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I argue that Aristotle thinks of perception as veridical, and that phantasia – as a secondary motion consequent on perception – is responsible for all sensory error. I neutralize passages where Aristotle seems to countenance misperception by defending what I call an “object-oriented reading,” which holds that though Aristotle says we can make errors about the objects of perception, he is not committed to thinking that we can perceive them erroneously, as there are faculties besides perception (including phantasia) that engage with the objects of perception. According to the object-oriented reading, apparent misperception results when a false phantasia is mistaken for a perception, something that is possible due to the similarities between perception and phantasia. Nonetheless, since the faculties are distinct, perception remains veridical. I also address how this conception of phantasia can explain Aristotle’s appeals to phantasia in contexts like memory, thought, and animal motion.
In De Anima II.6, Aristotle divides perceptibles into three kinds: “special” perceptibles such as colors, sounds, and flavors, which can be perceived in their own right by only one sense; “common” perceptibles such as shapes, sizes, and movements, which can be perceived in their own right by multiple senses; and “incidental” perceptibles, such as the son of Diares, which can be perceived only “incidentally.” In this chapter, I explain what this division amounts to. First, I argue Aristotle’s distinction between perceiving something in its own right and perceiving it incidentally marks a causal distinction: what is perceived in its own right causes perception as such, while what is perceived incidentally coincides with what is perceived in its own right. Second, I argue that, for Aristotle, special perceptibles, unlike common ones, belong to homogeneous bodies on account of their chemical composition and affect sense organs along a range between contrary extremes. Finally, I explain the primacy Aristotle assigns to special perceptibles and his claim that perception of them alone is free from error. I conclude with some brief reflections on the primary/secondary quality distinction.
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