In a 1998 article, Bohman argued that the contemporary deliberative turn in democratic theory had reached its ‘coming of age’, as deliberative democrats began to show greater interest in the institutionalization of their proposal. Moreover, Bohman referred to this growing interest with an expression that was unprecedented at the time: ‘deliberative constitutionalism’. At present, deliberative constitutionalism has become one of the most original and relevant contemporary proposals. In this context, my article proceeds as follows. I begin by arguing that the contemporary deliberative turn in democratic theory also gave rise to a deliberative turn in constitutionalism—that is, a trend aimed at orienting constitutionalism and judicial review towards democratic deliberation. Next, I argue that, at that embryonic yet promising stage, deliberative constitutionalism had shortcomings that hindered the aim assumed since its origins. Finally, I argue that, over recent decades, these shortcomings have been finessed, which shows that deliberative constitutionalism has also reached its coming of age.

This Article addresses the question of how to explain and justify the allocation of politically sensitive legal questions to civil courts in the European Union. It proposes a pluralist theoretical view on interactions of private law adjudication with legislative initiatives in the process of building a European political community. This is elaborated on the basis of a reconstruction of the interaction between judicial and legislative processes in three high-profile cases (concerning non-discrimination, housing and climate change) in light of three theoretical perspectives: social justice, constitutionalism and public sphere theory. The first two perspectives shed light on the legal-political dimension of private legal questions in the European Union and manners in which to handle the plurality of sources and institutions in this field. They do, however, not fully clarify the distinction and relation between Habermasian discourses of justification and discourses of application of law in European Private Law adjudication. The Article suggests that public sphere theory, with a basis in Fraser’s work on transnationalisation, can complement the theoretical understanding of the role of judges in European Private Law. It is submitted that the interaction between national and European levels of adjudication helps maintain transnational deliberative spheres in which the legal-political stakes behind private law can be discussed. This opens up space for the inclusion of different voices in democratic deliberations on questions of social justice. Private law adjudication may thus be considered to contribute to the initiation of discourses of justification which serve the re-imagination of a European political community.

This paper advocates a move beyond the systemic approach in the field of Deliberative Democracy. It argues that the notion of deliberative ecology can deliver the necessary conceptual elements that deliberative democrats seek in deliberative systems without some of the problems they either overlook or embrace. To advocate the advantages of an ecological perspective to deliberation, the article focuses on six axes of comparison: (i) performances of actants (instead of functions of arenas and players); (ii) articulations and translations (instead of transmission); (iii) vulnerabilities (instead of pathologies and dysfunctions); (iv) practice (instead of institutionally-oriented design); (v) diverse temporalities (instead of linear temporality) and; (vi) hologram-based analysis (instead of systemic analysis). In a nutshell, the article claims that the ecological approach to deliberation has the advantage of conceptualizing an ever-changing web of relations of interdependency, which connects diverse entities that are either relevant to a public discussion or that hinder its enactment.

This Article interrogates the role of national constitutional courts within the Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference mechanism from both descriptive and normative angles. First, I demonstrate that although a clear majority of the constitutional courts submit references to the ECJ on a more frequent basis, differences in individual approaches remain significant. Subsequently, I argue that the core normative attractivity of the questions submitted in the course of domestic constitutional review lies in their participative and deliberative potential. Compared to ordinary courts, constitutional courts are better suited to amplify the ‘unheard’ voices of immobile EU citizens. By counterbalancing the demands of the EU's functional constitution, which is primarily based on the ideals of market capitalism, constitutional courts’ questions may contribute to the EU's capacity to generate legitimate decisions. Finally, I put my theoretical claims in context and analyse the main ways in which such deliberative potential can translate into practice.

The literature on deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) establishes a link between political dissatisfaction and support for DMPs. However, little is known about the sources of political dissatisfaction that trigger this support. Our research tackles this specific question and claims that citizen dissatisfaction is rooted in a position of ‘losers of representative democracy’, which leads citizens to be more open to reforms that move away from the representative model. Building on the literature on loser's consent, we focus on the effect of voting for a party not associated with the government and of descriptive and substantive (under)-representation in support of DMPs. We rely on a comparative survey conducted across fifteen Western European countries. Supporters of opposition parties and those who are badly represented, both descriptively and substantively, are more supportive of DMPs. These findings have important implications for understanding the public appeal for deliberative democracy instruments.

As law graduates wield significant influence in public life, law schools’ responsibility for cultivating students’ civic capacities and dispositions remains an important but often neglected project. Taking up this project, this article traces a thread of deliberative democratic aspirations within legal education scholarship and explores the potential of participation within law schools’ own political processes for realising these ideals. To do so, it examines law students’ experiences of an experiment with deliberative democracy’s leading institutional innovation – the deliberative mini-public – and demonstrates the ways in which participation fostered deliberative capacities, a more collective orientation, and increased confidence. Ultimately, the article illustrates the mutually reinforcing nature of civic and legal education, affirms law schools’ broader role within society and offers both theoretical and practical insights into the place of democratic innovation within the law school.

The legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) as institutions for social and environmental governance in the global economy has received much scholarly attention over the past years. To date, however, research has yet to focus on assessing the legitimacy of MSIs in their interactions with other actors within larger systems of deliberation. Drawing on the deliberative systems perspective developed within deliberative democracy theory, we theorise a normative framework to evaluate the roles of MSIs within the broader systems of governance they co-construct through their interactions with other initiatives, governments, non-governmental organisations, and other external actors. As we demonstrate in our evaluation of the illustrative case of the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety as a MSI in the context of the Bangladeshi garment industry, this framework can help researchers assess whether a MSI ultimately serves to enhance or undermine the deliberative legitimacy of the overall system of which it forms a part.

In the last two decades, a robust consensus has emerged among philosophers of science, whereby political, ethical, or social values must play some role in scientific inquiry, and that the ‘value-free ideal’ is thus a misguided conception of science. However, the question of how to distinguish, in a principled way, which values may legitimately influence science remains. This question, which has been dubbed the ‘new demarcation problem,’ has until recently received comparatively less attention from philosophers of science. In this paper, I appeal to Rawls’s theory of justice (1971) on the basis of which I defend a Rawlsian solution to the new demarcation problem. As I argue, the Rawlsian solution places plausible constraints on which values ought to influence scientific inquiry, and, moreover, can be fruitfully applied to concrete cases to determine how the conflicting interests of stakeholders should be balanced. After considering and responding to the objection that Rawls’s theory of justice applies only to the “basic structure” of society, I compare the Rawlsian solution to some other approaches to the new demarcation problem, especially those that emphasize democratic criteria.

Examining recent developments in deliberative democracy alongside growing attention to system-wide racism, I look at the ways deliberative systems theory and practice deals with the tension between the theory's normative claims and the structural injustice against which deliberative systems unfold. I focus on work aimed at deepening inclusion in deliberative systems, noting that this focus on inclusion into unjust systems stops the deliberative literature from taking full responsibility for structural and systemic racism. Taking a critical approach to the deliberative literature's capacity to confront systemic racism and live up to its normative principles of treating all people as equals, I argue that we need to reframe power to centre the relationship between race and democracy. As I do so, I propose ways to begin dismantling foundational injustice in deliberative systems, centring foundational inequalities in deliberative theory and design, and setting out differential responsibilities for listening as deliberative theorists confront the problem of white supremacy in deliberative systems.

Deliberative minipublics—participatory processes combining civic lottery with structured deliberation—are increasingly presented as a solution to address a series of problems. Whereas political theory has been prolific in conceiving their contributions, it remains unclear how the people organizing minipublics in practice view their purposes, and how these conceptions align with the theory. This paper conducts a thematic analysis of the reports of all the minipublics convened in Belgium between 2001 and 2021 (n = 51) to map whether and how justifications coincide with the theory. The analysis reveals an important gap: minipublics are in practice predominantly presented as contributions to policymaking, while more deliberative functions remain peripheral. Some common practical purposes also remain under-theorized, in particular their capacity to bridge the gap between citizens and politics. This desynchronization, combined with a plethora of desired outcomes associated with minipublics, indicates the creation of a minipublic bubble which inflates their capacity to solve problems.

As deliberative democracy is gaining practical momentum, the question arises whether citizens’ attitudes toward everyday political talk are congruent with this ‘talk-centric’ vision of democratic governance. Drawing on a unique survey we examine how German citizens view the practice of discussing politics in everyday life, and what determines these attitudes. We find that only a minority appreciates talking about politics. To explain these views, we combine Fishbein and Ajzen’s Expectancy-Value Model of attitudes toward behaviors with perspectives from research on interpersonal communication. Individuals’ interest in politics emerges as the only relevant political disposition for attitudes toward everyday political talk. Its impact is surpassed and conditioned by conflict orientations and other enduring psychological dispositions, as well as contextual circumstances like the closeness of social ties and the amount of disagreement experienced during conversations. The beneficial effect of political interest dwindles under adverse interpersonal conditions. The social dimension of everyday political talk thus appears to outweigh its political dimension.

This introduction argues that the use of the concept of deliberative democracy in corporate social responsibility (CSR) research needs to be theoretically extended. We review three developments that have recently occurred in deliberative democracy theory within political science and philosophy: 1) the conceptualization of deliberative systems (macro level), 2) the considerations of mini-publics (micro level), and 3) the role of online deliberation. We discuss the challenges and prospects that incorporating these three developments into future CSR-related research creates. We thereby also introduce the articles in this special issue and show how they connect to each of the three developments. On the basis of this discussion, we outline the contours for a more general program of distributed deliberative CSR that enables CSR scholars to incorporate an updated understanding of deliberative democracy theory into their future work.

Research on the normative ideal of democracy has taken a sharp deliberative and epistemic turn. It is now increasingly common for claims about the putative cognitive benefits of political deliberation to play central roles in normative arguments for democracy. In this paper, I argue that the most prominent epistemic defences of deliberative democracy fail. Relying on empirical findings on the workings of implicit bias, I show that they overstate the epistemic virtues of political deliberation. I also argue that findings in cognitive and social psychology can aid in the development of a new and improved generation of epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy.