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This study describes the presence of the royal cucumber Parastichopus regalis (Cuvier, 1817) in The Natural Park of Ria Formosa (NPRF), Portugal. A single individual was observed during a monitoring scuba dive at a depth of 3 m inside this shallow mesotidal lagoon. The most plausible explanation for this occurrence is attributed to the rejection by trawlers when returning to their home port from their fishing grounds. This marine species has a deeper distribution outside the lagoon and is commonly captured as by-catch and subsequently discarded. This study also alerts us to the growing presence of non-indigenous species and the emergent threat of new invasions, highlighting the need to adopt biosecurity measures, like good practices for fishers when dealing with discards to avoid new species introductions in this fragile coastal marine habitat.
Safe vaccines are critical for biosecurity protection, yet adverse events—rightly or wrongly attributed to immunization—potentially cause rapid loss of confidence, reduced vaccine uptake, and resurgence of preventable disease. Effective vaccine safety incident management is essential to provide assessment and lead appropriate actions to ensure vaccination programs are safe and mitigate unwarranted crisis escalation that could damage vaccine programs and the effective control of vaccine preventable disease outbreaks or pandemics. Incident management systems (IMS) are used globally to direct emergency management response, particularly for natural disasters of fire, flood, and storm. Public health is equally an emergency response and can therefore benefit from these command control constructs. While examples of IMS for outbreak response and mass immunization logistics exist, there is little to no information on their use in vaccine safety. We describe Australia’s vaccine safety Alert Advisory Group establishment in Victoria during the COVID-19 pandemic and onward embedding into routine practice, anticipant of new vaccines, and the next biosecurity threat.
Our paper sheds light on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) cooperation among trading countries. We contribute to the existing literature a data-driven analysis on the effectiveness of various forms (in monetary value, duration, and diversification) of SPS related technical assistance received by 33 countries from 1993 to 2015. The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) SPS Agreement encourages biosecurity for countries through technical assistance, to safeguard human health and productivity from contamination by biological hazards (pests, pathogens, or invasive species). Our panel model finds that WTO's SPS program encourages simultaneously agricultural trade and biosecurity. We implement a Multiple Indicator Solution (MIS) to correct bias from the endogenous technical assistance. The effectiveness of technical assistance depends on geography and the level of development among the heterogeneous countries referred to in our data. This investment in biosecurity benefits both donors and recipients of technical assistance. Based on our results donors should be encouraged to invest in countries with below average resources and abilities.
The Covid-19 pandemic saw a surge in cyber attacks targeting pharmaceutical companies and research organisations working on vaccines and treatments for the virus. Such attacks raised concerns around the (in)security of bioinformation (e.g. genomic data, epidemiological data, biomedical data, and health data) and the potential cyberbio risks resulting from stealing, compromising, or exploiting it in hostile cyber operations. This article critically investigates threat discourses around bioinformation as presented in the newly emerging field of ‘cyberbiosecurity’. As introduced by scholarly literature in life sciences, cyberbiosecurity aims to understand and address cyber risks engendered by the digitisation of biology. Such risks include, for example, embedding malware in DNA, corrupting gene-sequencing, manipulating biomedical materials, stealing epidemiological data, or even developing biological weapons and spreading diseases. This article brings the discussion on cyberbiosecurity into the realms of International Relations and Security Studies by problematising the futuristic threat discourses co-producing this burgeoning field and the pre-emptive security measures it advocates, specifically in relation to bioinformation. It analyses how cyberbiosecurity as a concept and field of policy analysis influences the existing securitised governance of bioinformation, the global competition to control it, and the inequalities associated with its ownership and dissemination. As such, the article presents a critical intervention in current debates around the intersection between biological dangers and cyber threats and in the calls for ‘peculiar’ policy measures to defend against cyberbio risks in the ‘new normal’.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States is actively reshaping parts of its national security enterprise. This article explores the underlying politics, with a specific interest in the context of biosecurity, biodefense, and bioterrorism strategy, programs, and response, as the United States responds to the most significant outbreak of an emerging infectious disease in over a century. How the implicit or tacit failure to recognize the political will and political decision-making connected to warfare and conflict for biological weapons programs in these trends is explored. Securitization of public health has been a focus of the literature over the past half century. This recent trend may represent something of an inverse: an attempt to treat national security interests as public health problems. A hypothesis is that the most significant underrecognized problem associated with COVID-19 is disinformation and the weakening of confidence in institutions, including governments, and how adversaries may exploit that blind spot.
Salmonella spp. is a common zoonotic pathogen, causing gastrointestinal infections in people. Pigs and pig meat are a major source of infection. Although farm biosecurity is believed to be important for controlling Salmonella transmission, robust evidence is lacking on which measures are most effective. This study enrolled 250 pig farms across nine European countries. From each farm, 20 pooled faecal samples (or similar information) were collected and analysed for Salmonella presence. Based on the proportion of positive results, farms were categorised as at higher or lower Salmonella risk, and associations with variables from a comprehensive questionnaire investigated. Multivariable analysis indicated that farms were less likely to be in the higher-risk category if they had ‘<400 sows’; used rodent baits close to pig enclosures; isolated stay-behind (sick) pigs; did not answer that the hygiene lock/ anteroom was easy to clean; did not have a full perimeter fence; did apply downtime of at least 3 days between farrowing batches; and had fully slatted flooring in all fattener buildings. A principal components analysis assessed the sources of variation between farms, and correlation between variables. The study results suggest simple control measures that could be prioritised on European pig farms to control Salmonella.
This chapter reviews agricultural policy priorities of increased recent profile and the classification of and constraints on associated support within the Agreement on Agriculture. Many of the evolving priorities are environmental, concerning productivity growth (with implications for sustainability and other priorities), biosecurity, biodiversity, water management and climate change mitigation. The green box offers opportunity to address these priorities through unlimited support for general services and direct payments to producers. Several conceptual and definitional issues arise, including whether limiting payments in certain categories to the amount of losses, costs or income forgone is too restrictive to achieve socially-desired non-trade objectives. If considered too constraining additional provisions could be crafted in the green box. With climate change a predominant priority, making measures exemptible on a mitigation basis alone without requiring that they have at most minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on production might be seen as a way forward.
Chapter 2 considers the extinction crisis, eco-collapse, ecocide, and their consequences for humanity as well as global solutions and what individuals can do.
The term ‘depopulation’ is used in this case to describe mass euthanasia or killing of groups of animals on a farm for emergency disease eradication purposes. There are a number of guidelines for monitoring animal welfare during such operations, eg the OIE Terrestrial Health Code and the EU regulation on protection of animals at the time of killing, which can be useful when designing a specific monitoring system for depopulation. In this paper, the responsibilities of the competent authorities are identified, and a systematic approach to monitoring on-farm killing is proposed, including three major critical points: i) animal handling prior to killing; ii) the stun/kill quality, ie the effectiveness of the method used to render the animals unconscious and dead; and iii) confirmation of death prior to carcase disposal. The importance of good biosecurity routines, efficient disease detection systems, relevant training of staff and thorough contingency planning to prevent animal welfare problems from arising is strongly emphasised. It is the responsibility of national competent authorities to provide the appointed official veterinarians in charge of monitoring animal welfare during depopulation with proper tools, including anything from appropriate knowledge and practical checklists to the authority to demand immediate corrective action when necessary, and to develop systems for feedback and incorporation of experiences from previous outbreaks into the national contingency plans.
Broiler chickens are among the main livestock sectors worldwide. With individual treatments being inapplicable, contrary to many other animal species, the need for antimicrobial use (AMU) is relatively high. AMU in animals is known to drive the emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). High farm biosecurity is a cornerstone for animal health and welfare, as well as food safety, as it protects animals from the introduction and spread of pathogens and therefore the need for AMU. The goal of this study was to identify the main biosecurity practices associated with AMU in broiler farms and to develop a statistical model that produces customised recommendations as to which biosecurity measures could be implemented on a farm to reduce its AMU, including a cost-effectiveness analysis of the recommended measures. AMU and biosecurity data were obtained cross-sectionally in 2014 from 181 broiler farms across nine European countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain). Using mixed-effects random forest analysis (Mix-RF), recursive feature elimination was implemented to determine the biosecurity measures that best predicted AMU at the farm level. Subsequently, an algorithm was developed to generate AMU reduction scenarios based on the implementation of these measures. In the final Mix-RF model, 21 factors were present: 10 about internal biosecurity, 8 about external biosecurity and 3 about farm size and productivity, with the latter showing the largest (Gini) importance. Other AMU predictors, in order of importance, were the number of depopulation steps, compliance with a vaccination protocol for non-officially controlled diseases, and requiring visitors to check in before entering the farm. K-means clustering on the proximity matrix of the final Mix-RF model revealed that several measures interacted with each other, indicating that high AMU levels can arise for various reasons depending on the situation. The algorithm utilised the AMU predictive power of biosecurity measures while accounting also for their interactions, representing a first step toward aiding the decision-making process of veterinarians and farmers who are in need of implementing on-farm biosecurity measures to reduce their AMU.
Restoration of the European native oyster is underway across Europe, and Scotland provides a good example of the current experience and lessons to be learnt for future restoration work. Translocations of shellfish carry inherent risks that must be taken into account when considering whether this is the most appropriate conservation action to take. Marine restoration projects require strict biosecurity protocols to address disease and non-native species risks relevant to both species translocation and associated operations. Native oyster restoration is a long-term commitment and projects need to organise appropriate surveys and consultation periods before starting work, together with long-term monitoring after the initial deployment phase.
Increased global movement of biological materials, coupled with climate change, and other environmental pressures are leading to increasing threats to plants from pests and pathogens. These pests and pathogens are relevant to plant conservation translocations as a source of translocation failure, and because the translocation itself can lead to pest and pathogen transmission. Many plant conservation translocations are relatively low risk, especially those involving the small-scale local movement of plant material between proximal sites. In contrast, plant translocations that involve movement of large amounts of material, and/or large geographical distances or crossing natural ecological barriers, are intrinsically higher risk. Additional high-risk factors include the potential for pest and pathogen transmission to occur at nursery/propagation facilities, especially if the translocated material is held in close proximity to other plants infected with pests and pathogens and/or material sourced from distant localities. Despite the importance of these issues, plant health risks are often not explicitly considered in plant conservation translocations. To support greater awareness and the effective uptake of appropriate biosecurity steps in plant conservation translocations, there is a pressing need to develop generally applicable best-practice guidelines targeted at translocation practitioners.
Conservation translocation - the movement of species for conservation benefit - includes reintroducing species into the wild, reinforcing dwindling populations, helping species shift ranges in the face of environmental change, and moving species to enhance ecosystem function. Conservation translocation can lead to clear conservation benefits and can excite and engage a broad spectrum of people. However, these projects are often complex and involve careful consideration and planning of biological and socio-economic issues. This volume draws on the latest research and experience of specialists from around the world to help provide guidance on best practice and to promote thinking over how conservation translocations can continue to be developed. The key concepts cover project planning, biological and social factors influencing the efficacy of translocations, and how to deal with complex decision-making. This book aims to inspire, inform and help practitioners maximise their chances of success, and minimise the risks of failure.
The apple buprestid, Agrilus mali Matsumura, that was widespread in north-eastern China, was accidently introduced to the wild apple forest ecosystem in mountainous areas of Xinjiang, China. This invasive beetle feeds on domesticated apples and many species of Malus and presents a serious threat to ancestral apple germplasm sources and apple production worldwide. Estimating the potential area at risk of colonization by A. mali is crucial for instigating appropriate preventative management strategies, especially under global warming. We developed a CLIMEX model of A. mali to project this pest's potential distribution under current and future climatic scenarios in 2100 using CSIRO-Mk 3.0 GCM running the SRES A1B emissions scenario. Under current climate, A. mali could potentially invade neighbouring central Asia and eventually the mid-latitude temperate zone, and some subtropical areas and Pampas Steppe in the Southern Hemisphere. This potential distribution encompasses wild apples species, the ancestral germplasm for domesticated apples. With global warming, the potential distribution shifts to higher latitudes, with the potential range expanding slightly, though the overall suitability could decline in both hemispheres. In 2100, the length of the growing season of this pest in the mid-latitude temperature zone could increase by 1–2 weeks, with higher growth rates in most sites compared with current climate in mid-latitudes, at least in China. Our work highlights the need for strategies to prevent the spread of this pest, managing the threats to wild apples in Tian Shan Mountain forests in Central Asia, and commercial apple production globally. We discuss practical management tactics to reduce the spread of this pest and mitigate its impacts.
In the past decade, international actors have launched “brain projects” or “brain initiatives.” One of the emerging technologies enabled by these publicly funded programs is brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), which are devices that allow communication between the brain and external devices like a prosthetic arm or a keyboard. BCIs are poised to have significant impacts on public health, society, and national security. This research presents the first analytical framework that attempts to predict the dissemination of neurotechnologies to both the commercial and military sectors in the United States and China. While China started its project later with less funding, we find that it has other advantages that make earlier adoption more likely. We also articulate national security risks implicit in later adoption, including the inability to set international ethical and legal norms for BCI use, especially in wartime operating environments, and data privacy risks for citizens who use technology developed by foreign actors.
The composition of nonnative floras is influenced by a region’s socioeconomic history, yet rarely are these factors studied alongside plant naturalization rates over time. Such information is especially critical for archipelagos, which often host large numbers of nonnative plants and would benefit from prevention of inter-island spread. We compiled the first record of occurrence and first record of naturalization for all naturalized plants in Hawai‘i alongside data on their origin, native climate types, taxonomy, and likely introduction pathway and compared rates of naturalization with socioeconomic trends. We found that the rate of total plant naturalizations has increased at a roughly constant rate during the past century without any sign of plateauing. However, this relatively steady increase is underlain by notable fluctuations in naturalization rates for different introduction pathways, with ornamentals increasing recently, while agriculture-related plants have decreased. Furthermore, this trend mirrors a shift from an agriculture-dominated economy to a tourism-based one associated with increases in both resident and tourist populations as well as general economic well-being. We further found that the average naturalized species spreads at a rate of 1.86 islands per decade, eventually occupying most major islands in the archipelago, and the rate of spread appears to be increasing since Hawai‘i’s economic shift. Our findings also emphasize the diversity of Hawai‘i’s nonnative flora, which originates from a variety of climates, continents, and taxonomic groups. We demonstrated that many nonnative species have native ranges that include temperate climates, which is important, because these climates typically co-occur with higher-elevation, remnant patches of native-dominated ecosystems in Hawai‘i. This study reveals trends that may help predict a species’ ability to naturalize and spread within and between islands, and we discuss management implications that may be extended to other regions.
Research within security studies has struggled to determine whether infectious disease (ID) represents an existential threat to national and international security. With the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19), it is imperative to reexamine the relationship between ID and global security. This article addresses the specific threat to security from COVID-19, asking, “Is COVID-19 a threat to national and international security?” To investigate this question, this article uses two theoretical approaches: human security and biosecurity. It argues that COVID-19 is a threat to global security by the ontological crisis posed to individuals through human security theory and through high politics, as evidenced by biosecurity. By viewing security threats through the lens of the individual and the state, it becomes clear that ID should be considered an international security threat. This article examines the relevant literature and applies the theoretical framework to a case study analysis focused on the United States.
To date, Antarctica is the only continent to have escaped the COVID-19 pandemic. This was facilitated by the continent's isolation and low human presence, combined with the global emergence of the pandemic at the end of the Antarctic summer season and the rapid action of those national governmental operators and other actors still active on and around the continent during the early phases of the outbreak. Here, we consider the implications of the pandemic for Antarctic governance, national operator logistics, science, tourism and the fishing industry, as well as for Antarctic environmental protection. Global disruption will result in a temporary decrease in human activity in Antarctica, in turn leading to a reduction in environmental impacts for a period, but also a reduced capacity to respond to environmental incidents. Given the diversity of transmission routes and vectors, preventing the introduction of the virus will be difficult, even with stringent quarantine procedures in place, and the risks and implications of virus transmission to Antarctic wildlife are largely unknown. With control of the pandemic a major global challenge, international cooperation will be essential if Antarctica is to remain free of coronavirus.
The flightless midge Eretmoptera murphyi is thought to be continuing its invasion of Signy Island via the treads of personnel boots. Current boot-wash biosecurity protocols in the Antarctic region rely on microbial biocides, primarily Virkon® S. As pesticides have limited approval for use in the Antarctic Treaty area, we investigated the efficacy of Virkon® S in controlling the spread of E. murphyi using boot-wash simulations and maximum threshold exposures. We found that E. murphyi tolerates over 8 h of submergence in 1% Virkon® S. Higher concentrations increased effectiveness, but larvae still exhibited > 50% survival after 5 h in 10% Virkon® S. Salt and hot water treatments (without Virkon® S) were explored as possible alternatives. Salt water proved ineffective, with mortality only in first-instar larvae across multi-day exposures. Larvae experienced 100% mortality when exposed for 10 s to 50°C water, but they showed complete survival at 45°C. Given that current boot-wash protocols alone are an ineffective control of this invasive insect, we advocate hot water (> 50°C) to remove soil, followed by Virkon® S as a microbial biocide on ‘clean’ boots. Implications for the spread of invasive invertebrates as a result of increased human activity in the Antarctic region are discussed.
Global pork production has largely adopted on-farm biosecurity to minimize vectors of disease transmission and protect swine health. Feed and ingredients were not originally thought to be substantial vectors, but recent incidents have demonstrated their ability to harbor disease. The objective of this paper is to review the potential role of swine feed as a disease vector and describe biosecurity measures that have been evaluated as a way of maintaining swine health. Recent research has demonstrated that viruses such as porcine epidemic diarrhea virus and African Swine Fever Virus can survive conditions of transboundary shipment in soybean meal, lysine, and complete feed, and contaminated feed can cause animal illness. Recent research has focused on potential methods of preventing feed-based pathogens from infecting pigs, including prevention of entry to the feed system, mitigation by thermal processing, or decontamination by chemical additives. Strategies have been designed to understand the spread of pathogens throughout the feed manufacturing environment, including potential batch-to-batch carryover, thus reducing transmission risk. In summary, the focus on feed biosecurity in recent years is warranted, but additional research is needed to further understand the risk and identify cost-effective approaches to maintain feed biosecurity as a way of protecting swine health.