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This chapter examines the notion of consent to be bound from the point of view of its motion and change from a classical concept included in the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties (VCLT), to its evolution in modern times. It also analyses the question of reservations to treaties, which was one of the projects of the International Law Commission. The chapter deals with the contentious issue of reservations to human rights treaties. The chapter also demonstrates that since consent to be bound is integral to the whole system of treaty law, it can also be identified in situations where we have an increase (auxesis), diminution (meiosis) or even alteration (alloiosis) of the treaty, as can happen when we are dealing with the system of reservations.
There are important decisions for which you do not have the authority to implement some alternatives that have great appeal to you. Someone else, who I refer to as the authorized decision-maker, controls whether the alternative that you prefer can be implemented. There is an effective way to remove such restrictions. You need to create a specific alternative that includes both the general features of your desired alternative and additional features to make that specific alternative attractive to the authorized decision-maker. You design it to be sufficiently attractive for it to be an alternative that cannot be refused by the authorized decision-maker. Knowing some values of the authorized decision-maker with respect to the decision at hand is a key to create desirable alternatives for him or her. Various procedures to do this are discussed. Value-focused negotiations indicate how knowing your negotiating partner’s values allows you to create win-win alternatives that better achieve their and your objectives. The procedure to generate post-agreement improvements to negotiations is also discussed.
The be like quotative emerged rapidly around the English-speaking world and has quickly saturated the quotative systems of young speakers in multiple countries. We study be like (and its covariants) in two communities – Toronto, Canada, and York, United Kingdom – in apparent time and at two separate points in real time. We trace the apparent-time trajectory of be like and its covariants from inception to saturation. We take advantage of the prodigious size of our dataset to examine understudied aspects of the linguistic factors that condition quotative variation. Building on earlier suggestions (Cukor-Avila 2002; Durham et al.2012) that be like might show patterning over time consistent with the Constant Rate Effect (or CRE, Kroch 1989), we argue that the CRE does indeed apply to the rise of be like, but needs to be handled with care. Logistic modelling assumes that the top of the S-curve is located at 100 per cent of a given variable context. In the case of be like, the saturation point is nearer 75–85 per cent, with minor variants retaining small semantic footholds in the system. In conjunction with our analysis, we suggest how to adapt the predictions of the CRE to changes likely to lead to saturation but not categorical use.
In Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) held that the EU law only requires valid “right to be forgotten” de-referencing requests to be carried out by a search engine operator on search engine versions accessible in EU member states, as opposed to all versions of its search engine worldwide. While the ruling has been perceived as a “win” for Google and other interveners, such as Microsoft and the Wikimedia Foundation, who argued against worldwide de-referencing, the Court also made clear that that while the EU law does not currently require worldwide de-referencing, “it also does not prohibit such a practice” (para. 72). As a result, the CJEU found that an order by a national supervisory or judicial authority of an EU member state requiring worldwide de-referencing in accordance with its own national data protection laws would not be inconsistent with EU law where the data subject's right to privacy is adequately balanced against the right to freedom of information. By leaving the door to extraterritorial de-referencing wide open, the CJEU continues to pursue its post-Snowden hard-line stance on data privacy in a manner that is likely to transform the data privacy landscape.
The chapter concerns steps to consider in preparing to become party to a treaty. It examines the eligibility of States and IOs to participate in multilateral treaties, including scenarios in which eligibility to join a treaty is not clear and what procedures may be used to resolve such issues. The chapter explains the importance of understanding ‘modes of expressing consent to be bound’, and choosing the appropriate mode. It looks at how a treaty may be made by exchange of instruments. Lastly, the chapter considers internal preparations to give consent to be bound for States and IOs, including consultations with stakeholders.
The First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has recently introduced the express promise that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself could directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. There are, however, differences between the Basic Law as the relevant standard of review and other standards of review that are dangerous to ignore. The constitutional status of the FCC’s jurisdiction depends crucially on whether the Court relies on the constitution or on EU fundamental rights. If the constitutional status of the novel jurisdiction covered any binding-effect, and that is a big if, the FCC still would not safeguard the unity and coherence of Union law. Leaving aside the fact that the First Senate is confined to reversing and remanding (unable to enforce anything directly), no beneficial effect on legal certainty grows apparent. Any binding-effect of the novel jurisdiction only provides for consistency without finality. And to venture further into the question: Even if anyone welcomed this novel kind of consistency without finality (virtually “provisional consistency”), this oddish consistency would still be a localized consistency, i.e. in German courts only.
The Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.
The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Right to be forgotten II case is an example of constitutional pluralism in action. It demonstrates how a pluralist-minded court can elevate itself from and above the constitutional confines of its own legal order. By integrating the material standards of another legal order in its own review of constitutionality a national constitutional court contributes directly to the strengthening of the fundamental rights of individuals against the national authorities within the overall system of European legal order.
This article discusses two landmark judgements by the German Federal Constitutional Court (CC) on the relationship between domestic and EU fundamental rights protection (Right to be forgotten I and II). In these judgements, for the first time, the CC uses EU fundamental rights as a standard of review. In addition, the CC establishes a novel framework of “parallel applicability” of EU and domestic fundamental rights for subject matters that are not fully harmonized by EU law. The article first presents the new approach, showing that it structurally changes the parameters of the relationship between the CC and the CJEU. Second, the article assesses the legal-political tendency reflected in this change: is this constructive dialogue or rather pushback against the CJEU? The article argues that this new jurisprudence should be characterized as an instance of resistance. The CC resists against the CJEU in its function as fundamental rights court, attempting to reduce the authority of the CJEU and reversing a development that it considered to be unfavourable to its own authority. This is structural pushback aimed at the CJEU’s function rather than at individual decisions or norms - however, without rejection the CJEU as an institution altogether.
This article explores the challenges of the extraterritorial application of the right to be forgotten and, more broadly, of EU data protection law in light of the recent case law of the ECJ. The paper explains that there are good arguments for the EU to apply its high data protection standards outside its borders, but that such an extraterritorial application faces challenges, as it may clash with duties of international comity, legal diversity, or contrasting rulings delivered by courts in other jurisdictions. As the article points out from a comparative perspective, the protection of privacy in the digital age increasingly exposes a tension between efforts by legal systems to impose their high standards of data protection outside their borders – a dynamic which could be regarded as ‘imperialist’ – and claims by other legal systems to assert their own power over data – a dynamic which one could name ‘sovereigntist’. As the article suggests, navigating between the Scylla of imperialism and the Charybdis of sovereigntism will not be an easy task. In this context, greater convergence in the data protection framework of liberal democratic systems worldwide appears as the preferable path to secure privacy in the digital age.
Chapter 3 delves into the historical context surrounding the ancient practices of bail and the origins of probation, as well as contemporary developments in Canada, the U.S.A. and the U.K. It goes back to the “antiquities of bail” (De Haas, 1940) and the origins of probation in order to contextualize and understand better the legal framework that governs them today. In particular, it traces the history of judicially imposed conditions of release, trying to identify how and when they came to be included in bail and sentencing practices. In order to trace the origins of conditions of release and of their intricate connection with the regulation of the poor, one has to follow the history of another important instrument of law enforcement, namely recognizances to keep the peace and peace bonds. This chapter ultimately shows how legal actors have throughout the history of English common law used the criminal process to create and enforce territories, directly governing people’s uses of spaces.
Rooted in historical linguistics, variationist sociolinguistics is often concerned with diachrony as reflected in synchronic grammars. World Englishes (WEs), which emerge through particular sociohistorical factors (e.g. colonialization, language contact, mass migration, dialect mixing, etc.), provide an ideal window for examining questions that are central to this mission: the inheritance of shared features, ongoing evolutionary mechanisms, and pathways of innovation as dialects interact and settle within new local linguistic ecologies. These varieties thus extend our knowledge base concerning the underlying mechanisms of language variation and change. In so doing, they enable theoretical and empirical advances through application of the comparative method, exposing the interaction between external social forces and internal linguistic ones on linguist forms and functions. In this chapter, I review variationist research that targets multiple varieties, both in the Inner Circle and, where available, the Outer Circle, to outline the gains that are possible by harnessing the synergistic energies of WEs through a variationist lens.
This chapter investigates the persistence and development of so-called dialect roots, that is, features of local forms of British English that are transplanted to overseas territories. It discusses dialect input and the survival of features, independent developments within overseas communities, including realignments of features in the dialect inputs, as well as contact phenomena when English speakers interact with those of other dialects and languages. The diagnostic value of these roots is exemplified with selected cases from around the world (Newfoundland English, Liberian English, Caribbean Englishes), which are assessed with reference to the archaic/dynamic character of individual features in new-dialect formation and language-contact scenarios.
The first part of this chapter draws attention to the elements which show a concern for reciprocal entitlements and obligations in some works associated with Archbishop Wulfstan, arguing that these can more usefully be read as works of morality rather than as estate literature. The second part relates a little-studied remark in his ‘Sermon of the Wolf’ to a context of the proliferation of small lordships, bringing increased pressure on the local peasantry.
At Apollonia (Uluborlu) after Augustus died the Res gestae was inscribed below statues of the imperial family. Apollonios, son of Olympichos, went on a mission to Germanicus Caesar in 18<AU: Pl. confirm date is correct>. Apollonios’ grandfather had been a priest of Zeus, but Apollonios was a priest of the goddess Rome. In the third century, a cross was carved on the pediment of the gravestone of Alexandros (also known as Artemon), a member of this same family. Still prominent in civic life, the third-century descendants looked to Christianity. In churches, feelings about holding public office were mixed. Origen advised against, and the Council of Elvira ruled that duoviri should not step inside a church during their term of office. But Christian city councillors are attested, and more in Phrygia than anywhere. At Synnada, Dorymedon, a councillor, was martyred during the reign of Probus (276–282), along with Trophimos, whose ossuary is now in the Bursa Museum. Another gravestone, from outside Apollonia, commemorates Zoulakios, whose father-in-law was ‘Diogenes the Christian’. Probably this Diogenes was born before the middle of the second century, so one can argue for a connection with the Montanist missionary endeavour.
Technology companies are the sheriffs of what used to be the wild west of the internet. In the 1990s, when the internet was young, the imagery of the western frontier really seemed like a good analogy. The internet seemed to radically decentralize power: no longer could massive publishers or broadcasters control the media; anyone could be a publisher and get their message out.1 The internet seemed inherently designed to preserve the freedom of individuals. It seemed impossible to enforce laws against the apparently anonymous masses of internet users distributed around the world. The commercial internet grew out of a military design that avoided single points of failure and was resilient against both nuclear attack and interference by hostile governments.2
In August 2017, several hundred white nationalists marched on the small university town of Charlottesville, Virginia. The rally turned tragic when one of the protesters rammed his car into a crowd of counterprotesters, killing 32-year-old Heather Heyer. The Washington Post characterized the protesters as “a meticulously organized, well-coordinated and heavily armed company of white nationalists.”1
This chapter examines Marx’s involvement in French socialist thought and action. Contrary to the standard view, Marx’s ideas were widely available in France at this time through a series of translations that appeared from 1872. These translations presented a ‘French Marx’ that was subtly, but noticeably, different from the German original and other versions, and whose ideas were more finely attuned to French circumstances. The construction of this French Marx was overseen and encouraged by Marx himself, who in translation was often willing to sacrifice the ‘purity’ of his ideas in order to broaden their appeal. The chapter contrasts this with his rigidity in the First International – where most French socialists met Marx for the first time, and which forms the basis for most studies of French Marxism – and argues that historians must combine the two. In order to fully understand why ideas such as Marxism spread, we must supplement the social and organisational histories of international socialism with attentive studies of its ideas, its texts, and their dissemination.