system function.
tVNS had no effect on the recognition of gradually or static expressed emotions but altered response inhibition on the emotional Go/NoGo-task. Specifically, tVNS increased the likelihood of omitting a response toward sad target-stimuli in adolescents with MDD, while decreasing errors (independent of the target emotion) in controls. Effects of acute tVNS on autonomic nervous system function were found in non-depressed controls only.
Acute tVNS alters the recognition of briefly presented facial expressions of negative valence in adolescents with MDD while generally increasing emotion recognition in controls. tVNS seems to specifically alter early visual processing of stimuli of negative emotional valence in MDD. These findings suggest a potential therapeutic benefit of tVNS in adolescent MDD that requires further evaluation within clinical trials.
Our brains are continuously changing and these changes alter brain functions. With maturation, there is growth and unfortunately, even with healthy aging, decline. Aging-related decrements affect neurons and their connectivity, neurotransmitter systems, and even support systems such as glia. Aging affects some brain regions (frontal lobes and hippocampi) more than others. This book reviews and discusses aging-related changes and their influence on the major neurobehavioral domains, beginning with reviews of aging-related changes in anatomy and physiology. Subsequent chapters review cross-sectional and longitudinal studies of aging-related changes in sensory perception (vision, hearing, touch, smell, taste) and cognitive functions (memory, language, motor planning, attention, executive functions, emotions, creativity). In each chapter, mechanisms that may account for these changes are discussed. Declines related to aging per se are distinguished from declines related to aging-associated diseases. Final chapters discuss what can potentially be done to slow or reverse aging-related decline of cognitive functions, including exercise, cognitive rehabilitation, and pharmacological agents. It is hoped this book will help clinicians differentiate between normal aging processes and brain diseases, reduce the adverse effects of brain aging, and stimulate further research on how adverse effects of brain aging can be reversed, stopped, modified, or best managed.
This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions—specifically their normative dimension—while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.
The chapter continues dwelling on the theme, introduced in Chapter 4, of exilic life as depicted and remembered in Javanese texts, with an emphasis on (1) the challenges and emotional turmoil experienced by long-term exiles returning from Ceylon to Java and (2) a gendered perspective on exile and return. The former is explored primarily through the textual testimonies narrating the return of Pangeran Juru, previously known as Natakusuma, who was the chief council to King Pakubuwana II until he was banished in 1742. Depictions of his return after more than a decade in exile provide evidence of the transformative effects of the experience and the struggle to reintegrate into court life. As for gender, the chapter argues that, although women’s voices recounting exile are even rarer than men’s, it is women who tend to deliver the more detailed, emotional and thus revealing accounts. It is also their exilic lives whose traces tend to come to us through narrations of marriage, love relationships, widowhood and divorce, bringing out more fully the human dimension of living through exile and return.
Emotions not only affect other people individually but also also help to form and consolidate wider social alliances or divisions. This chapter focuses on emotion’s effects and functions in group life and on how interpersonal processes might scale up to produce collective outcomes. Ingroup members’ emotions signal their shared or distinct social identities and communicate relevant group norms, as well as aligning intragroup relations more directly. Mutual entrainment of movements may be facilitated by temporally structured interaction rituals, and joint participation in collective action can reinforce a sense of efficacy and shared purpose. Emotions not only align relations within groups but also between them. Like interpersonally targeted emotions, intergroup emotions are often attuned to actual or anticipated responses from their targets and respond directly to emotional feedback from the outgroups at which they are directed. Many theorists explain these social-functional outcomes by reference to single-minded processes of self-categorization and group-based appraisal, paying relatively less attention to the relation-aligning consequences of the collective enactment of identities. However, group emotions make most sense when grounded and contextualised in processes of group mobilization and intergroup exchange.
Inhibitory control is a key deficit in patients with schizophrenia. This study aims to test whether emotions can facilitate inhibition in patients with schizophrenia when they increase attention to inhibitory process.
A total of 36 patients with schizophrenia and 36 healthy controls completed an emotional stop-signal task. The task involved selective responses to “Go” stimuli and stopped response when emotional or neutral stop cues occurred.
In all conditions, patients with schizophrenia took longer time to inhibit response compared with healthy controls, indicating an overall impairment in response inhibition. Importantly, patients with schizophrenia and controls acquired similar size of benefit from the negative stop cues, showing as reduced reaction time to negative than neutral stop cues. However, the negative stop cues impaired subsequent Go performance only in patients with schizophrenia, indicating additional cost of the negative stop cues for patients with schizophrenia. In both groups, the positive stop cues did not have any significant influence on response inhibition.
These findings provide novel evidence for the benefit of emotional stop cues on inhibitory control in patients with schizophrenia and reveal different after-effects of emotional enhancement effect in patients and healthy populations. The findings may help develop effective interventions for improving inhibitory control in patients with schizophrenia and other clinical populations.
This chapter discusses how and why emotions affect other people’s actions, appraisals and emotions. One popular explanation of interpersonal influence is primitive emotional contagion. According to this account, people arrive at similar emotional states because they copy one another’s gestures and expressions (mimicry). The feelings and sensations produced by these gestures and expressions then produce convergent emotional experiences (interoceptive feedback). However, mimicry effects are too selective and feedback effects too weak to make this process work consistently. An alternative process is social appraisal, which involves calibrating emotional orientations to objects or events in the shared environment. Most studies of social appraisal present participants with verbal or facial information about someone else’s emotion and assess their inferences about that information. However, relation alignment may also operate at a more implicit level when people adjust to each other’s developing object-directed signals and movements. Similar processes may also produce divergent or conflicting emotional orientations when two people approach the same event from different angles or interpret its consequences in different ways.
Like many of Nietzsche’s striking words and phrases, “perspectivism” (“Perspektivismus”) has received a great deal of attention in the secondary literature. However, Nietzsche uses the term only once in his published and authorized manuscripts, twice in fragments from 1886 to 1887, and once in a fragment from 1888. While tantalizing, GS 354 and the three fragments from 1886 to 1888 radically underdetermine what Nietzsche could have meant by “perspectivism.” In order to shed light on Nietzsche’s perspectivism, I approach it from two angles. First, I explore some of the rhetorical tropes that Nietzsche uses to reorient his audience’s perspective. These include engaging the audience’s emotions, apostrophic address to the reader, and what I’ve elsewhere called “Nietzschean summoning.” Each of these methods tugs at the affects and values of the audience, positioning them to notice, find salient, and be disposed to act in relation to certain (aspects of) things while ignoring, finding less salient, and being disposed to neglect (aspects of) other things. This suggests that, for Nietzsche, perspectivism has less to do with cognition than the painterly metaphor of a visual perspective suggests. Second, I employ the digital humanities methodology pioneered in my recent work to further elucidate the concept of perspectivism. I argue that, for Nietzsche, perspectivism relates primarily to agents’ motivational and evaluative sets, and that it is meant to offer a methodology for achieving various epistemic goods.
People often regulate their emotions when attempting to influence other people. For example, I may try to maintain calm about what is happening to avoid making you worried, or alternatively work up my anger or disappointment to make you worry more. In both these cases, regulation of my emotion serves to regulate your emotions. This chapter focuses on both intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation and their intended and actual consequences. When two people try to regulate each other’s emotions at the same time, their emotions may converge or diverge, producing increasingly compatible orientations or escalating clashes of perspective. In some case of mutual regulation, interactants may successfully achieve regulatory effects that neither individual could have achieved separately.