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To exercise its responsibilities effectively in the global interest, the legislative function in a reformed United Nations will require supporting advisory mechanisms for specialized scientific, technical and other expertise. Moreover, a strong civil society voice including nongovernmental organizations has been shown to contribute constructively to global policy-making; a Chamber of Civil Society could thus play a central advisory role to the General Assembly. The goal will be to ensure an effective UN decision-making capacity, based on the best available knowledge and analysis, to address global challenges. Additional supporting mechanisms are necessary to support this process; advisory bodies made up of individuals with established expertise would initially focus their efforts on several pressing global catastrophic risks, including climate change, the deterioration of the environment, nuclear proliferation and the peace and security challenges this raises. An excellent precedent in this area is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In the scientific domain beyond pressing global catastrophic risks, the General Assembly will need to have a number of general advisory mechanisms to provide additional specialized expertise, supplemented by an ethical advisory process in an Office of Ethical Assessment, to provide analysis of the ethical implications of issues under consideration.
Among the social challenges facing humanity, population and migration are at the root of many problems. Globalization has very significantly advanced across a range of areas, except with respect to the free movement of people. Extreme inequality has maintained rapid population growth in some regions, while in others the falling birth rate is leading to a rapid aging of the population. The anticipated global population of up to 11 billion in this century could only be supported with fundamental changes in lifestyles, consumption patterns, social relationships, institutions and value systems towards social justice and equity. Regional and global carrying capacities must be respected. Migration should be seen not as a threat but as an opportunity for both migrants and receiving communities. Large-scale, environmentally induced migrations can be anticipated and planned for to reduce human suffering.
This chapter addresses the question of funding the operations of the United Nations. It reviews the early history of UN funding and the systems that emerged as a result of the constraints that the UN Charter imposed on its members, with specific reference to the jurisdiction given to the General Assembly on budgetary issues under the one country–one vote system. The structure of the UN budget is also reviewed, as regards both sources and uses of funds, with updated data for 2017. The history of various funding mechanisms put forth in the postwar period is analyzed, including: Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn’s proposals contained in World Peace Through World Law; an examination of the advantages of the model currently used in the European Union, which itself evolved over time into a system of reliable, independent funding; a discussion of the merits of a Tobin-like tax on financial transactions to fund not only UN operations but also other development needs; and a system that would allocate resources to the UN as a fixed proportion of each member’s gross national income (GNI), without the multiple exemptions and carve-outs that are in place in today’s convoluted system of revenue generation.
Agentialism about self-knowledge (hereafter simply “agentialism”) is the view that key to understanding our capacity for self-knowledge is appreciating the connection between that capacity and our identities as rational agents—as creatures for whom believing, intending, desiring, and so on are manifestations of a capacity to be responsive to reasons. This connection, agentialists maintain, consists in the fact that coming to know our own minds involves an exercise of our rational capacities in the service of answering the relevant first-order question. Agentialists face the task of accounting for the connection between our identities as rational agents and our capacity to know our stored beliefs. It’s plausible that one comes to know that one believes that p by exercising one’s rational capacities in those cases where the belief that p is formed on the basis of present consideration of the reasons for and against p. But what exactly is the relevance of our rational capacities in the case where one has already formed the belief in question? In this paper I provide an answer to this question. That answer involves an appeal to a particular model of memory. According to the model I favor, memory preserves, in addition to the content of one’s beliefs, one’s commitment to their truth.
This paper focuses on the problem of skin corrosion on the upper wing surfaces of rib-stiffened aircraft. For maritime and military transport aircraft this often results in multiple co-located repairs. The common approach to corrosion damage in operational aircraft is to blend out the corrosion and rivet a mechanical doubler over the region. In particular this paper describes the results of a combined numerical and experimental investigation into the ability of the additive metal technology, Supersonic Particle Deposition (SPD), to restore the load-carrying capacity of rib-stiffened wing planks with simulated skin corrosion. The experimental results reveal that unrepaired skin corrosion can result in failure by yielding. The experimental results also reveal that SPD repairs to skin corrosion can restore the stress field in the structure, and can ensure that the load-carrying capability of the repaired structure is above proof load.
This chapter examines China’s diversity regime which buried its political and cultural diversity in history. For most international relations scholars, China appears as an exception to this volume’s argument on cultural diversity. What is unique about China is not its unity but its precocious capacities for direct rule and military-fiscal extraction which began under the first two unified dynasties: the Qin and the Han. China’s seeming unity is the product of the mutually reinforcing processes of coercive political unification and cultural homogenization. Political unity achieved by military victories produced and reproduced cultural homogeneity. Successful unifiers equated cultural diversity with political troubles and thus sought to level their subjects. A flattened cultural landscape, in turn, legitimated unifiers’ claim to rule ‘all under heaven’. This chapter first outlines China’s cultural plurality in its formative era. It then examines how unified dynasties forged a singular Han culture with an extreme homogenization regime that included mass killings and migrations, standardization of weights and measures, erasure of intellectual diversity, and monopolization of history writing.
− ESG–Agency scholars have identified 20 environmental governance functions performed by agents in earth system governance, with most scholarly attention focused on rule-making and regulation; convening and facilitating participation; and knowledge generation, provision, and sharing. − Forms of governance and multilevel/multiscalar dynamics serve as structural factors that that enable or constrain the performance of agency in earth system governance. − ESG–Agency scholarship over the past decade confirms that the state remains a key agent of earth system governance, despite expectations that the state’s role would diminish with the rise of nonstate actors and the reconfiguration of authority in world politics.
Research has highlighted the role of the state in sustaining authoritarian regimes. But how does state capacity support autocrats during elections? The author argues that one specific aspect of state capacity – control over territory through the state apparatus – helps autocrats ensure large majority electoral victories. High-capacity rulers can rely on local agents and institutions to subtly manipulate elections, for instance by controlling the media or inhibiting the work of domestic election monitors throughout the territory while staying clear of costly manipulation such as election violence. In cross-national analyses of authoritarian multiparty elections from 1946 to 2017, the study finds that state territorial control increases the likelihood of large victories. Furthermore, high levels of state control correlate with subtle strategies of manipulation, including media bias and restrictions on domestic monitors – strategies that are also positively associated with large victories. At the same time, state control is negatively associated with election violence.
This chapter provides an overview of forensic mental health assessments in criminal, civil, and juvenile and family court settings. We begin with a general discussion of the nature and method of forensic assessment, highlighting the various data sources on which a forensic assessment is based and the hypothesis testing nature of the evaluation process. We then turn to an overview of the most common types of assessments conducted within the criminal forensic context (adjudicative competence, criminal responsibility, risk assessment and management), the civil forensic context (personal injury, disability determination, worker’s compensation), and the juvenile and family court contexts (parenting capacity, child custody, juvenile waiver to criminal court). Finally, we end with a general discussion of the importance of the written evaluation report.
Many autocratic states cultivate networks of informants and operatives who have responsibility over small local cells. This chapter shows how the Chinese state has constructed a modern system of infiltration organized around sub-village cells. This decentralized system of informal control enables local officials to closely monitor local society. Case study and quantitative evidence show how village cell leaders help local officials implement policies including land confiscation and family planning quotas. Hiring more informants and putting them in charge of smaller cells, while costly, increases compliance with state policies. This strategy of infiltration is largely a substitute for cultivating and co-opting civil society.
In this concluding chapter, I briefly recap the main findings and then examine their broader implications. The case of Wukan Village shows how the strategy of informal control can be effective in the short run but backfire in the long run. The most effective check on autocratic state power is unlikely to come from the state itself, but from an adversarial relationship between local civil society and the state. Independent community leaders and activists who can mobilize their groups and threaten officials with broad-based political mobilization can even the balance of power between the state and society, and create meaningful incentives for responsiveness.
In this chapter, I turn my attention to the dynamics of co-optation of local notables. One might expect that the inclusion of communal elites in local political institutions might strengthen the voice of villagers and make local governments more responsive. By contrast, I argue that when communal elites are included in formal political institutions in rural China, they help the state control their group. Drawing on evidence from case studies, an original experiment, and a national dataset, I show how the inclusion of local elites in formal political bodies allows the state to requisition land and enforce family planning policy while forestalling collective action. Case studies from Scotland and the United States suggest that this mechanism of informal control may have applicability beyond China. When the leaders of communal groups remain outside the state, however, they can help to organize resistance against it.
This chapter contrasts and compares the ways different colonial states in West Africa developed local fiscal capacity. We show that per capita revenues were higher in the more commercialised coastal export economies than in remote parts of the interior. We argue that British and French approaches to fiscal expansion differed partly because opportunities to tax trade were lower in French West Africa, where a larger share of the revenues were drawn from direct taxes, usually in combination with mandatory labour services or forced cultivation programmes. The imposition of a federal system in the French-ruled territories created tighter financial ties between the AOF and France than were seen in the British colonies, who enjoyed larger scale advantages in revenue collection based on higher population densities and lower barriers to transport and communication. Despite these differences, all fiscal regimes remained too weak to function as a solid basis for sovereign debt creation by the time of independence. This put the post-colonial states of West Africa in a precarious situation, especially when world market prices for their export commodities dropped in the 1970s, while interest rates on public debt shot up in the 1980s.
This chapter introduces and motivates the main theme of the book and the key questions related to the development of fiscal capacity in colonial Asia and Africa. We situate the colonial fiscal state in the context of the changing world order in the long century between 1850 and 1960. We discuss the historiography and existing theoretical perspectives on fiscal development, arguing that these remain biased towards the European, or Eurasian experience at best. We also summarize the key insights of all the chapters in light of the general patterns that emerge from the comparative perspective adopted in this book. Finally, we formulate a brief future research agenda which identifies the next steps to be taken to improve our understanding of the various ways in which fiscal states have developed across the globe since the mid-nineteenth century.
How do authoritarian governments control society? How, in turn, can citizens control the state? The conventional wisdom is that a strong civil society increases citizen control over their governments, even in autocracies. The central argument of this book, by contrast, is that in autocratic states, civil society groups can give officials leverage over citizens and strengthen the state’s coercive capacity. This chapter explains how autocrats from China to Hungary to Venezuela to Russia have used civil society groups to strengthen authoritarian control. These institutions allow autocrats to reduce protest and implement coercive policies by giving authoritarian leaders moral authority and by helping them monitor society. Autocrats use three key tactics of “informal control”: they cultivate civil society groups, co-opt their leaders, and create parallel institutions of infiltration.
This chapter lays out a theory of political control. How does the Chinese state control protest and implement policies such as sweeping urbanization schemes that displace millions or family planning quotas that restrict the reproductive choices of half the population? Scholars of authoritarian regimes like China have often focused on coercive institutions that strengthen state capacity. In this book, by contrast, I focus on everyday, informal methods of coercion. “Informal institutions of control” created by civil society groups encourage obedience by calling on the obligations, allegiances, and bonds that non-state groups create. Drawing on evidence from qualitative case studies, the chapter illustrates the three mechanisms through which informal control occurs: cultivating civil society groups, co-opting local notables, and infiltrating society. Informal control fosters compliance with the state but it can backfire in the long run by creating grievances and linking activists to each other. Finally, I explain how the state strategically deploys each of these strategies.
Cultivating civil society – encouraging the establishment of non-state groups like churches, temples, or civic associations – can strengthen the state’s informal control over society. In this chapter, I show how local officials in China encourage the establishment of lineage associations, temple organizations, and social clubs as a way to infiltrate local society and increase their informal authority. I draw on case studies and a national dataset to show how the presence of these groups helps local officials requisition land and suppress protest. Governments outside China, from Asia to Latin America, have engaged in similar forms of informal control, suggesting the theory may not be limited to China. The flip-side of informal control is that if communities lack strong social organizations, activists can find creative ways to mount spontaneous, leaderless resistance.
This chapter illustrates how the impulse of Chinese financing and contractors on the delivery of infrastructure megaprojects has given a different development option to African governments. I ground the findings on a detailed study of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) built by Kenya, with Chinese assistance, between 2014 and 2017. The project was originally turned down by traditional lenders (the World Bank) based on a narrow cost–benefit analysis. I trace the ability of the Kenyan–Chinese project organisation to navigate the institutional voids in the environment, and rivalry between neighbouring countries, through a powerful and centralised organisation structure. I also show, though, that the detachment of this hierarchical authority from the institutional environment comes with a real cost that imperils the potential of the project organisation to catalyse broader socio-economic growth. Still, the case suggests that a centralised approach delivers outcomes for a reasonable cost. It effectively builds an option for further future development. This, I argue, makes the Chinese approach a viable alternative to the inclusive institutional approach espoused by traditional lenders.