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Organizations are utilizing digital technologies to modernize their innovations in today’s competitive and rapidly changing market environment. This study’s goal is to explore the influence of open innovation on firms’ digital technology integration, aiming to enhance their innovation skills and produce competitive, adaptable digital solutions. The methods used include analysis, synthesis, and generalization. Organizations can enhance open innovation by acquiring knowledge, capabilities, ideas, technologies, and information for new products and services, with the relationship between open innovation and digital innovation accelerating their capabilities. The study emphasizes the challenges organizations face in modern IT, emphasizing open innovation, access to external knowledge, and the need for improved internal production efficiency and competitiveness. The practical value of this study is manifested in the identification of strategies for optimizing open innovation for their transformation into digital solutions.
This article investigates the relationship between intra-party leadership contestations on levels of satisfaction with democracy among party voters, trying to identify the impact of the former on the latter. The article draws on empirical data for a cross-sectional analysis from three different data sets that cover 11 countries, including a more case-specific analysis that utilizes panel data from Germany. Overall, the study aims to capture the dynamics of intra-party politics and the magnitude of its effect on perceptions of democracy among parties' voters. We find that intra-party politics at its probably most competitive version, that is elections for the head of the party, does not seem to exercise any significant influence on voters' satisfaction with democracy.
In this chapter, I explore the imaginaries of prosperity underlying the European Union’s (EU) approach to industrial law and policy. Long considered a taboo in European politics, the EU began to rediscover industrial policy after the 2008 great financial crisis, gradually increasing its ambitions when it came to shaping the relations between the state and the market. Having reviewed an array of EU measures, starting with the 2010 industrial policy and including the more recent burst of legislative proposals (Chips Act, Batteries Act, Critical Minerals Act, and Net Zero Industry Act), this chapter aims to do two things. First, it identifies shifts in the background understanding of political economy, including the role and appropriate objectives of markets, politics, law, and government, that lie behind successive policy interventions. Second, this chapter sketches the contours of the new synthesis of prosperity that emerges from these recent proposals and measures, while at the same time, and in no ambiguous terms, drawing attention to its considerable limitations.
This text consults seven variants of institutional theory to explore how these can be applied to strategic management. These variants are New Institutional Economics, Old Institutionalism, New Institutionalism, institutional entrepreneurship and change, intra organizational institutionalization, institutional logics, and institutional work. In doing so, three strategic management styles are distinguished: competitiveness based strategic management, legitimacy based strategic management, and performativity based strategic management. While the competitive based style sees institutional theory submitting to mainstream strategy research, offering additional variables and considerations to explain competitive advantage, the legitimacy based style makes institutional theory a strategy theory in its own right by providing an explanation for an organization's viability that emphasizes legitimacy over competitive advantage. The performativity based style is an even more radical departure from mainstream strategizing by purporting that a future is actively created with organizations making contributions as emerging issues are being dealt with.
Surveying the devastation in Germany or Japan in 1945, few could have predicted how rapidly reconstruction would ensue, or that it would be followed rapidly by breathtaking and sustained economic growth. The post-war economic and technological performance of the two nations has generated marvels and, not surprisingly, also a desire in many other countries to imitate them. To some degree, they are, however, inimitable. After all, prior to 1945, each of the two nations had already developed distinctive capabilities, organisations, behaviours, political traditions, and social norms. The revolutionary changes to the German and Japanese versions of capitalism that followed defeat therefore emerged from highly unusual circumstances. Recognising this, however, does not mean that lessons cannot be learned from looking at their post-war history. There are two broad sets of lessons. First, a number of institutional and organisational innovations developed in the two countries after 1945 can serve as inspiration for similar innovations in other countries. Second, analysis of their responses to issues such as globalisation, energy policy, and national security can yield useful insights for others. Overall, the track record of German and Japanese capitalisms in adapting to the global political economy since 1945 favours guarded optimism about the future.
In 1945, Germany and Japan lay prostrate after total war and resounding defeat. By 1960, they had the second and fifth largest economies in the world respectively. This global leadership has been maintained ever since. How did these 'economic miracles' come to pass, and why were these two nations particularly adept at achieving them? Ray Stokes is the first to unpack these questions from comparative and international perspectives, emphasising both the individuals and companies behind this exceptional performance and the broader global political and economic contexts. He highlights the potent mixtures in both countries of judicious state action, effective industrial organisation, benign labour relations, and technological innovation, which they adapted constantly – sometimes painfully – to take full advantage of rapidly growing post-war international trade and globalisation. Together, they explain the spectacular resurgence of Deutschland AG and Japan Incorporated to global economic and technological leadership, which they have sustained to the present.
This chapter explains the consequences on the labour market of the structural changes induced by decarbonisation policies. These policies are indeed likely going to have consequences on labour income distribution given existing rigidities in the labour markets and their different impacts on sectors and job categories. The chapter notably discusses whether decarbonisation can be a net job creator or destroyer, illustrating how job losses can be managed in a fair manner and how green jobs creation can be incentivised.
This chapter offers an analysis of the challenges for governments and the private sector in cybersecurity governance from a systemic perspective. It first identifies the challenges that the liberal international order, characterised by political liberalism, economic openness, and international cooperation, has faced in the area of cybersecurity governance. It also observes that there have so far been no successful global efforts to harmonise rules or create a unified regime. This chapter then emphasises how the private sector’s essential role as innovators possessing technological expertise is unique to cybergovernance and explains how the interplay of different actors, both public and private, has practical meaning for states and actors.
In this contribution, we exploit machine learning techniques to evaluate whether and how close firms are to become successful exporters. First, we train various algorithms using financial information on both exporters and non-exporters in France in 2010–2018. Thus, we show that it is possible to predict the distance non-exporters are from export status. In particular, we find that a Bayesian Additive Regression Tree with Missingness In Attributes (BART-MIA) performs better than other techniques with an accuracy of up to 0.90. Predictions are robust to changes in definitions of exporters and in the presence of discontinuous exporting activity. Eventually, we discuss how our exporting scores can be helpful for trade promotion, trade credit, and assessing aggregate trade potential. For example, back-of-the-envelope estimates show that a representative firm with just below-average exporting scores needs up to 44% more cash resources and up to 2.5 times more capital to get to foreign markets.
The institutions of the developmental states set up in the postwar period began to crumble in the 1980s as liberalisation took hold. Isolationist approaches were on the back foot. However, this did not mark the end of economic nationalism. Nation-states were now recast as agents shaping competitiveness and therefore growth. This process is visible in the Baltic states breaking free from the Soviet Union, in Malaysia of the 1990s, and most importantly in reform-era China. Beyond these similarities, the differences are equally enlightening. China’s reforms as conceived by Deng Xiaoping saw an initially cautious, but increasingly rapid, dismantling of Maoist autarky, with the ‘rejuvenation’ of the nation becoming the principal aim. Malaysia under Mahathir Mohamad only slowly moved towards a developmental policy, because policy also tried to achieve the economic advancement of ethnic Malays over the country’s ethnic Chinese minority. Finally, not all independent states born from the Soviet dissolution could turn to the West. Ukraine in the early 1990s remained caught between internal divisions and increasingly aggressive Russian policy.
Theoretical equivalence exists among various auction mechanisms, specifically the Second-Price-Auction (SPA), a competitive environment, and the BDM mechanism, a non-competitive environment. Yet, empirical studies suggest that behavior in these mechanisms may diverge. Our experimental study examines the WTP and the WTA of individuals by analyzing buying and selling bidding patterns both for a physical product (mugs) and for two types of lotteries (regular lotteries and extreme lotteries) in these two auctions mechanism: SPA and BDM. We found that the WTP in the SPA is higher than the WTP in the BDM for mugs and for regular lotteries, while the mechanisms do not differ significantly for extreme lotteries. In addition, the WTA in the SPA is lower than in the BDM for regular lotteries only. These results indicate that the WTP and WTA, as well as the WTA-WTP gap, tend to differ in the SPA and in the BDM as a result of the interaction between the competitiveness effect and other psychological effects on bidding patterns for riskless and risky assets. In addition, the current study suggests that the competitiveness effect depends not only on the type of mechanism (SPA), but also on the type of item (physical assets or lotteries) and the type of lottery. In addition, the influence of the competitiveness effect may vary between buying and selling positions.
In this paper, we document a violation of normative and descriptive models of decision making under risk. In contrast to uncertainty effects found by Gneezy, List and Wu (2006), some subjects in our experiments valued lotteries more than the best possible outcome. We show that the overbidding effect is more strongly related to individuals’ competitiveness traits than comprehension of the lottery’s payoff mechanism.
Using “average" indicators is simply misleading in most occasions, and firm-level analysis allows a much more targeted set of policies. Firm-level analysis is an essential tool to complement and integrate the macro assessment and related policy response across the whole range of productivity drivers – from labour to trade, from finance to competition. The great advantage of the CompNet dataset is that is built in such a fashion to be able to be used – as it is and directly – to derive at the very least a first set of granular stylised facts to inform policy considerations. Users can use the dataset to assess competitiveness, financial constraints and sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations. The book has also presented a wide variety of applications of firm-level-based analysis which goes over and above the mere presentation of stylised facts and joint distributions coming directly out of the dataset, including zombie firms impacts, export and participation in global value chains and concentration and market power.
This paper investigates the benefits of incorporating diversification effects into the pricing process of insurance policies from two different business lines. The paper shows that, for the same risk reduction, insurers pricing policies jointly can have a competitive advantage over those pricing them separately. However, the choice of competitiveness constrains the underwriting flexibility of joint pricers. The paper goes a step further by modelling explicitly the relationship between premiums and the number of customers in each line. Using the total collected premiums as a criterion to compare the competing strategies, the paper provides conditions for the optimal pricing decision based on policyholders’ sensitivity to price discounts. The results are illustrated for a portfolio of annuities and assurances. Further, using non-life data from the Brazilian insurance market, an empirical exploration shows that most pairs satisfy the condition for being priced jointly, even when pairwise correlations are high.
India's ambition of playing a prominent role in regional and global affairs has been particularly visible since the assumption of office by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014. The ambition has resulted in India's external engagement, abandoning the posturing of non-alignment for a more proactive multi-alignment strategy. Its efforts to engage with major powers such as the US and China, as well as other global middle powers such as Japan, the UK, and Australia, have been positioned on rapid economic progress, enabled by one of the fastest rates of growth among major economies. Attempts to expand global strategic influence, a natural outcome of robust economic expansion, should have seen India pursuing an aggressive outward-oriented external trade policy for increasing its share in global trade. India, though, has shown a marked resistance to open trade, including being reluctant to engage in regional and bilateral trade negotiations. This paper examines the dichotomy between India's desire to play a prominent global role and its aversion to open trade policies. Attributing the inward-looking approach to lack of competitiveness of Indian industry, absence of domestic pro-trade constituencies, and discomfort in negotiating new-generation trade issues, the paper argues India's quest for greater global strategic influence might be adversely affected by its restrictive trade policies.
The EU´s falling share in global manufacturing has fuelled concerns about an overall loss of EU competitiveness, in particular vis-à-vis China. We analyse the empirical evidence underlying these concerns by applying a newly developed decomposition technique to global input-output data spanning the years 2000 to 2014. Our results confirm the diminishing role of the EU in manufacturing value chains, but also show that this is mostly, by nearly 75 per cent, a consequence of the geographical and sectoral reallocation of global demand, reflecting the lower economic growth in the EU relative to the rest of the world. Still, the other almost 25 per cent of the EU’s loss of global share is explained by its lower participation in manufacturing value chains, which confirms a downturn in EU competitiveness. By extending the analysis to individual manufacturing activities we show that this general trend is more pronounced for low-tech (e.g. textiles) than high-tech sectors, with pharmaceuticals emerging as the most resilient EU industry. Policy concerns appear to be most warranted for electronics, a key sector for which the EU´s global share fell even more than for overall manufacturing, without evidence that EU value added from upstream service inputs could significantly mitigate this trend.
Chapter 4 provides background on the ten aspiring global cities and their theoretical and empirical comparability. Despite important variations, the cities examined share these core features: (1) They are key national and regional nodes of business and politics. (2) They experienced major and controversial redevelopment, which has caused different forms of displacement. (3) They have intensified the use of branding and cultural policies as engine of economic growth, often thereby promoting the “creative class.” The chapter presents data showing their shared prominence and discusses the high degree of institutional variation between the cities.There is significant variation in how markets and governments combine to pursue international competitiveness policies and the associated urban redevelopment. In developmental states, an essential feature is the elimination of informal settlements, with the consequent massive and brutal displacement of the poor, as examined in Seoul, Istanbul, Buenos Aires, and Santiago. In more advanced economies, a key dynamic is the erosion of public-sector housing, as illustrated for Hamburg. Redevelopment policies weresupported by city branding and legitimized by connections to cultural industries as new engines for economic growth, as examined in Tel Aviv, Seoul, Buenos Aires, and Los Angeles.
The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).
Governments support clean technologies to advance both environmental goals and national competitiveness. By adopting environmental policies early on, governments are argued to create durable competitive advantages for domestic companies that develop clean technologies for export to late adopters. This paper argues that policy competition between lead and follower markets conditions the ability of governments to create durable competitive advantages in low-carbon technologies. Depending on the complexity of the technology, we observe two patterns of green industrial policy competition. In low-complexity technologies, such as solar photovoltaics, follower markets are likely to adopt policies that support manufacturing capacity to rapidly achieve price advantages from economies of scale, with global supply chains intensifying this competition (“scaling up”). In high-complexity technologies, such as electric vehicles, follower markets are likely to adopt policies that support research and development to develop differentiated high-tech products for export (“innovating up”). We also suggest that new forms of interdependence in policy competition can affect the political sustainability of lead market policies. Competition in scaling-up is more likely to undermine political coalitions in favor of government support for low-carbon technologies, while innovating-up dynamics embed political coalitions that support lead market policies for low-carbon technologies.
The aim of this article is twofold: first, it seeks to address the question of why the competitive knowledge economy orientation that emerged in certain economically advanced states as a response to the crisis of Fordism came to be embraced by the Indian and the Brazilian states from the late 1980s onwards. Second, it aims to elucidate the manner in which the goal of becoming competitive knowledge economies has been articulated and implemented locally, especially from the mid-1990s onwards, by key fragments of the Indian and the Brazilian states. Drawing on insights from the competition state, regulation school, knowledge economy literature and that on India and Brazil, attention is paid to the context- and conjuncture-specific domestic and international factors that have contributed not only to the adoption of the competitive knowledge economy orientation, but also to the necessarily distinctive ways in which it found expression in practice in India and Brazil.