The International Political Science Association (IPSA) is a unique case against the common perception that Beijing has the upper hand when the two regimes by the Taiwan Strait contest to join international (non-governmental) organisations. Beijing relentlessly pushes international organisations to acknowledge the One China principle; Taipei also relentlessly denies this principle while it seeks to join. In the 1980s, Chinese and Taiwanese political scientists, representing their own regimes, applied Track II diplomacy to compete over membership of this organisation. IPSA membership mattered to both regimes and their political scientists. After many years of Track II competition, The Chinese Association of Political Science in Taipei became a “collective” member without compromising on how to name itself in April 1989. As a result, Beijing's counterpart withdrew from the IPSA. This situation has now persisted for over thirty years. The IPSA case not only challenges the current understanding of Cross-Strait relations but also throws light on the theoretical understanding of Track II diplomacy.

To what extent can de facto states act autonomously vis-à-vis their patron states and domestic societies? This article draws on theories of clientelism in international relations to develop a novel argument explaining the agency of de facto states. Examining two strategic triangles—Russia–Transnistria–Moldova and US–Taiwan–China—it demonstrates that interrelated domestic factors such as robust political competition, democratic pluralism, reimagined national identities, and big business shape the autonomy of de facto states in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, the structured focused comparison of Transnistria and Taiwan indicates that the agency of de facto states declines when rising parent states and dissatisfied patron states challenge the status quo, engaging in great power competition. Their autonomy varies across areas of low and high politics, as patron states prioritize military-security issues and interfere less in the economic and cultural affairs of the de facto states.

Nacrite and dickite are found in two localities in northern Taiwan. One, containing nacrite and dickite, is associated with a gold-enargite deposit as a vug-filling clay in the Chinkushih (CKS) mine district near the northern coast. The other is the occurrence of dickite in the interstices of a Miocene coarse-grained quartzose sandstone in the Nanshihchiao (NSC) area, near Taipei city. X-ray diffraction (XRD), differential thermal analysis (DTA), scanning electron microscope (SEM), and petrographic examinations were used to characterize the mineralogical features. Nacrite most often takes the unusual form of rhombic platelets, and dickite is commonly elongated in habit with the shapes possibly related to their origin. Based on geological evidence, we believe that both nacrite and dickite are of hydrothermal origin. In the CKS area, the formation of nacrite and dickite is related to the hypogene gold-enargite mineralization. In contrast, the transformation of dickite in the NSC area is due to the influence of the raised temperatures of sandstone formation, resulting from volcanic activity during the Kungkuan stage after the deposition of the sandstone.

In this article, I examine the ROC president's discursive response to PRC efforts to limit Taiwan's future possibilities and undermine confidence in Taiwan's future. I argue that the capacity to imagine the future, and perceiving agency to affect future outcomes, is crucial for national resilience. Since Taiwan is routinely exposed to factors known to cause reduced self-efficacy and morale – uncertainty, threat, marginalization, restricted agency, circumscribed action repertoires – it is crucial that Taiwanese people have a meaningful sense of “what are we striving for?” and confidence that they have the agency to realize these aspirations. The article sets out an empirical examination of discursive constructions of the future as a vector for enhancing cohesion and resolve in Taiwanese society. Foregrounding a novel dimension in the study of Taiwan, the article contributes both an interpretivist account of President Tsai Ing-wen's discourse and opens a new avenue for research on the largely neglected issue of futurity in cross-Strait relations.

This study examines how the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent Western responses influence Chinese public opinion on the use of force. Using two original, preregistered online survey experiments, first in June 2022 and then in June 2023, we show that the Russian invasion is associated with a modest but statistically significant increase in Chinese support for using military force in international affairs in general and against Taiwan in particular. However, information on Western military measures aiding Ukraine curbs the modest impact of the invasion. Such information is especially effective in reducing support for an outright military invasion of Taiwan. Causal mediation analyses reveal that the Russian invasion influences public opinion by inducing optimism regarding military success and pessimism regarding peaceful resolution of the conflict. These findings suggest that foreign military aggression and subsequent international countermeasures can sway domestic public opinion on using military force.

Nominally, the policy of the United States towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan is governed by the ‘One China’ Policy (OCP). However, the conditions under which OCP was originally formulated have long since given way to substantial growth in the economic and military power of the PRC and the democratisation of Taiwan. These changes raise several questions regarding the viability and applicability of OCP. Drawing on securitisation theory, this article examines discourses across three US presidential administrations to assess the trajectory of socio-political constructions of the PRC, Taiwan, and OCP. Three case studies suggest substantial challenges for OCP as a basis for maintaining desecuritised relations between the United States and the PRC. While discourses of ‘engagement’ prominent in the 1990s have lost ground, with presidential administrations increasingly but inconsistently drawing on OCP, in Congress OCP plays no role, while Taiwan is increasingly constructed as akin to the American self, serving as an identity proxy that highlights the otherness of the PRC. Polling supports the idea that OCP is not rooted in general American understandings of the region and consequently cannot serve to ground policy in a crisis.

The Tuluanshan Formation of the eastern Coastal Range of Taiwan overlies an andesitic core complex presumed to be the source of hydrothermal fluids responsible for the Si- and Mg-rich mineralization of sepiolite and palygorskite (attapulgite) which are found in veins within fissures and in fracture zones of the volcanic rocks of the region. This study was undertaken in order to understand these relationships better by characterizing sepiolite and palygorskite in this Formation and by examining their occurrence and distribution in the Tungho (TH) and Chunjih (CJ) areas. Samples were analyzed using X-ray diffraction (XRD), thermal analysis, Fourier-transform infrared (FTIR) spectroscopy, and petrographic, scanning (SEM), and transmission (TEM) electron microscopic methods. Sepiolite and palygorskite are blocky and earthy-type materials that display fibrous characteristics when viewed using TEM and SEM and occurred alone or with chalcedony in veins. The fibers of blocky sepiolite are commonly intercalated with smectite but the earthy type of sepiolite and palygorskite observed in this study displayed precipitation from fluid enriched in Si, Al, Mg, and minor Fe and depleted in other ions at an earlier stage of offset of the andesitic veins. Continuation of reverse faulting and high shearing stress caused the precipitation of a significant quantity of interlaminated sepiolite. Sepiolite and palygorskite were formed at an earlier stage of fluid interaction relative to smectite in the Tuluanshan Formation.

There has been limited research on clay mineral transformation in serpentinitic soils under humid tropical conditions. In this study, four soil pedons were selected along a toposequence from the summit (Entisol), shoulder (Vertisol), backslope (Alfisol) to footslope (Ultisol) positions to explore the contributions and the significance of landscape and weathering status of serpentinitic rock with regard to clay mineral transformations in eastern Taiwan. Experimental results indicated that the large amount of dithionite-citrate-bicarbonate-extractable Fe (Fed) and clay in the subsurface horizon were mainly caused by the strong leaching potential from intensive rainfall and weathering of the fine-grained parent rocks. The clay mineralogy reflected the clear weathering trend of the soils along the toposequence: (1) the soils on the summit and shoulder contained smectite and serpentine, which are predominant in the young soils derived from serpentinitic rocks; and (2) vermiculite gradually increased in the relatively old soils on backslope and footslope. The mineralogical transformations observed along the toposequence indicated that chlorite and serpentine, initially present in the Entisol on the summit, weather into smectite and interstratified chlorite-vermiculite in the intermediate soil on the shoulder under strong leaching and oxidizing conditions. Furthermore, vermiculite formed as the major weathering product of chlorite and smectite in the soil developed on the backslope. In addition to vermiculite, kaolinite and quartz formed in the soils on the footslope with the greatest concentration of Fed along the toposequence.

Cet article aborde les relations sino-africaines dans le cadre de l'analyse comparative des politiques étrangères. Il propose une analyse constructiviste des stratégies diplomatiques du Niger et du Burkina Faso dans leurs relations avec la RPC et Taïwan depuis les années soixante. En s'inspirant d'une démarche éclectique combinant d'une part, agents et structures et de l'autre, facteurs domestiques et facteurs systémiques, il explique les stratégies fluctuantes de reconnaissance diplomatique des deux États à l’égard des deux « Chine » par la construction sociale de l'intérêt national. Les résultats corroborent les postulats du constructivisme sur le poids des idées et des contextes dans la fabrique de l'intérêt national.