This chapter explores a set of intracorpus echoes in Catullus that has gone largely unexamined, presumably because it unites three poems that appear to be so utterly mismatched as to seem that they cannot comment on one another. The author argues that a familiar comic routine featuring Roman comedy’s “clever slave” binds these three poems together and illustrates how Catullus engages in social competition with his peers and rivals among the Roman elite. This character provides Catullus a model for displaying what William Anderson has dubbed “Heroic Badness,” a distinctly Plautine virtue by which the underdogs of Roman comedy gain the upper hand over blocking figures who hinder them from achieving their goals, despite the fact that they suffer from social and situational impairments. This chapter argues that the Roman elite found value in identifying with Roman comedy’s servus callidus and explores implications this affinity has for Catullus’ depiction of himself and others in his poetry.

This chapter considers rules applicable in the UK to shareholders exercising power in their own interests, rather than the interests of the company, and asks whether these create any problems for private equity investors, in theory and in practice. It also looks at other ways in which shareholders and directors can be held liable for the actions of their companies, including Bribery Act rules, health and safety laws, competition law rules and tortious liability.

Chapter Four turns to Aristophanes’ Wasps, wherein the playwright’s depiction of Philocleon as a renegade komast and irrepressibly unruly dancer in Wasps provocatively questions the socializing force of the kōmos as well as the mimetic force of dance itself. This chapter begins by considering the kōmos more broadly as a space for solo dance, especially male solo dance. I argue that Greek literature persistently imagines the kōmos (and even the symposium) as a kind of chorus, drawing the potentially unruly expression associated with these spaces into the socializing orbit of choreia. In the second half of the chapter, I show that Aristophanes exploits the unruly potential of komastic dance to represent Philocleon as a character who repeatedly breaks free of both social and generic constraints, even to the point of sidelining the chorus itself. In the final scenes of the play, I suggest that Aristophanes probes the ability of dance to function as a stable form of representation and problematizes the place of dance within both drama and society.

Chapter One examines the representation of both choral and solo dance in Books 6–8 of the Odyssey, arguing that the representation of virtuosic Phaeacian dance in the eighth book of the poem underscores the tense relationship between Odysseus and his Phaeacian hosts and articulates distinctions between choral and solo dance that echo across Greek literature. While the Odyssey itself is much earlier than the late Archaic and Classical texts explored in subsequent chapters, the models of performance set forth in Archaic hexameter poetry retain their currency in Greek culture through the time of Plato and beyond. The chapter thus considers Homeric poetry as paradigmatic for the representation of both choral and solo dance. The chapter also advances a new reading of the role of dance in the Phaeacian books of the Odyssey, arguing that the Homeric poet presents embodied performance and action as a means by which Odysseus and the Phaeacians negotiate their fraught relationship. My analysis highlights the disruptive and competitive elements of dance that simmer beneath the surface of the poem, suggesting that the prevailing scholarly interest in choral dancing has occluded the unique and unusual elements of Phaeacian dance.

Large carnivores, such as brown bears (Ursus arctos), wolves (Canis lupus), and tigers (Panthera tigris), can play a key ecological role from their apex position in trophic systems. Within the overall context of bottom-up and top-down regulation of ecosystems, predation by large carnivores often induces demographic and behavioral changes in prey species. These vertical interactions between different trophic levels are important regulatory mechanisms in nature. On the other hand, competitive interactions between species, or horizontal interactions within the same trophic level, are also common. Interspecific interactions between large carnivores are widespread in many ecosystems and can play an important role in community structure and stability. Predation is the mechanism driving apex predators’ function in nature, but it is also a source of conflict with different stakeholders, e.g. hunters and livestock owners, when predation affects domestic or semidomestic species (depredation). This situation is challenging when trying to secure long-term carnivore conservation and coexistence with people in the human-dominated landscapes that currently characterize most of our planet.

Which groups and organizations govern Japan? How do they cooperate and compete with each other? To what extent is the Japanese establishment connected with voluntary associations at popular levels? What are the characteristics of Japanese democracy? This chapter attempts to address these and other questions with a focus on the top layers of Japanese society. It is widely acknowledged that Japan’s establishment comprises three sectors – big business, parliament, and the public bureaucracy (ministries and agencies at the national level) – which are often referred to as a 'three-way deadlock'. In view of this, this chapter examines Japan's three-way deadlock, the emerging free-market political economy, community-level interest groups, political culture, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, relations with Korea and China, major media organizations, and deep-seated rifts that have opened up within elite structure.

Rapid, recent technological change has brought forward a new form of “algorithmic competition.” Firms can and do draw on supercharged connectivity, mass data collection, algorithmic processing, and automated pricing to engage in what can be called “robo-selling.” But algorithmic competition can also produce results that harm consumers. Notably, robo-selling may make anticompetitive collusion more likely, all things being equal. Additionally, the possibility of new forms of algorithmic price discrimination may also cause consumers to suffer. There are no easy solutions, particularly because algorithmic competition also promises significant benefits to consumers. As a result, this chapter sets forth some approaches to each of these issues, necessarily tentative, to address the changes that algorithmic competition is likely to bring.

Resentment has a bad, but undeserved rap, in both political theory and popular culture today. But this book has shown that liberal political theorists were not always so dismissed of resentment as a moral motive because of its psychological features, most importantly, its basis in equal recognition. But I have also demonstrated the limitations of sympathetic resentment throughout the book. In this conclusion, I consider how commercial institutions like competition and free exchange might ameliorate our prospects for spectatorial resentment, as well as what the empirical research on resentment, empathy, and perspective-taking might teach us about how to improve sympathetic resentment. Finally, I reflect on what persistent injustice in liberal societies might suggest about the value of the theory of sympathetic resentment I have offered in this book.

Many reforms of education governance throughout the postwar decades have been heavily contested politically. Since around the 1980s, governments in several advanced Western countries have reformed their education systems by increasing private provision, school choice, decentralization, and competition; by lowering or increasing the number of educational tracks available in secondary education; and by reorienting the role of vocational education and training in the education system. Yet, to date we possess insufficient knowledge of the extent to which such reforms are actually in line with individual preferences. This chapter studies individual preferences toward education governance for four educational sectors (early childhood education and care, schools, vocational education and training, and higher education) along three dimensions of education governance. On average, our findings reveal a strong support of public opinion for a publicly dominated, comprehensive model of education provision, coupled with a high degree of choice for students and parents. Yet, for most issues, preferences toward education governance are highly contested between individuals of different ideological orientations and partisan constituencies. Conflicting preferences at the individual level reflect the oftentimes high degree of partisan conflict on many reform issues in the governance of education.

Chapter 4 discusses how capital for Marx functions as a totality. It also explains how Marx’s conception of totality is based on Hegel’s conception of the logic of essence. Capital has a sui generis character, and is able to maintain and reproduce itself through individuals. Thus, the ground-level of domination in capitalism is not the domination of capitalists over workers, but the abstract domination of the totality of capital over both capitalists and workers. It is true that individuals can exert power over each other; yet they can do so not due to their personal characteristics, but in fact as a “personification of economic categories.” Finally, I observe that the power of capital has an impersonal and non-intentional character, although that power must necessarily be mediated by the action of individuals.

The IBM antitrust case is usually viewed as a cautionary tale of wasteful government overreach into fast-moving technology industries. The case extended from the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, when it was dropped by the Department of Justice. Far from being a failure, the Justice Department’s efforts to rein in IBM led to the creation of independent markets for software and personal computers. IBM’s fall from dominance, necessary to open the door for Microsoft, Apple, and the entire Internet industry, was not a foregone consequence of Schumpeterian forces, but the outcome of sustained government action. Unrelenting technological progress is not inherently self-actualizing. While regulators should consider potential innovation harms of intervention, they should not shy away from bold action to promote innovation in protomarkets that otherwise might never develop.

Non-native, exotic or introduced species fall into the category of aliens, whereas an invasive species is an alien that gives rise to ecological, economic, health or other concerns as a result of its establishment and spread, or has the potential to do so. Their effects include predation, competition and displacement, or hybridization with natives, as well as the transmission of parasites or pathogens. In cases where aliens are ecological engineers, the ramifications of their establishment are such that food-web architecture is disrupted, causing shifts in ecosystem structure and function. Predators (often piscivores) can cause marked changes in lakes (such as Victoria), but filter-feeing bivalves are also nuisance species. Fishes (often deliberately stocked), molluscs, crayfishes and other crustaceans, as well as aquatic macrophytes are frequently invasive, but aliens include a broad array of taxa. Both lakes and rivers in almost all continents are affected, especially those subject to human modification or with compromised water quality. The outcome of such invasions is replacement of natives, and on-going biotic homogenization of a formerly diverse global biota.

While the C40 has come to claim a position of global leadership based on a demonstrated ability to generate coordinated action and collective effort, the description of the network presented in Chapter 1 signals that this has not always been the case. This chapter explores the early phase of the C40 (2005-2009) in which the network was characterized by uneven participation and an inability to engender network-wide engagement and coordination. Applying the theory of global urban governance fields brings to light the dynamics of competition and political contestation and links the observed lack of coordination to an inability to achieve convergence around a common identity. The Clinton Climate Initiative and the C40 Chair (occupied by the cities of London and Toronto) and Secretariat each sought to project divergent ideas with respect to how cities of the C40 should “do” global climate governance, yet neither was able to leverage the mechanism of recognition to effectively claim authority and give shape and substance to the governance field. As a result, the governance field remained fragmented and uncoordinated; split, as with so many other city-networks, into a small group of leading cities and a large group of laggards.

This chapter discusses the causes and consequences of financial innovation. Financial innovation involves creating and popularising new financial instruments, as well as new financial technologies, institutions, and markets. There has been a recent increase in financial technology (FinTech), which combines changes in customer contact, for instance using mobile apps, with big data and new methodologies for handling the data. Competition, regulation and deregulation, and technological advances are important drivers of financial innovation. Competition stimulates financial institutions to develop new products and processes. Since regulation may forbid or otherwise restrain financial innovation, deregulation may spur innovation. Indeed, several innovations have been the result of attempts to circumvent regulation. And technological advances have made new instruments possible. While innovation can help foster growth and economic prosperity, some innovative financial instruments have been blamed for their role in the global financial crisis.

This chapter presents evidence on individual psychological attributes and preferences of men and women which combine to identify the female ‘style of leadership‘. It then focuses on women as decision-makers in business positions and presents empirical analysis to test some of the predictions of the impact of female leadership on firms’ outcomes using rigorous identification strategies. The empirical analysis is organized by outcome: firms’ business performance, firms’ social and sustainability performance, firms’ international performance (export and trade) and labour market outcomes. Cross-country analysis with fixed effects as well as more detailed country analyses for two selected countries, Norway and Italy, are provided.