Chapter 5 investigates the availability of external review under the new economic governance of the Eurozone. It shows that the transformation of the EU’s powers in the economic and fiscal fields have not come together with a parallel intensification of judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice. It also finds that, considering the Court’s current case law and the conceptual frameworks that continue to structure its action (starting with the concepts of challengeable act and legal effects or the rules on standing) a shift in approach is quite unlikely. The result is a profound disconnect between the evolving nature of law and governance in the realm of EU economic policy and its judicial apprehension by the Court of Justice, an inappropriate level of review and a widening accountability gap. It notes that several bodies have sought to instil a certain dose of review, without compensating the lack of judicial review however. It enjoins the Court to lift the constitutional uncertainty produced by the new economic governance of the Eurozone, to come to terms with what standard economic governance has progressively become and to make sure that supranational judicial scrutiny keeps up with the evolving powers of the EU.

Chapter 2 aims to analyse the current state of the debate surrounding AWS in order to understand different legal approaches to the topic of AWS. The chapter examines the different arguments (legal and non-legal) put forward in favour of and against a pre-emptive ban of AWS, the several definitions suggested by different states (Ireland, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States), and the difficulty in finding a common ground to discuss AWS. The definitions offered by states reveal different conceptions of AI, the interaction between human and weapons and opposite approaches to accountability. In this regard, looking at the present stage of AI and at what is expected from AWS, one definition is offered and fully examined. Two elements are crucial for the understanding of AWS: first, that AWS will be designed and programmed for a specific mission and, second, that AWS will be required to be assertive but also adaptable to the mutable circumstances of the battlefield.

Part one of this book introduces readers to the concept of accountability, setting out the range of current theoretical debates on the meaning and scope of the concept. It further introduces readers to the concepts of accountability deficits (ie too little accountability) and accountability overloads (ie too much accountability), explaining the role that these concepts play in the context of discussions about public governance. Ultimately, it is argued that more theoretical work needs to be done to give shape to these ideas.

Accountability is often referred to as an essential feature of modern democratic society, said to underpin the legitimacy of government. In this context, it is common to hear claims of accountability ‘deficit’ (ie that a particular mechanism or area is lacking in accountability) and ‘overload’ (ie that a particular mechanism or area over-delivers on accountability). Despite the frequency of references to these concepts, their precise content remains undeveloped. This book offers an explanation of the concepts of accountability deficit and overload, as well as a framework for future discussion and exploration of these ideas. It outlines the scale of the challenges of defining an accountability benchmark and developing a picture of accountability mechanisms as a system. While difficult, if accountability is indeed a foundational concept underpinning our system of government, there is merit in meeting these challenges head-on.

One of the most prevalent themes in the accountability literature is claims about the ‘amount’ of accountability that applies in a given situation. There are claims of accountability ‘deficits’ (ie too little accountability) on the one hand, and claims of accountability ‘overload’ (ie too much accountability) on the other. This chapter draws out these claims and argues that, while these claims presuppose that accountability is a measurable concept, the literature often glosses over the underlying question of what is being measured, or how the measurement is to be conducted. This missing dimension of the literature is the core problem tackled in this book, which unpacks two of the hidden assumptions that underlie these claims. The first of these assumptions is that it is possible to identify some form of accountability benchmark, being a normative judgement as to the ‘ideal amount’ of accountability against which an arrangement can be measured and found wanting. The second is that it is possible to assess the universe of applicable accountability mechanisms against that benchmark, and to form a judgement as to whether the system underperforms (deficit) or overperforms (overload).

Part two of this book explores the various challenges that must be confronted in defining a ‘benchmark’ of accountability. It commences by identifying the underlying rationales for accountability, and then addresses the various issues thrown up when seeking to transform the mechanistic description of accountability (ie who is accountable, to whom, for what and how) into a normative account (ie who should be accountable to whom, for what and how). If we were able to do so, we would then have a yardstick against which we could measure the performance of accountability mechanisms and find them wanting.

There is an extensive body of literature addressing the concept of accountability, replete with overlapping definitions. This chapter introduces readers to this wide body of cross-disciplinary literature to provide a picture of areas of agreement and disagreement amongst theorists. Though accountability remains a contested concept, there is general agreement that accountability refers to a relational mechanism that can be analysed within the framework of the questions: who is accountable, to whom, for what, and how? One of the largest unresolved questions about accountability, as explored in this chapter, is whether it is simply a mechanical concept (ie a description of a mechanism with certain attributes) or more broadly reflects a value or ideal (ie the notion of being an accountable person). The conclusion drawn here is that it is particularly difficult to divorce the concept of accountability from a normative background in discussing concepts of accountability deficits and overloads. Each of these concepts rests on the normative assumption that it is possible to identity an ‘ideal amount’ of accountability.

Accountability is often referred to as an essential feature of modern democratic society, said to underpin the legitimacy of government. In this context, it is common to hear claims of accountability ‘deficit’ (ie that a particular mechanism or area is lacking in accountability) and ‘overload’ (ie that a particular mechanism or area over-delivers on accountability). Despite the frequency of references to these concepts, their precise content remains undeveloped. This book offers an explanation of the concepts of accountability deficit and overload, as well as a framework for future discussion and exploration of these ideas. It outlines the scale of the challenges of defining an accountability benchmark and developing a picture of accountability mechanisms as a system. While difficult, if accountability is indeed a foundational concept underpinning our system of government, there is merit in meeting these challenges head-on.

This chapter assesses the impact of autonomous control of weapons on the operation of accountability regimes which seek to address serious violations of IHL. It begins with a general statement on accountability for the behaviour of autonomous weapons which refutes the suggestion that autonomy would create an ‘accountability gap’ which would rob the law of its normative power. The next section covers the law of State responsibility and finds that, while the operation of that law would not be greatly affected, it is unlikely to be a sufficient means of retraining violations of IHL. The law of individual criminal accountability is discussed via a case study of the effects of weapon autonomy on the material and mental elements of a war crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Some alternative accountability regimes based on tort law and administrative law are surveyed. The final section notes the value of weapons reviews as a prospective accountability measure and outlines the technical challenges facing those who would review complex autonomous machines.