Chapter 9 explores the hospital as an economic entity. The chapter discusses the differences between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, the organization of hospital workforces, and how the for-profit/not-for-profit distinction interacts with the organization. Then the chapter explores how different parties involved with the hospital seek to exert influence over how hospital resources are used: what they want and how they get it. Finally, the chapter covers topics in how hospitals operate within the sector: hospital growth, hospital competition, and operation of hospital systems.

Chapter 12 deals with how prices are set within the healthcare sector. Prices do not come from direct interaction between buyers and sellers but are instead arrived at via a complex negotiation process between multiple parties. This chapter covers the lifecycle of a medical bill, the role of chargemasters (master price lists) in billing, how providers negotiate with insurers, and how the uninsured are treated in billing. The chapter then discusses price competition and quality competition between providers, as well as the role of price transparency.

The economies of scope and scale of finance combined with the network effects of data and technology create benefits and pose risks toccompetition within financial markets. The same FinTech economies that reduce costs and increase efficiencies often contribute to decreasing competition in FinTech market segments. This market concentration is at odds with key objectives of financial regulation, including market efficiency, investor/client protection, and systemic risk prevention, and may require regulators to intervene.

This chapter examines the conflictual context of the slave trade on the Loango coast. European slave merchants competed with each other, and French slave merchants from various ports clashed as well. French slave traders provided local agents with goods that had local demand and also attempted to respond to the specific tastes of local rulers and agents, to whom they paid customs, often referred to as presents. When these arrangements failed, ship captains did not hesitate to give themselves the upper hand by sabotaging their European rivals. The chapter shows how, on occasion, French traders also physically assaulted even their compatriots by stealing their cargos of commodities and human beings. Despite European pressures to monopolize the trade in the region, the rulers of Ngoyo, Kakongo, and Loango kept significant control over their territories during the eighteenth century. However, on some occasions, Ngoyo’s Woyo residents of Cabinda supported the French to fight the Portuguese who also attempted to control the region. Likewise, in some situations, local traders sided with specific French traders in detriment of others as well. Understanding these conflicts is central to grasp the importance of gifts of prestige and local agents in the trade of enslaved Africans on the Loango coast.

Leisure time and social affairs were of paramount importance for enslaved people; in these spaces they developed positive personal identities and meaningful relationships with others. The significance of competition in leisure activities, however, with its attendant emphasis on contest, and even conflict, meant the identities forged in these spaces were neither static nor fixed in time. Competition involves putting your reputation on the line and, regardless of any sense of shared honor through participation, to lose is to be publicly revealed as having been mastered by another. Enslaved people who had valued their physical prowess or mental aptitude as allowing them to demonstrate themselves as the best in the community might struggle in the face of challenges from younger rivals or simply from time itself. Younger members of the community might see in their elders a rival to supplant, and, in doing so, a hierarchy they might stand atop. Such conflicts demonstrate the necessity of intersectional analysis when exploring enslaved social dynamics and identities, wherein age must be incorporated as much as the well-studied categories of gender, class, and race.

Chapter 7 examines the detrimental effects that polarization between different groups can have on individuals, groups, communities, and societies. The book thereby contrasts itself with positive perspectives on polarization and conflict in society. One important aspect that may start important instances of group polarization is how to respond to dissenting opinions, and the affective and defensive responses dissenters may trigger. Fairness concerns come with an important dark side. For example, people may go to great lengths to protect their views that they live in fair and just societies and that their group and culture are involved in what is morally right. Indeed, desperately wanting to be involved in what is morally pure can strengthen important aspects of group polarization in our modern society. This is especially the case when groups have clear group boundaries, involve some form of (authoritative or moral) direct leadership, and when group members think their tribe is fighting for a worthy moral cause. Thinking of individuals as members of other groups in abstract terms facilitates enemy thinking between different groups. People tend to adhere more to fairness principles when they act out of their own individual responsibilities than when they feel responsible to defend their group interests.

Utilitarian conservation focuses on a few ecological processes: population regulation in resource-limited systems, succession, predation, and competition. This approach assumes that nature tends toward equilibrium. According to this balance-of-nature mindset, populations are regulated by density-dependent processes. Exponential population growth can generate high numbers quickly, but competition for limiting resources generally keeps populations near the carrying capacity of their environment. In the absence of predation, however, populations may erupt, deplete their food supply, and crash. Similarly, plant associations go through predictable sequences of seral stages culminating in stable climatic climaxes that are able to reproduce themselves indefinitely unless in the absence of disturbances such as fire. Plant associations are groups of interdependent species that all react in the same way to their environment. Utilitarian conservation focuses on keeping populations of economically valuable species such as game animals and commercially harvested trees in balance with their environment.

New information and evidence challenge equilibrium models. Fluctuations among livestock in African rangelands and northern fur seals in the Pacific Ocean do not conform to models of competition for resources maintaining populations in equilibrium. Rather than the self-interested competition for resources predicted by the tragedy of the commons, many societies regulate resource use through cooperative arrangements. Evidence from several disciplines undermines the concept of a stable climax association that perpetuates itself indefinitely. Some so-called climax communities depend on disturbances, including natural or anthropogenic burning. Some ecosystems have multiple stable states, and some reach irreversible tipping points, which are becoming more likely because of climate change. Viewing nature as in flux rather than in balance addresses these issues, while the current scale of environmental change infuses a sense of urgency into these discussions.

Interorganizational coordination is increasingly viewed as crucial to frontline crisis response. Contemporary crises often require the collective action of multiple organizations. Many researchers recommend integrating frontline responders of diverse organizations to make good use of scarce resources and synchronize their actions. In practice, frontline responders frequently choose fragmentation by dividing responsibilities and limiting interactions instead. This allows them to implement a fast response without being dependent on others. At the same time, it can lead to safety risks and suboptimal outcomes. Frontline responders face a dilemma, because they have an interest in pursuing both integration and fragmentation. It is useful to note that coordination may not always be the right course of action in a crisis. Even if it is, it does not necessarily need to be formal, as much coordination emerges in the operational field. For more structured ways of coordinating, the nature of the crisis and existing interorganizational relations are useful guides in how to organize the coordination. Generally, it must be conditional upon the situation at hand.

In this chapter I first draw from the results of the study of the Byzantine icon to establish the definition of an “iconic mediation” in general. In a second move, I then dissolve the adequation model of mediation, or “seashell model” as inherently iconoclastic. I also outline key assumptions held by the “sonic resonance” model of mediation in Gadamer and the “window” mediation of Marion, concluding neither of them are adequate to account for the mediation of the icon. I thus develop a new schema of mediation, based on the model of a love letter, to guide our understanding of the paradoxical character of iconic mediation which preserves the visceral tension between “everything matters” and “nothing matters.” The love letter, like the icon, can be understood rigorously, but only from a higher point of view, from the horizon of love.

This chapter looks at the distribution of epichoric alphabets across the whole Aegean Basin, to the different styles of letter shapes used for writing the Greek language according to city of origin. The whole distribution is considered, and in comparing this to models used in previous generations the case is made that the situation is so complex that it cannot so easily be sketched out on a simple map. In focusing on case studies from sanctuaries and harbours, the long-held view is confirmed that these were places of hyper-connectivity, with communities and individuals competing for status – but that network analysis marks these patterns even more acutely. A wider point about data modelling is also made in this chapter. Depending on how representative one considers the data to be, very different patterns can be drawn (and very different conclusions can be reached).

Common ownership is the talk of the town in antitrust land. The competitive implications of rival firms being partially owned and controlled by a small set of overlapping owners are both fascinating and hotly contested. Could the source of potential harm be minority shareholder control in a setting of widely held companies? Critics question the extent and mechanisms of common owners’ influence driving any pro- or anticompetitive effects. This chapter aims to present a comprehensive account of partial ownership, capturing the incentives and effects of both individual and institutional investors and also cross- and common shareholding. It illustrates the early historical unity between corporate and competition laws in regulating shareholding acquisitions but also their progressive quiet disconnect. Triggered by the contemporary common ownership (hypo)thesis, it puts forward a taxonomy of shareholding types and their control characteristics from a competition law perspective, with emphasis on commonly thought passive and diversified investment holdings. The chapter concludes by urging competition and corporate governance and finance policymakers towards harmonic regulatory solutions to address common ownership. It also offers a quantum theory of the corporate property “atom”, drawing cautionary tales about the dynamic and ambiguous qualities of minority common shareholding for antitrust enforcers.

This chapter highlights the potential anti-competitive risks raised by interlocking directorates between competitors (companies having common board members). Although in the US, Section 8 of the Clayton Act specifically prohibits interlocks among competitors, there is no such prohibition in Europe. The main claim of this chapter is that there may be an enforcement gap around anti-competitive effects of interlocking directorates in Europe. A review of relevant provisions shows that interlocking directorates are likely to fall short of EU competition law. In addition, national corporate laws, as well as tools of corporate governance may be of limited use to remedy competitive concerns. This chapter concludes with a discussion of research avenues that would inform suggestions for reforms.