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This chapter introduces the backdrop to the achievements and challenges experienced as ASEAN has intensified its program of harmonising minimum standards of consumer protection across Southeast Asia, especially over the last decade. A key factor outlined is economic integration both among ASEAN member states and with their wider regional and global economies. Yet diversity among member states (demographics, economic development, legal and political systems, NGOs and press freedom) can influence the timing and extent of consumer law reform and implementation in each country. The chapter ends with summaries of the scope and key lessons of the remaining substantive chapters (examining product safety regulation, consumer contracts, financial and health services, and interaction of consumer law with competition law) as well as the concluding chapter (adding proposals for enhancing more public-private ‘shared regional value’).
Consumer product safety law has become a core element of consumer protection law in almost all ASEAN member states. Reforms began by creating post-market intervention powers for consumer affairs regulators, allowing them to ban or recall goods found to be unsafe; and sometimes pre-market powers, to set minimum safety standards. Yet many general consumer affairs regulators still lack capacity and jurisdiction, especially for pre-market powers, limiting capacity to exercise even post-market regulatory powers and to engage in proliferating cross-border standard-setting networks. The Chapter also examines the relationship between regulators and NGOs, as well as with private litigants who may wish to turn instead to the court system to obtain relief for harm from unsafe goods. Five ASEAN states have enacted strict product liability legislation. Indeed, although inspired by 1985 European Union legislation, the versions in Southeast Asia generally are more pro-plaintiff in various ways. Yet there are almost no court filings. Appendices present two extended case studies: informal networks promoting food standards and safety, and formal agreements harmonising cosmetics regulation.
The question of legal ‘style’ is a central one in comparative law, as mainstream comparative law tends to downplay its importance. The kinds of comparative law scholarship that have attracted most attention in the last decades – the ‘harmonisation projects’ and the ‘legal origins’ literature (perhaps also the ‘legal formant’ literature) – indeed adopt a functionalistic approach to legal systems, whereby only the outcome of judicial decisions (and the factors causally feeding into them) matters – that is, their style does not. This narrow perspective has led to arguments in favour of harmonisation of law worldwide – the thesis according to which law everywhere does and should converge so as to facilitate transnational commerce and globalisation more generally. I propose to argue that legal style matters, as law is about much more than just resolving disputes. Specifically, it is also, and most importantly, a collective statement of identity. To illustrate, I plan on analysing some of the most striking stylistic differences between French and English law, and outline the different such statements emerging from them.
The first chapter introduces the problem to which the book responds: the ongoing exclusion of indigenous groups in many parts of the world from legal and policy frameworks determining the right to use water on their lands. The chapter presents the problem using academic and policy debates about indigenous water rights and the regulation of water while explaining how the comparative experiences considered in the book provide new perspectives on the reasons why indigenous water rights are needed, and the role law might play to provide for them.
Mary Ann Glendon is a prolific and broad-ranging scholar who has also made important forays into public service on behalf of the United States and the Holy See. Her scholarly work can be best understood not as the systematic development or application of a particular jurisprudential school of thought, but rather as the painstaking work of pursuing a series of insights into the transitions to be made in law and in society, across a broad range of discrete topics, around the turn of the twenty-first century. Certain persistent and coherent themes have animated and united her work, especially ideas that resonate deeply with Catholic social thought. Across her scholarly writing on labor and property law, family law, the legal profession, constitutional law, and international human rights, she has remained persistently concerned with the role and importance of mediating institutions of civil society, especially families, with the systemic relationships between law and society, and with the unique importance of comparative methods to help arrive at a sound balance between universal ideals of justice, liberty, and dignity, on the one hand, and the value of the diversity and particularity of local communities, on the other.
The existing international scope of English freezing injunctions in support of foreign proceedings is excessively claimant-friendly and inconsistent with the need for a level playing field in litigation. The English courts must reconsider the current boundaries of relief by taking into account an international systemic perspective of the purpose of private international law rules. This requires a multilateral and horizontal approach to the existence of jurisdiction rather than the unilateral and vertical approach that exists under the rules of jurisdiction of English national law. The traditional justifications for the availability of collateral freezing injunctions with respect to assets located abroad rest on a series of fundamental theoretical flaws. This article proposes a range of reforms with the aim of strengthening the equality of the parties and eliminating encroachment on the sovereignty of foreign States.
In the law, as in other domains, the predominance of English is both a gift and a curse. Ours is an age of global rapprochement, at least in the literal sense, brought about by technology. As national borders become increasingly porous, the possibility of conversations across legal cultures has never been more interesting or relevant. In no area of the law could this be more apparent than in relation to intellectual property, which is intimately connected with technological developments. English, as a shared language, makes these conversations possible – however halting or incomplete they might be – promising to enrich the understanding of law on all sides.
Additional opinions (AOs) – dissenting opinions, separate opinions and declarations, whether authored individually or jointly – are a distinctive characteristic of the ICJ’s jurisprudence. Few decisions of the International Court of Justice (the Court, ICJ) are delivered without any additional opinion attached to it. Yet, despite their ubiquity, there is still significant disagreement as to their relationship to the authority of the Court and its decisions. Although this disagreement is commonly attributed to the different approaches and attitudes traditionally associated with the ‘civil law’ and ‘common law’ traditions, few ask specifically why those traditions take the approach they do, and even fewer consider the appropriateness of the extension of those attitudes to the ICJ, which of course is neither ‘civil law’ nor ‘common law’. In this article, using the work of Mirjan Damaška, I offer a contextually coherent and contextually contingent understand of the theory and practice of additional opinions at the ICJ upon which engagement with this practice – by judges, scholars and practitioners – can be premised. This effort to understand the relationship between additional opinions and institutional authority will, by its very nature, lead to a broader enquiry into the very nature of institutional authority at the ICJ. Having explained the importance of AOs to the structural integrity of the Court’s authority, I will close this article by highlighting the role of various stakeholders when engaging with that practice to ensure that their institutional function is discharged.
In light of the recent rise of destruction and looting of cultural property, a need for formalized heritage protection has arisen. Increasingly popular in the debate has become the instrument of international assistance known as “safe havens.” These temporary refuges for at-risk cultural goods in a third country have recently been implemented by Switzerland, France, the United States, and the Association of Art Museum Directors. We assess the contributions and shortcomings of these four regimes using a comparative approach. Mainly, we find that, despite variations in their scope and structure, none of the models accounts entirely for today’s major difficulties in protecting endangered cultural properties. We draw recommendations for future safe haven states against the backdrop of the existing models and hope to see the instrument used in practice as a way to safely isolate cultural property from destructive conflicts.
In recent years there has been a trend towards independent and more transparent ethical regulation for sitting judges, which is said to promote public confidence in the judicial institution, and reflect a move towards accountability and transparency as judicial values. However, regimes governing sitting judges largely fall away when the judge retires from the bench. Increasing longevity and rising numbers of former judges raise complex ethical regulation questions. Drawing on judicial ethics regimes in England and Wales, Australia, the United States and New Zealand, and instances where the conduct of former judges has reflected poorly on the integrity of the judiciary, this article argues that there are strong reasons for extending ethics regulation beyond judicial retirement. By reference to the principles that inform the rules regulating the conduct of sitting judges, we investigate the extent to which misconduct and disciplining regimes should extend to former judges, and whether there is a stronger role for soft instruments and more formalized processes for regulating former judges. In doing so, we propose a model for the development of ethical regulation for former judges.
It is frequently assumed that legal transplants can help law makers in choosing the best ideas from elsewhere in the world. However, this paper suggests that there can also be cases of ‘malicious legal transplants’. It explains why such transplants emerge and how they may be prevented. This discussion fills a gap in the normative debate about legal transplants: while it is valuable to identify good models, it is equally important to understand how the impact of malicious ideas can be prevented.
As States that use the death penalty liberally in a world that increasingly favours abolition, the Muslim-majority jurisdictions that are strict exponents of Islamic law and the People's Republic of China share a crucial commonality: their frequent use of victim–perpetrator reconciliation agreements to remove convicted murderers from the threat of execution. In both cases, rather than a prisoner's last chance at escaping execution being recourse to executive clemency, victim–perpetrator reconciliation agreements fulfil largely the same purpose, together with providing means of compensating victims for economic loss, and enabling the State concerned to reduce execution numbers without formally limiting the death penalty's scope in law. Utilizing the functionalist approach of comparative law methodology, this article compares the 13 death penalty retentionist nations that have incorporated Islamic law principles into their positive criminal law with the People's Republic of China, as to the functions underpinning victim–perpetrator reconciliation agreements in death penalty cases.
While histories of ideas in premodern perspectives habitually understood history as divisions of fixed periods, modernists tend to narrate these histories in terms of flowing streams curving through timelines, intersections, and junctions. Crucial moments, accordingly, are turns and returns, shifts and orientations. I am not sure what it takes to diagnose and proclaim an intellectual turn or how to affirm or refute such a phenomenon, but I take the audacious risk and argue that the last couple of decades have seen a “legal turn” in the study of religions—a renewed focus on legal aspects of religion that includes legal concepts, theories, and practices.
Three common law countries—the UK, Canada and Australia—have significantly expanded citizenship revocation laws as a counterterrorism response. This article provides a detailed examination of these laws, their development and their use. It also explores and critiques the extent to which the laws shift citizenship away from fundamental common law principles, and the means by which such a shift has been justified.
In an era when relations between men and women are governed by the principles of equality and liberty, we may ask whether it is appropriate to preserve a post-divorce support entitlement between spouses, and what justification there is for doing so. European legislation is not very forthcoming in this regard, and this means that looking for the justification for entitlement to an allowance to compensate for financial disparities calls for a tool to be developed first that would identify that justification. After testing a two-option model in which the traditional support and compensation functions of a post-divorce financial allowance were contrasted and finding that this model did not provide a useful comparison between the selected European legal systems, a second, three-option model was developed and applied to those systems. The second model distinguishes the support, compensation and insurance justifications and can identify more pronounced differences. However, this does not mean that there are any noteworthy differences among the various post-divorce allowances in terms of the amounts awarded.
This article examines the problem of the law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement. The cases of Sulamérica in the English Court of Appeal and of FirstLink in the High Court of Singapore demonstrate that leading arbitration jurisdictions around the world can come to diametrically opposite results. In particular, there are currently diverging views as to whether the law applicable to the arbitration agreement should be the law chosen by the parties to govern their substantive legal relationship or the law of the seat of the arbitration. The issue is unlikely to be settled soon at international level. However, without embracing extreme approaches that purport to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement without reference to any national legal system, a more ‘transnational’ approach should be encouraged. This may emerge, based on three structured principles which would be desirable for international convergence, namely the non-discrimination principle, the estoppel principle and the validation principle. These principles can be developed without conflicting with the conventional conflicts-of-laws approach which was adopted by the English Court of Appeal in Sulamérica.
Global laws are an important inspiration for commercial law reforms around the world. Much analysis of this phenomenon emphasizes the capacity of regulatory élites, such as lawmakers, courts and lawyers, to adapt global laws to local conditions. What is often absent from this top-down analysis is a wide-ranging consideration of what the regulated think about global laws. This article aims to redress this shortcoming in the comparative literature by drawing fresh perspectives from bottom-up responses to global laws. It takes from socio-legal scholarship a framework for analysing the interface between thought formation and social action and explores the question—how do the regulated conceptualize and localize global laws? If compliance is socially constructed from below, as this literature suggests, then attempts to understand legal globalization by focusing exclusively on regulatory élites misses much of the localization story.