Play is often considered an indicator and promotor of animal welfare and may facilitate closer cat-human relationships. However, few studies have empirically investigated these associations. The current study aimed to investigate play-related factors associated with four welfare outcome measures in cats (Felis catus) including: cat quality of life; cat-guardian relationship quality; problem behaviour prevalence; and behavioural changes. An online survey was developed using demographic information, questions related to play and resources, free text sections and the following validated measures: cat quality of life (QOL), the cat owner relationship scale, and the adult playfulness trait scale. Responses were completed by 1,591 cat guardians from 55 countries. Higher cat playfulness scores and a greater number of games played were significantly associated with higher cat QOL scores while longer amounts of daily play, greater number of games, both cat and guardian initiating play and higher guardian playfulness scores were all significantly associated with higher cat-guardian relationship scores. Exclusively indoor housing was significantly associated with both higher cat QOL and higher cat-guardian relationships scores compared to cats with outdoor access. Behavioural changes associated with distress in cats were reported when play was absent. Play may be an important factor in assessing and maintaining cat welfare. Further research into the mechanisms of how play impacts welfare and cat-guardian relationships is needed.

In animal care, when current decisions are made to maximise long-term quality of life (QoL), a key necessity is being able to make accurate predictions about how current choices will affect the animal's future QoL. However, in the procession of any individual's life, many factors that influence QoL change — some are foreseeable, many are not. Moreover, QoL has no fixed anchor points; it is dynamic, mutable, with a shifting frame of reference over time. In addition to actual changes in QoL over time, numerous factors have been identified that influence one's ability to adopt the mindset of the individual at a later point in time — for one's self as well as that of others. It has been shown that in people, across a wide range of health conditions, individuals with illness or disability typically report greater happiness and QoL than do healthy people envisioning themselves in similar circumstances (‘the disability paradox‘). Difficulties in QoL outcome prediction fall into two categories: (1) predictions made with the wrong mindset, in which there is a mismatch between the mindset of the assessor/predictor and that of the assessee/experiencer; and (2) predictions made on the basis of unforeseen or incorrectly estimated psychological changes in the assessee/experiencer.

The notion ‘quality of life’ (QoL) suggests that welfare in animals encompasses more than just an absence of suffering; it concerns the quality of an animal's entire relationship with its environment, of how it lives its life. Judgements of such quality are based on the integration of perceived details of how animals behave over time in different contexts. The scientific status of such judgements has long been ambiguous, but in recent decades has begun to be addressed by animal scientists. This paper starts with a brief review of qualitative approaches to the study of animal behaviour, which tend to address characteristics such as individuality, personality, and emotionality. The question then arises whether such characteristics involve a subjective, experiential aspect, and identify animals as sentient beings. The second half of this paper argues that taking the integrative nature of qualitative judgements seriously enables a ‘whole animal’ perspective, through which it becomes possible to view behaviour as a dynamic, expressive body language that provides a basis for assessing the quality of an animal's experience (eg contented, anxious). Judging this quality is a skill that requires knowledge of species-specific behaviour, experience in observing and interacting with animals in different contexts, and a willingness to communicate with animals as sentient beings. A substantial body of research indicates that this skill can function reliably in a scientific context, and can be applied usefully as a practical welfare assessment tool. Thus qualitative approaches to the study of animal behaviour should make an important contribution to the growing interest in animal QoL.

Two distinct approaches have emerged for the assessment of quality of life (QoL) and welfare in domestic dogs. One approach, which has so far been applied only to companion dogs, is derived from proxy assessment of QoL in human beings, with the owner or veterinarian acting as the proxy. Because dogs are a different species to human beings, assessment by proxy is even more challenging than when the subject being assessed is human. Our evaluation of published studies indicates that existing canine QoL instruments are imperfect, in part because of avoidable deficiencies such as failure to define QoL and using measures of health status as sole indicators of QoL. The second approach to QoL assessment, which stems from animal welfare science, is based upon objective measurement of behaviour and stress physiology, and has been applied mainly to dogs in laboratory and rescue kennels. We review these and our own recent studies, and conclude that although interpretation of signs of acute stress may be relatively straightforward, signs of chronic stress such as stereotypic behaviour require further research before they can be incorporated into QoL measures. So far, there has been little attempt to integrate proxy assessment with objective measures. We recommend that this integration would be beneficial. Fundamentally, both approaches aim to describe and quantify aspects of some inner state of well-being, and it should eventually be possible to map each on to the other.

The dual problem of explaining brain evolution and the way in which it has led to wide species differences in behaviour and physiology has often appeared intractable to scientists. The main limiting factor is that we do not understand enough about how brains work to appreciate why gross or fine morphological differences can lead to the considerable across- as well as within-species differences in behaviour. Even at a molecular level, while two-thirds of our genes are involved in regulating brain function, there is a high degree of homology within different phyla. In the context of quality of life (QoL), arguably the most important consideration is that the brain you have evolved is adapted to the environment you are living in and is capable of generating ‘conscious’ experience. When that environment is radically altered, issues arise regarding whether there is sufficient adaptability to cope and the extent to which mental as well as physical suffering might be experienced as a consequence. At the other end of the spectrum there is the question of how enriched social and physical environments might enhance QoL through promoting positive affect. Here I will discuss potential functional contributions of differences in brain size and organisation and the impact of experience. I will mainly focus on mental functioning and show particularly that capacities for consciousness, emotional experience, social interaction and cognition and behavioural flexibility are likely to be widespread in other animal species, even if less developed than in humans.

In this paper I describe a hypothetical strategy for assessing poor and good welfare with the aim of making a judgement about an animal's quality of life. The concepts discussed here may also contribute to the notion of what makes ‘a life worth living’. The strategy involves attributing scores to positive and negative aspects of an animal's well-being, using predefined categories and a simple scoring rote, and then summating these scores into an overall welfare score. The strategy incorporates a mathematical calculation that has certain mathematical biases to help ensure that any animal suffering is not excessive. I draw attention to some limitations of the proposed strategy and stress that such mathematical scoring systems cannot be used simplistically. Nevertheless, the proposed strategy could be refined, tested and validated to assist decision-making by those with a duty of care to the animal concerned.

In many situations choices must be made that will have an impact on the welfare of companion animals. Often one of the options will be to euthanase the animal in question. The way in which one views this option will depend not only on one's assessment of the quality of the animal's life (or the lives of other affected parties), but also on how one values an animal life as such. Clearly, a companion animal may be valued by a human being or by another animal. A dog's death may affect its owner's quality of life (QoL), or it may affect the QoL of other animals in the household. But does the life of an animal have any value other than that? Is anything lost, for example, when a dog that lived with a sole owner, now deceased, is euthanased? Conversely, would anything be gained if the dog were re-homed (apart from the potentially positive contribution to the new owners' QoL)? More generally, in prolonging, or refraining from ending, the life of an animal, is it thereby ensured that something of value persists? There seem to be three main views on this matter. The first is that animal life has no value in itself. The second is that animal life has value to the extent that the life in question is worth living for the animal. The third view is that the life of an animal has a value that exceeds what is ‘in it’ for the animal in question. The view one accepts here will have a dramatic impact on one's attitude to many of the choices to be made about the treatment of companion animals — choices in which one must balance quality of life against, as it were, quantity of life. So the heart of the matter is not only quality of life. It is also value of life. Unfortunately it may prove much more difficult to agree about the value of animal life than it is to agree about the significance of animal welfare.

Dogs can be held temporarily or permanently in kennels for a number of reasons, not necessarily for their own benefit. Although restrictive environments have been associated with poor welfare, priorities for research and change cannot be understood unless the various aspects of the kennel environment are appreciated separately. This review critically evaluates the experimental research regarding the physical, social, sensory, occupational, nutritional and psychological aspects of the kennel environment and their effects on canine welfare, with a view to providing a consolidated report on our current state of knowledge on this subject. However, the lack of within-dog, single manipulations and a focus on quantitative measures affects the ability to make valid conclusions about the welfare benefits of several aspects, including social housing, kennel size and location. Despite these criticisms, the evidence for the positive benefits of group housing is strong. There is also considerable evidence for the benefits of positive human contact particularly on sociability and stress responses in other situations. Surprisingly few studies have looked at other forms of enrichment and even less have considered the potential for the kennel to be over-stimulating in an auditory, olfactory and visual sense. Such topics are suggested as priorities for further research, in addition to ways of minimising aggression in group housing and the effect of establishment of predictability on adjustment to kennelling.

The concept of quality of life in animals is closely associated with the concepts of animal sentience and animal welfare. It reflects a positive approach that inquires what animals like or prefer doing. The assessment of farm animal welfare requires a good understanding of the animals' affective experience, including their emotions. However, affective experience in animals is difficult to measure because of the absence of verbal communication. Recent studies in the field of cognitive psychology have shown that affective experience can be investigated without using verbal communication by examination of the interactions between emotions and cognition. On the one hand, appraisal theories provide a conceptual framework which suggests that emotions in humans are triggered by a cognitive process whereby the situation is evaluated on a limited number of elementary criteria such as familiarity and predictability. We have applied these appraisal theories to develop an experimental approach for studying the elementary criteria used by farm animals to evaluate their environment and the combinations of those criteria that trigger emotions. On the other hand, an increasing body of research, first in humans and then in other animals, suggests that emotions also influence cognitive processes by modifying attention, memory and judgement in a short- or long-term manner. Cognitive processes could therefore be manipulated and measured to provide new insights into how not only emotions but also more persistent affective states can be assessed in animals. Further work based on these cognitive approaches will offer new paradigms for improving our understanding of animal welfare, thus contributing to ‘a life of high quality’ in animals.

Assessments and predictions of patient quality of life (QoL) permeate many veterinary decisions, including (1) whether to perform a procedure due to concurrent QoL issues, (2) whether a procedure will negatively affect QoL in the near or distant future, and (3) whether QoL is poor enough to warrant euthanasia. In order to understand how veterinarians manage decisions relating to patient well-being, interviews with 41 veterinarians and over 100 hours of observations of 10 veterinarians were conducted. Participants held diverse views regarding the type of parameters that should be included when defining QoL. Interestingly, they also held differing views about who should be assessing patient QoL, with some participants believing that animals' owners were better able to assess patient QoL than veterinarians. For these veterinarians, respecting the client's autonomy in deciding what was best for the patient weighed heavily in their decisions. Other veterinarians felt that they, rather than the client, were the best assessors of QoL and felt justified in persuading clients to follow a certain course of action (often considered a paternalistic approach). These findings raise some interesting questions for the profession. What role should veterinarians play when assessing patient QoL? When is paternalism acceptable or even mandatory in veterinary medicine? Does respecting client autonomy also require an evaluation of the client's abilities to make appropriate decisions for the patient? The lack of uniformity in defining and assessing patient QoL highlights the need for increased dialogue with respect to veterinarians' responsibilities to both animals and clients.

Our view of which individuals should be the subjects of our moral actions is expanding to include more people and more species. Animal welfare is the subject of rapidly increasing concern in most countries in the world, and this concern is resulting in changes in the ways in which animal users keep and treat animals. Ethical decisions about whether the killing of an animal is justifiable should be considered separately from those about how poor welfare can be and still be acceptable. The term ‘euthanasia’ should be restricted to killing an animal for its own benefit. Quality of life (QoL) in humans is generally taken to include: physical condition and any impairment of this resulting from injury or disease; capacity to function; perception of functioning; and satisfaction with functioning in relation to what is believed possible. If the welfare of an individual is its state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment, then welfare is essentially the same as QoL. Both include the state of the individual's coping systems, including those responding to pathology, various behavioural and physiological responses, and cognitive processes associated with suffering or pleasure. Hence, both welfare and QoL include health and the extent of positive and negative feelings. Many papers referring to animal welfare include objective quantification whilst few papers referring to QoL do so. Some human studies assess QoL by the less objective method of questions asked of subjects. Neither QoL nor welfare should be assessed using solely subjective measures. Assessment of welfare must take account of the wide variety of coping systems and coping strategies used. A range of measures including those of behaviour, physiology, brain function, immune system function, and damage is needed. The ease or difficulty of coping should be interpreted within the framework of the abilities of the animal. Animals with more sophisticated cognitive functioning may have the best abilities to cope with problems. The scheme presented here for assessing welfare over time facilitates ethical decisions regarding whether welfare is good or whether it is unacceptably poor.

Because it is the pet-owning public that normally provides the day-to-day care for companion animals, maintaining or improving standards in animal welfare is best achieved by engaging owners in the debate over an individual animal's quality of life (QoL). Veterinary practice teams (including veterinary surgeons and nurses) are in an ideal position to promote discussion of pets' QoL, as most owners respect and value their opinion. As well as educating each new generation of animal carers on appropriate husbandry, the veterinary profession can engage the pet-owning public in the scientific process of QoL assessment and the related debates concerning definitions of welfare and QoL. QoL assessment is a complex process with many influencing factors. The structure of an assessment will depend upon its purpose, which may be research, legislation, a certification scheme or, probably most usefully, a management tool to facilitate clinical decision-making. The process of completing a QoL assessment within a clinical environment may result in positive changes in human behaviour towards animals irrespective of the actual result of the assessment. This influence on human behaviour is a key test of validity for formal assessment systems that are designed to improve QoL.

An international panel of experts in the fields of canine and feline health, welfare and behaviour conducted an online discussion addressing two questions: (1) how can one define quality of life (QoL) for dogs and cats in confined living situations, such as laboratories; and (2) what additional research is needed to determine how optimal QoL can be achieved? The panel suggested that QoL encompasses animal welfare and the subjective ‘feelings’ of the animal regarding its life, and that it can only be inferred from behavioural, physiological and other measures. Two methods for measuring QoL were proposed: establishing an ethogram defining QoL for individuals; and developing a ‘quality of living’ scale that can be applied to facilities housing groups of dogs and cats. Constructing these measures requires a comprehensive research program, and the paper discusses overall research objectives, specific questions that must be addressed, and some proposed research methods.

It is believed widely, and with good reason, that some other members of the animal kingdom, like us, have feelings (associated with brain states induced by various sensory inputs and cognitive processes) which can be pleasant or unpleasant. Associated with the strengthening scientific foundations for this belief, there has been growing consensus around the world that we have a moral responsibility, in all of our dealings and interactions with sentient animals, to take account of their feelings. This has led to widespread re-evaluation, in recent years, of the nature of our interactions with other animals. However, assessment of the feelings of animals — the quality of their lives — remains a great challenge for veterinarians and others involved with their management. The fundamental difficulty is that whilst judgements about management or treatment often have to be made on the basis of our inferences of how they feel (ie of the feelings they consciously experience), a subjective step cannot be avoided in making these inferences. We cannot know how other animals feel but can only infer this based on our knowledge of the animal and on our own experiences of feelings. This inevitable ‘gap’ in objective deductions about feelings is often wide enough that people can reach radically different conclusions when judging an animal's quality of life. Opinions thus often differ regarding the point at which it becomes kinder to euthanase an animal than not to do so, the point at which it becomes kinder not to undertake a potentially painful therapeutic intervention than to do so, and where the balance lies when animal welfare costs are being ‘weighed’ against some benefit of their use for humans (eg as laboratory, farm or companion animals). The aim of this meeting is to discuss if and how science has helped in developing reasoned approaches to these dilemmas, and to consider the need for further research, education, and policy development.

Although the term ‘quality of life’ (QoL) is not unfamiliar to veterinary surgeons, only recently has the scientific community attempted to measure it in farm and companion animals. Typically such studies have applied methodologies from the field of human health-related quality of life (HRQoL), without due consideration of the applicability of both the term and its measurement to animals. However, it is necessary to clarify the philosophical basis of QoL if it is to be defended as a rigorous and reliable aid to decision-making in animal welfare science. In this paper we review common concepts in human HRQoL and discuss the value of, and difficulties regarding, the transfer of the concept of human HRQoL to companion animals. Human definitions tend to focus on individuals and their assessment of the state of their life in terms of physical, social and psychological functioning. The use of the term ‘quality of life’ for animals may therefore expand on what is usually considered when using the term ‘welfare’, and thereby improve on current practice, which tends to focus on relatively few outcome measures that are largely indicative of poor welfare. However, failure in the human literature to properly define QoL and defend the choice of measures accordingly, together with the common use of objective indicators and proxies, has led to confusion over the relative roles of objective and subjective measures in the determination and constitution of QoL. A suggestion for an appropriate definition of animal QoL that clarifies these relationships is offered, together with a list of social/environmental and physical/psychological health-related domains that may be suitable for a generic companion animal QoL assessment tool. In the absence of knowledge on both basic needs and individual preferences, particularly for institutionalised animals, QoL tools may be more appropriately designed as outcome-based tools, focussing on observable signs of health and behaviour. The extent to which recent QoL assessment tools for companion animals have covered these domains, and the extent to which the psychometric properties of the tools have been addressed, is also briefly discussed.

The relationship between the socio-economic status of working equine owners and the welfare status of their animals is yet to be documented. The aim of this study was to provide an approach to understanding socio-economic status, quality of life and working aspects of working horse owners, in order to establish their social vulnerability index and to determine how these measures correlate with the welfare state of their horses. Seventy-two owners and their urban working horses (n = 122) were studied. Owners’ socioeconomic and educational status was established together with their quality of life perception and multi-dimensional poverty index. The animal welfare index was constructed using animal-based measures. Whilst over 90% of owners were considered vulnerable, only 28.3% of horses were classified as being in a poor welfare state (eg presence of lesions and morphology not adequate for draught type). There were no significant correlations between owners’ factors and the animal welfare index. We conclude, therefore, that social vulnerability of owners does not necessarily imply that their animals will be in a poor welfare state.

An online survey, using open and prompted response questions, was undertaken to collate the views of stakeholders on the priority welfare issues currently facing companion dogs (Canis familiaris) in Great Britain and on dogs’ general quality of life. The stakeholder sectors targeted broadly comprised Education, Government, Industry, Charity and Veterinary. Overall, respondents described companion dogs as, at minimum, having a life worth living. Whether welfare issues were openly described or ranked within a set list, those of high priority in the perceptions of stakeholders matched those cited in published scientific literature; particularly, exaggerated physical features, inherited disease, obesity and inappropriate socialisation. Puppy farming and status dogs, which have been highlighted recently in the media, were also viewed as important. Lack of appropriate mental stimulation, irresponsible ownership and inappropriate environment were raised as priority issues by stakeholders and are under-reported in scientific literature. Significant differences between stakeholder sectors in ranking of welfare issues perceived importance, urgency to rectify, impact (on the individual) or prevalence in Britain may be explained by vested interests, organisational roles, differences in terminology and the contexts within which stakeholders came into contact with companion dogs. Pet travel, dew claw removal and complementary and alternative medicines were amongst those issues thought to be of least urgent welfare concern. Issues perceived to enhance welfare included the quality of veterinary care, physical stimulation, educational resources, responsible ownership, the high status of dogs in society and the work of welfare organisations.

Chronic pain and distress are universally accepted conditions that may adversely affect an animal's quality of life (QOL) and lead to the humane euthanasia of an animal. At most research institutions and zoological parks in the USA, a veterinarian, who has physically examined the animal and reviewed the clinical records, ultimately decides when an animal has reached a humane endpoint. To aid in the difficult process of interpreting pain and distress, we have developed specific behavioural guidelines, in addition to standard clinical information, to help define unique characteristics and traits of primates to assess and promote discussion of an individual primate's QOL, and thereby, to assist in the decision-making process regarding euthanasia. These guidelines advocate the creation of a QOL team when the animal is diagnosed with a life-threatening or debilitating chronic condition, or at the time the animal is entered into a terminal study. The team compiles a list of characteristics unique to that individual animal by utilising a questionnaire and a behavioural ethogram. This list enables the team to quantitatively assess any deviations from the established normal behavioural repertoire of that individual. Concurrently, the QOL team determines the number of behavioural deviations that are needed to trigger an immediate discussion of the necessity for humane euthanasia of the animal. The team remains intact once created, and revisits the animal's condition as frequently as deemed necessary. This process improves animal welfare by continuing the quest to optimally define QOL for captive primates, and potentially for all captive animals.

A recent FAWC report introduced ‘a life worth living’ as a useful concept in farm animal welfare discussions and policy. But what does this concept mean? And is it a useful one? This paper extends FAWC's approach in several ways. It firstly provides an account of the concept of a life worth living in more detail, in relation to current animal welfare thinking, such as experiences and quality of life. It then describes how the concept might be applied in animal welfare management decisions and in setting standards for regulations and Farm Assurance schemes. The paper identifies several advantages to the concept: it is animal-based, intuitively understandable, and has direct prescriptive force in decision-making. But the concept also has certain limitations, especially that it is potentially complex and subjective and that it cannot include all ethically relevant concerns about farm animal welfare. Nevertheless, the paper concludes that the concept may become a useful addition to welfare dialogue, and finishes by identifying the core areas where further work is necessary.