We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards? Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima. Hitler's Atomic Bomb sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends.
When Germany invaded Poland, German officials set up a research project into the possible military uses of uranium fission. A nuclear reactor, what the Germans called a “uranium machine,” needed a moderator to slow down neutrons. Water, heavy water, and pure carbon in the form of graphite were all considered, but water would need uranium in which the percentage of isotope 235 is increased, and it did not appear feasible for German industry to produce graphite with sufficient purity. Paul Harteck and his collaborator Wilhelm Groth first tried to separate the uranium isotopes with a separation tube. When this failed, the two physical chemists turned to centrifuges. Scientists in Berlin, Heidelberg, and Leipzig began experiments on the behavior of materials when bombarded with neutrons and on model nuclear reactors. At first the materials needed were scarce but Germany captured the Norsk Hydro in Norway, the largest heavy water producer in the world, and the defeat of Belgium brought with it tons of uranium compounds. From the start of the war through to the autumn of 1941, this research had low priority and made modest progress. At this stage of the war, powerful new weapons did not appear needed.
By the time Walther Gerlach took over the uranium project in late 1943, it was clear that Germany could not build atomic bombs before the end of the war, which was now going very badly for Germany. Work continued under Paul Harteck on isotope separation and heavy water production. Small but steady improvements were made with the centrifuges, but only very small samples with low levels of uranium 235 enrichment were ever achieved. Heavy water production failed, despite great efforts. The work on model nuclear reactors continued, culminating in a final experiment using a lattice of uranium cubes immersed in heavy water. This came close but fell short of achieving a self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction. During this period the scientists were focused first and foremost on the survival of themselves and their families. Both Gerlach and Werner Heisenberg sought to facilitate this by continuing to suggest to powerful members of the Nazi elite that their research might lead to an unexpected breakthrough and win the war.
The German military catastrophe in Stalingrad began the period of “Total War.” The research into heavy water production, isotope separation, and model nuclear reactors became progressively more difficult as the war economy became more strained and the Allies began bombing Germany. Problems with heavy water production in Norway, including sabotage at the Norsk Hydro, caused the Germans to search for alternative ways to make heavy water in Germany and Italy. Although hampered by the war, progress was made with centrifuges, which had begun to slightly enrich the amount of isotope 235 in small samples of uranium. Whereas nuclear reactor experiments under the direction of Werner Heisenberg had used layers of uranium and moderator, a competing group led by Kurt Diebner began experimenting with three-dimensional lattices with better results. Because research in Berlin and Hamburg had become very difficult, if not impossible, several institutes were evacuated to towns in southwest Germany.
When the war slowed down in the winter of 1942-1942, the uranium research was evaluated with the result that it became clear that atomic bombs could not be made in Germany in time to influence the outcome of the war. The project was transferred from Army Ordnance to the Reich Research Council, the institution responsible for mobilizing civilian research for the war effort. The scientists, who were now threatened with the loss of their exemptions from frontline service, began to “sell” their research. Although they did not promise to deliver atomic bombs, they did emphasize the tremendous power of such weapons and warned that the Americans, who had much greater resources, were apparently working on this. In the meantime a model nuclear reactor experiment had produced a neutron increase, which was interpreted as proof in principle that a nuclear reactor could be built. Several influential figures responsible for armament production now took a keen interest in uranium research and the powerful Minister of Armaments Albert Speer decided to generously support the project.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.