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This introduction offers a brief account of Clare’s biography, drawing attention to some of the major events in his life, and some of the aspects of his life and his work which have most interested critics. It goes on to offer an extended close reading of one of Clare’s poems, in order to demonstrate the ways in which Clare is able to write within convention, but also to develop a unique poetic voice. By examining his engagement with the aesthetic discourse of the picturesque as exemplary, it argues for his particular capacity both to reflect and to enable reflection upon Romantic-period issues and debates, and also for the originality of Clare’s posture and verse.
This introduction briefly explores the relationship between compositional choice and stylistic expectation or ideology. With new music now a plethora of styles and approaches, how might we understand work that’s happening currently in the context of historical and social influence?
Research in conversational hand gesturing shows an array of philosophical senses of intersubjectivity. Gesturing is interpersonally rational, as demonstrated in studies linking gesturing to common ground achievements and effects and to markings of communicative intent. Gesturing is an ecological and interactional activity through which copresent interlocutors codetermine their own social and environmental relatings, building as well as attending to a shared world. Gesturing is an intercorporeal experience central to what it means to live as linguistic bodies. Taken together, research indicates that hand gesturing even as a variegated phenomenon offers insight into how language works. The full story of intersubjectivity and attendant features of recognition, interpretation, normativity, conventionality, and reference begins and ends with actual bodies interacting. As these matters concern the core of pragmatic philosophy, gesture research has radical relevance for all language theorists. An enactive approach to intersubjectivity and language offers a framework for making this case.
The Constitutional Convention in Chile, like other constitution-making mechanisms in democracies, carried out its work within the democratic institutional framework. In a democracy, the success of a constitution-making process depends not only on internal factors, such as its capacity for representation and the procedural rules by which it is governed, but also on external factors such as participation, the government’s role and other contingent factors. When the process – including both internal and external factors – fails to produce adherence to the new constitution, institutional resistance to changes is very likely to occur. This article argues that the manner in which the political and social spectrum was represented in the Chilean Convention, combined with the way participation was implemented and the rules governing the Convention, insulated it from society and the rest of the democratic institutions. As a result, party and public adherence to the proposal made by the Convention was low and its contents generated institutional resistance from outside.
A quick glance through history demonstrates that it has not always been an unbroken chain of human happiness, to put it mildly.Different individuals, groups and peoples have faced persecution for any number of reasons: where they came from, how they looked, their perceived (dis)ability, who or what they believed in, who they loved, how they identified, the family they were born into, or, in some cases, for no reason at all. It is against this backdrop that our current set of human rights has emerged. While this chapter focuses primarilyon children’s rights and their relationship with education and educator obligations, it is necessary to understand the history of rights in order to understand why human rights, and particularly children’s rights, are so important to the work we do as educators.
Rule combination can contribute to morphological simplicity. Synchronically, rule combinations (like word combinations) are sometimes stored as formulaic units, and this fact contributes to a morphological system’s processing simplicity, since accessing a stored rule combination directly is simpler than decomposing that combination into its component rules for separate lookup. Stored, formulaic rule combinations may also contribute to diachronic simplifications of a language’s morphology, since they are the locus of reanalyses that may eventuate in “affix telescoping,” the development of a rule combination into a simple rule. But affix telescoping is not a monolithic phenomenon; it involves the reduction of a rule combination’s combinatory transparency along at least four dimensions. Thus, it is possible to find rule combinations that are progressing toward reanalysis as simple rules without yet having reached the point of reanalysis.
In contrast to the small-scale we of shared action, this chapter analyses the large-scale and temporally prolonged we’s of communities governed by social norms. Drawing on Heidegger’s analysis of the Anyone and of historicity, I distinguish between anonymous social normativity and historical social normativity. Anonymous social normativity provides a set of social norms in the form of a relatively stable, socially inflected comportmental pattern that we assume to be a universal default. However, this kind of social normativity comes with only a minimal awareness of its own nature, extent, and origin. Historical social normativity, on the other hand, implies a historical awareness in which social norms are disclosed as historical and hence as fragile and contestable. For Heidegger, this leads to the proto-political possibility of what I call communal commitments—roughly, commitments in which a group of people commit themselves to sustain a particular set of social norms across generations.
This chapter discusses whether Heidegger’s holism – roughly, the view that the meaning of the parts (entities) depends on the whole (the world) – entails a vicious relativism. I argue that Heidegger is a holist because he is committed to both object externalism (the view that intentional states depend on environmental objects) and social externalism (the view that intentional states depend on other people). Whether his holism entails relativism depends on how we understand these two commitments. Discussing recent interpretations of Heidegger’s holism (Lafont, Dreyfus, Okrent, Carman), I argue that Heidegger’s holism entails a form of relativism only if we take his social externalism to be a function of social conventions. I then go on to challenge that this is the case by arguing that Heidegger is an open-ended social externalist according to whom intentional states do not depend solely on our relation to social conventions (or any other particular social formation such as language or tradition) but on our on-going social interaction broadly construed.
Chapter 6 examines Rousseau's claim that human societies are artificial and that recognizing this is crucial to understanding how theories of social pathology can ascribe non-arbitrary standards of healthy functioning to institutions. The most important sense in which society is made by us is expressed in the claim that institutions are grounded in conventions. The upshot of this claim is that a kind of self-consciousness is intrinsic to social life, namely, collective acceptance of the authority of the rules governing social institutions, which, in the most fundamental institutions, includes a shared conception of the good that explains their "point," part of which consists in promoting the freedom of social members. Because acting in accordance with such a conception is constitutive of activity in institutional life, the functions of institutions – including a conception of their healthy functioning – are accessible, if imperfectly, to the agents on whose activity those functions depend.
Chapter 3 marks the transition of Augustine’s argument in The City of God from politics to philosophy, by means of the civil religion of ancient Rome. In books VI and VII, Augustine endeavors to unmask counterfeits of virtuous humility – conventions propagated by civic and philosophic elites, including in some respects Varro and Seneca – and to exhort people to live and worship only in accord with their true dignity.
Although state constitutional conventions in the United States were once called frequently and brought about significant changes in governance, recent decades have seen little convention activity. I examine the contrast between the earlier regularity of conventions and their recent absence, but from a different perspective than is usually taken—not by explaining the recent absence but rather explaining the regularity from the 1770s through 1970s. I investigate why legislatures in prior eras agreed to call conventions and how legislators’ traditional opposition to conventions was overcome on a regular basis. After identifying the state constitutional conventions held in the US and setting aside conventions that were called to join, leave, or rejoin the Union or were instigated by institutions other than legislatures, I focus on 82 conventions called at the discretion of legislators and for reasons unrelated to joining, leaving, or rejoining the Union. I identify the issues and circumstances that were responsible for legislators’ willingness to overcome their traditional opposition to holding conventions, thereby contributing to a better understanding of both the challenges in calling conventions and the occasions when these challenges can be overcome.
The authors of this article met on a Master of Arts (MA) music education course a month before the Swanwick Tillman Sequence of Musical Development was published. The course was a portal to an exciting range of literature, with the Swanwick Tillman spiral providing a long-term source of discussion and reflection as our careers have diverged and converged over the intervening years. This paper takes the form of a duoethnographic conversation in which we summarise and reflect on that ongoing synergistic discussion, showing the influence the spiral has had within our particular situations.
This article argues that it is a waste of time seeking to treat populists as examples of homo economicus when seeking to persuade them that the conspiracy theories to which they subscribe are big lies. But it does not follow that homo economicus is worthless in this context. He has a role in explaining the evolution of the social norms whose violation is the root cause of the rise of populist movements. Such an approach requires a willingness to entertain both proximate and ultimate explanations of human behaviour simultaneously.
In the Guide of the Perplexed Maimonides offers innovative readings of biblical terms and narratives through which he reveals his philosophy. Since he does not compose a comprehensive commentary on the Bible, Maimonides includes biblical exegesis throughout his philosophic work by explaining philosophic issues within the biblical text, in an effort to resolve seeming contradictions between philosophy and a literal understanding of the Bible. In the Introduction to the Guide, Maimonides presents his dual objective: to explain obscure biblical terms and parables, or verses and passages that have an external (literal, conventional) and an internal (philosophic) meaning. Maimonides maintains that the Bible has an esoteric level of philosophic truth, accessible to the intellectually qualified, which he discusses in his Guide for the discernment of those capable of understanding. Influenced by Al-Farabi, Maimonides argues that religion defers to philosophy and the Bible presents educational myths in which images represent philosophical truths for the masses. According to Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides views the Garden of Eden narrative as such a myth reflecting “philosophic anthropology rather than historical narrative.” In his discussion of the episode in the Garden of Eden, Maimonides explores the human condition before and after the transgression and fulfills both objectives of his philosophic work by explaining an equivocal term and the figurative meaning of the sin and sinners in the parable – an explanation that is critical for a correct philosophical understanding of the challenging narrative.
Maimonides never wrote a commentary on the Hebrew Bible or on any part thereof. That literary choice is belied by the influential legacy of Maimonides’ biblical hermeneutics as developed in the Guide. For the Guide is a work that is declaredly about Scripture. This claim merits emphasis: The Guide is first and foremost an exegetical work. In the general introduction, Maimonides writes that the two primary purposes of the Guide are: first, to explain the meaning of certain terms that appear in the Bible; second, to explain the meaning of meshalim, or parables that appear in the Bible. However, in terms of form, the expected approach for an exegetical work, in light of Maimonides’ intellectual background, would have been to compose a commentary on all or part of the Bible. Jewish biblical commentary was a sophisticated art by Maimonides’ time, originating as far back as Saadia Gaon’s (882–942) commentary on the book of Job, which adapted the genre of formal commentary for Hebrew biblical texts. In such formal commentaries, which harken back to models of ancient Greek and medieval Arabic philosophical commentary, three features stand out. One, there is a clear division between text and commentary, between chunks of text (lemmata) and their interpretation, between author and commentator. Two, the commentator follows the order of the text as a structural principle for the commentary. Three, the commentary is the product of one interpreter and reflects an individual reading. Often the commentator adds a preface of some sort, whose structure and themes were guided by a number of conventions. Saadia’s commentary features all of these elements, including an extensive introduction. As far as Greek commentaries on the philosophical-scientific canon, it is a matter of some contention whether Maimonides was familiar with commentaries on Aristotle by Alexander of Aphrodisias. We do know that he was familiar with Galen’s commentary on Hippocrates’ aphorisms, in Arabic translation, since he himself authored a commentary on Galen’s commentary.
In this chapter we explore the interrelated phenomena of conventionalization and conventions. We argue that the essence of convention is to facilitate meaning making in interaction, while conventionalization refers to the process through which conventions come into existence. We investigate the pragmatic complexity surrounding convention and conventionalization by arguing that (1) conventionalization is a matter of degree; (2) conventions and conventionalization are particularly prominent in intercultural interactions; and (3) language and socialisation are highly relevant to conventionalization. We also investigate facets of language use with complex implications for convention and practice, and we provide various interactional examples to illustrate these facets.
We can all agree that institutions matter, though as to which institutions matter most, and how much any of them matter, the matter is, paraphrasing Douglass North's words at the Nobel podium, unresolved after seven decades of immense effort. We suggest that the obstacle to progress is the paradigm of the New Institutional Economics itself. In this paper, we propose a new theory that is: grounded in institutions as coevolving sources of economic growth rather than as rules constraining growth; and deployed in dynamical systems theory rather than game theory. We show that with our approach some long-standing problems are resolved, in particular, the paradoxical and perplexingly pervasive influence of informal constraints on the long-run character of economies.
Today hate crimes are on the rise locally, nationally, and internationally. Many of these crimes stem from racism, discrimination, and xenophobia. The questions that arise are (1) What are the psychological premises that underlie one’s beliefs about racism, discrimination, and xenophobia? and (2) What are the psychological, social, and human rights consequences if we fail to act? In this chapter we address these questions by (1) describing the psychology of racism, prejudice, and discrimination; (2) examining how the United Nations and the global community have historically addressed racism and discrimination; and (3) providing an overview of the history of how psychological science has been used to address racism and discrimination within the global community. Finally, the chapter concludes by addressing the psychology of diversity and calling upon the global community to use evidence to address how we can best create a more equal society, given our differences, so as to maximize the potential of all of humanity and ensure the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
With the increasing fear that democracy is faltering worldwide, it is perhaps naïve to think that there could actually exist a rational and well-ordered system for electing the president of the United States. Yet the opposite idea—that the process for picking the president is irrational and arbitrary, failing to reflect the real preferences of the electorate—is deeply unsettling. The American president wields too much power for the incumbent to be the product of an incoherent procedure. For the sake of humanity as a whole, as well as the people of the United States, it is essential to endeavor as best as is humanly possible to conceptualize what a coherent and sensible system for presidential elections might be.
National convention delegates are chosen through a bewildering array of procedures that vary from state to state. Because states, for the most part, determine not only whether parties hold a primary or caucus, but also which voters are eligible to participate, delegates arrive at the national convention having been selected by very different constituencies that have very different policy ideas and very different levels of commitment to their respective parties.
The result is that neither the Republican Party nor the Democratic Party is able to express a clear ideological message through its presidential nominations. Presidential candidates seeking to win delegates in different state elections must appeal to the electorate in each state—and the state electorates differ greatly because the state-imposed voter eligibility rules differ greatly from state to state. As a result, candidates who articulate a clear and consistent message will draw different levels of support from the primary electorate in the various states, even when their messages appeal to similar proportions of party members and non-party members in each state.