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Friendship across a society includes the mild manners of doux commerce. Aristotle ranks economic exchanges according to increasing levels of friendliness: from cash on the barrel, to giving the partner extra time to repay, to a loan, to a gift with strings attached. Instead of reducing each to self-interest (like modern economists do), he finds commodity exchange has a tincture of the goodness of the next level up (interest-free loans), just as loans retain some of the goodness of outright gifts. Across a chasm of differences, we can still observe similar passions today: affection for customers, pride in one’s economic contribution (“gift”), wanting societal recognition (honor) for it. Adam Smith thought this vanity was the root of morality. Full morality is not required for civic friendship but only middle-class “virtues” (Politics, Books 3-4). Fair markets help maintain liberal civic friendship. When free markets are replaced by rent-seeking (crony capitalism, regulatory capture, lobbying), the game becomes rigged and we leave behind win-win assumptions for zero-sum assumptions, in which anyone else’s gain must be my loss. Our mild manners degenerate into resentment and discord.
In academic writing from Green perspectives, work on the economy is perhaps the most well developed. This is understandable given that the economy constitutes the metabolism between human society and the wider ecosystem of which it is a part in terms of materials, resources, energy and waste. This chapter explores the critiques that Greens provide of the contemporary economy before considering alternative visions of a Green economy, as well as thinking about how to get from one to the other. Hence, I first outline Green critiques of today’s global economy, in particular its ecological unsustainability and commitment to infinite growth on a finite planet. We then look at what a Green economy might look like and how this departs markedly from ideas which invoke the same label propagated by institutions like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and World Bank. Finally, we explore the range of strategies Greens employ and propose to build a green economy.
Chapter 4 examines the idea of the ‘forgotten army’. Whether in the Middle East or Macedonia, soldiers during the war were absolutely certain that their part in the conflict – their suffering, as explored in Chapter 1, and their contribution to the wider war effort, such as the liberation of Palestine or Mesopotamia, as shown in Chapter 3 – had gone unnoticed by the home front. In some ways worse was their fear that those at home had badly misrepresented the war outside the Western Front, recognising the only ‘real’ war as the one being fought in France and Flanders while those in the Middle East and Macedonia were on a ‘picnic’. Again, the Western Front was foremost in the minds of soldiers away from it. This fear became more serious in the war’s final two months, as soldiers in the British Salonika Force (BSF), alongside their French, Greek, and Serbian allies, forced the surrender of Bulgaria, while the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’s (EEF) northwards drive to Aleppo knocked out the Ottomans. In both cases, soldiers in Macedonia and the Middle East argued that it was their campaign that had set in motion the downfall of the Central Powers and, ultimately, the armistice with Germany and an end to the war.
Introducing the two regions at the heart of this study, chapter two maps out the geographical, political, economic, and cultural setting of the book. While it focuses on the years around the Great Reforms, it puts this period into broader perspective, tracing continuity and change throughout the nineteenth century. Thus, the chapter combines elements of temporal and spatial comparison, highlighting the distinctiveness of the two regions and their similarities. First, it discusses their dynamic, and diverging, role in the imperial imagination. While both regions were considered to be different from both the empire’s peripheries and traditional heartlands, they were appropriated as part of the imperial core, in discourse and in practice. Second, the chapter reviews the demographic composition of the two territories, their changing institutional landscapes and forms of governance. Finally, it charts the socio-economic conditions under which people lived, while paying close attention to the effects of migration. In all of these questions, the situation of Muslim Tatars is foregrounded.
Since the earliest stages of international climate policy, carbon dioxide (CO2) has been framed and widely accepted as a problem that needs to be solved by reducing its amount in the atmosphere. In principle this is a correct and relevant starting point for efforts to decarbonize societies. At the same time, however, the unquestioned and one-sided framing of CO2 as a problem has significantly biased the strategies for tackling climate change. We introduce the origins, meanings and implications of one-sided framing of CO2 in climate policy. We also discuss how alternative framings could impact policymaking and eventually our capacity to mitigate climate change. We introduce a paradox: framing CO2 as a problem often translates into policies that hamper the implementation of technologies to decrease the amount of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere. We suggest that plurality in framing CO2 could lead to innovative ways and strategies to combat climate change.
This introduction to the special issue in honor of Professor Yoram Barzel provides an overview of his scholarship and a summary of the contributions to this special issue. Each contribution advances or elaborates upon major themes in Barzel's theoretical and applied work on property rights, transaction costs, and political economy. The contributions fall into three categories: an examination of the foundations and implications of the ‘Barzelian’ method for social scientific analysis; Barzel's economics of property rights and transaction costs to historical case studies; and advances to Barzel's theory of the state, which includes an analysis of the origins of democracy and the rule of law.
Exploring the ways in which technological innovations necessarily affected economic and social frameworks, this chapter introduces the whole volume by maintaining that the study of textile production holds great potential for enhancing our understanding of the Bronze Age world
This article explores empirically how different types of labor market inequality affect policy preferences in post-industrial societies. I argue that the two main conceptualizations of labor market vulnerability identified in the insider–outsider literature are complementary: labor market risks are shaped by both labor market status—whether an individual is unemployed, in a temporary or permanent contract—and occupational unemployment—whether an individual is in an occupation with high or low unemployment. As a result, both status and occupation are important determinants of individual labor market policy preferences. In this paper, I first briefly conceptualize the link between labor market divides, risks and policy preferences, and then use cross-national survey data to investigate the determinants of preferences.
This chapter studies access, a short-term and casual use of property. Two forms of access are analyzed: independent access, and access in cooperative and communal projects. The chapter offers a normative evaluation of access and highlights the values and concerns associated with flexibility and mobility. It revisits the justifications for private property discussed in Chapter II and demonstrates that these justifications can also defend an alternative vision of flexibility and mobility. Yet there is an important twist. Instead of freedom from interference, access fosters freedom from being tied down to a particular space. Instead of personhood, access supports the ability to experiment with one’s personality and pushes the boundaries of the self. In addition, access affects communities and changes interactions with other people. Access also raises significant normative concerns, such as vulnerability to immediate changes in health or financial stability, and vulnerability to platform power. This chapter then suggests preliminary guidelines for reform that are later developed in Chapter VII, including removing barriers to access, promoting consumer protection, restraining platform power, and respecting the principles of communal access by adjusting the legal rules of cases involving the physical integrity of the property.
This chapter presents the sharing economy phenomenon and studies its main characteristics. It argues that it is a diverse phenomenon with diverse normative implications. There is a tendency in legal academia to focus almost exclusively on Airbnb and Uber, and this tendency flattens the complexity of the phenomenon. The chapter maps the phenomenon based on an institutional analysis, focusing on who owns or controls the property or service. It identifies four main institutional categories: peer-to-peer markets that include both for-profit projects and nonprofit enterprises, commercial companies, communal projects, and governmental programs. The distinction among forms of access is important. Each category raises different legal and policy-oriented challenges. Each category also carries different normative value from the perspective of flexibility.
The introduction discusses the changes in consumers' preferences and the symbolic and practical decline of ownership. Young consumers, especially millennials, prefer experiences over things, comfort and ease of use over ownership. It then presents the sharing economy phenomenon, renames it "the access economy" and introduces the main argument of the book: the sharing economy pushes for a mobile and flexible vision of engaging with possessions and, as a result, with other people. It then places this argument within the broader context of property discourse.
This contribution starts by presenting the three main approaches that political scientists use to analyze labor market vulnerability. We proceed to discuss various operationalizations of labor market vulnerability. We examine how they relate to the three theoretical approaches and we evaluate the consistency between theory and measurement. Finally, we recommend three measures that political scientists should deploy when analyzing the effect of labor market vulnerability on political preferences. We point out what each of these variables captures and what methodological challenges should be taken into account when using them.
This essay argues that several ongoing and future developments are likely to undermine the broad public support welfare states historically and currently enjoy. These developments—skill-biased technological change, privatization of pensions, higher rates of assortative mating, and the information revolution—can be expected to increase risk inequality, the predictability of risk, income and wealth inequality, and the overlap between income and risk. As a result, a plausible prediction is that intense polarization about social policy programs will replace their current broad appeal, pitting an increasing share of people with no jobs or poor jobs and little upward mobility against an increasing share of people with few incentives to support mandatory risk pooling because they can self-insure.
Why do left parties lose vote shares in times of economic crisis and hardship? Why do right-wing governments implement seemingly left-wing policies, such as labor market activation? Why is representation becoming more and more unequal? And why do workers vote for right-wing populist parties? Several political science theories propose meaningful and important answers to these key questions for comparative politics, focusing on identity politics, programmatic convergence of parties or exogenous constraints. However, there is an additional and distinct approach to all of the questions above, which emphasizes socio-structural transformations in the labor market: most of the processes above can be understood with reference to increasing labor market inequality and its political implications. The relevance and explanatory power of labor market inequality for mass politics have not been fully acknowledged in comparative political science and this is the reason for this symposium. Labor market inequality affects political preferences and behavior, electoral politics, representation, and government strategies. The main purpose of our symposium is to make broader comparative politics research aware of the crucial structural changes that labor markets have undergone in the advanced capitalist democracies of the OECD, and of the tremendous implications these changes have had for politics.
The growing research on post-industrial labor market inequality bears a strong—yet widely misunderstood—relevance for the literature on electoral realignment. In this contribution, I contend that the assumption of “labor market outsiders” being equal to “globalization/modernization losers” is largely mistaken. Rather, atypical work and unemployment is most widespread among service workers, whose primary electoral choice is to abstain from voting. This implies that the ongoing reconfiguration of European party systems—through the rise of right-wing populist parties—is driven by skilled and routine workers in the manufacturing sector (the traditional “insiders”). Hence, the rise of right-wing populist parties reflects a political mobilization of the formerly well-protected industrial working class, rather than of labor market outsiders.
Property rights are important for economic exchange, but in many parts of the world, they are not publicly guaranteed. Private market associations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort from group members. Under what circumstances do private associations provide a stable environment for economic activity? The author uses survey data collected from 1,179 randomly sampled traders across 199 markets in Lagos, Nigeria, and finds that markets maintain institutions to support trade not in the absence of government, but rather in response to active government interference. The author argues that associations develop protrade policies when threatened by politicians they perceive to be predatory and when the organizations can respond with threats of their own. The latter is easier when traders are not competing with one another. To maintain this balance of power, an association will not extort; it needs trader support to maintain the credibility of its threats to mobilize against predatory politicians.
The collapse of MBA polities lays the Levant open to Egyptian domination. A network of elite estate dwellers maintains power through Egyptian patronage and participation in the exchange of women and valuable gifts, abandoning large parts of the countryside.
The chapter discusses the convergence of neoliberalism with efforts at ‘democracy promotion’ and illustrates the precise meaning that ideals of democracy come to hold in Jordan’s only port city, Aqaba, which has come to epitomise neoliberal reform in the country. Processes of neoliberal restructuring in Aqaba have been directly supported by USAID under the assumption that they also help to enable processes of democratisation. The chapter argues that efforts at neoliberal ‘democracy promotion’ are part and parcel of a wider imperial agenda of control and domination. It illustrates this by providing an in-depth discussion of the founding of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) in 2001, the subsequent privatisation of Aqaba’s land, property and state-owned enterprises, the latter’s controversial sociopolitical effects, as well as concomitant attempts at neoliberal ‘democracy promotion’ and the further marketisation of sociopolitical life. Instead of enabling future processes of democratisation, it demonstrates that such interventions only further deprive procedural democracy of its already strongly diluted emancipatory potential, as socio-economic inequalities are radically exacerbated. The chapter is largely based on the study of various confidential and non-public documents authored and/or used by the USAID Aqaba support programmes.
This chapter continues to assess the impact of colonial rule on the townspeople, and the ways in which it revealed their attachments to the town and their ties to one another, but it emphasizes an economic theme. I begin with an investigation of the German imperial government’s plot to undermine the Wabagamoyo. Uncertain of how to wrest trade in the port away from local hands, the Germans’ plan was to develop the less economically significant town of Dar es Salaam, located about 70 km south of Bagamoyo, and divert the central caravan routes there, where the Germans had greater control over the economy. Yet building a new city did not mean that it was guaranteed to usurp Bagamoyo as the preeminent trading entrepôt of the colony. During the British period, many of the townspeople plotted ways to get around rationing restrictions imposed upon them by the British during WWII. This chapter concludes with a detailed examination of smuggling networks, revealing yet again the ties among the various social groups which bound them together as Wabagamoyo