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This chapter examines the policy issues that influence the shape and contours of the TV GVC. As with any trading system, the global TV industry is based on a set of social and political values that are predominantly those of open societies and market economies. These values are not universal and the nature and amount of participation of a country into the TV GVC depends on its elites’ degree of adherence to such values. Thus, the first section devotes special attention to China, which has largely shut its doors to the global TV industry. The second section examines the policy alternatives that exist for those countries that wish to embark on the path of GVC participation and economic upgrading. The chapter argues that such a policy has three key prongs: it must take into account the globalised nature of the TV industry and support firms that are best positioned to perform in the global marketplace, harness the benefits of trade, and incentivise creativity through regulation.
In ancient China, Japan, and Korea it is clear that roundworm and whipworm were the most common parasites present. Where data are available to estimate how common these parasites were, they suggest that more than half of the population were infected. Flukes spread by eating raw fish and crustaceans were a significant health risk, but less than half of individuals appear to have been affected. These include Chinese liver fluke, Fasciolopsis, Gymnophalloides, Metagonimus, and Paragonimus. The range of species of flukes present seem to have been higher in Korea and Japan than China, which may reflect the range of species endemic there, or the range of foods traditionally eaten raw in each culture. Oriental schistosomiasis is contracted by wading in still freshwater, so farmers growing rice in paddy fields were at particular risk. Major trade routes such as the Silk Road have been shown to act as conduits for the spread of intestinal parasites across East Asia.
Adherence to the Dietary Approaches to Stop Hypertension (DASH) diet has been associated with sleep quality. However, its relationship with sleep-disordered breathing (SDB) remains unknown. This study aimed to explore the association between the DASH diet and SDB using data from a community survey among adults in Suzhou, Eastern China.
We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the Suzhou Food Consumption and Health Survey in 2018-2020. Dietary intake was measured by a validated food frequency questionnaire (FFQ). The association between the DASH diet and SDB was estimated by multivariable logistic regression analysis. In addition, subgroup analysis and sensitivity analysis were performed to reinforce our findings.
A total of 3939 participants were included in the final analysis. Participants in the upper quintile of the DASH score consumed more fruits, vegetables, nuts and legumes, whole grains, and dairy, and less sodium, red/processed meats, and sweetened beverages. The OR for the highest compared with the lowest quintile of the DASH score was 0.68 (95% CI: 0.52, 0.88; P-trend=0.004) for SDB after multivariable adjustment. Of the eight DASH components, vegetables, nuts and legumes, and dairy products were inversely associated with SDB. The associations were similar in subgroups by age, gender, BMI, smoking, alcohol drinking, hypertension, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia.
Adherence to the DASH diet was independently associated with decreased odds of self-reported SDB. Our novel results expand previous findings on diet and sleep and suggest the possibility of improving SDB by enhancing diet quality.
Tibetan pastoralists have long been using dogs as guards. Since the late 1980s, the same dogs, called “Tibetan Mastiffs,” have become valuable pets for Han Chinese consumers. This paper discusses how commodification transforms the value of these dogs, and the care relationship between humans and dogs. Tibetan pastoralists and dogs participate in a reciprocal yet distanced care relationship through raising and guarding, which is not confined to a pursuit of dogs’ ferocity. In contrast, a taste for ferocity prevails in the Tibetan Mastiff market, and breeders care for dogs in a more dedicated, and yet more unilateral and dangerous, way. The unintended consequence of breeders’ care is that they raise dogs that sometimes bite; this is explained based on a process of value transformation in dogs’ guarding abilities, from ethical virtue to commercial price.
Socialist governance and popular sovereignty require state administration of care. In the People's Republic of China (PRC) today, such state care is provided in the form of public services and in the guarantee of social security. Ideally, different levels of government should foster relations of care in local communities and remain responsive to “the people.” Local self-government, relations of mutual support and ritual communities, however, reveal the deficits of state care. Much like general philosophies of care, such local ethics of care propose universal benchmarks against which social practice can be measured. This article outlines the main contours of state care in the post-Mao Zedong PRC, and contrasts its findings with empirical research on public services, social security and ritual responsiveness. Mutual help, neighbourhood communities and ritual practice, in particular, provide alternative models of care. As such, they can be extended and universalized, and offer possibilities for a critique of care.
Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the ‘92 Consensus’ and ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and ‘cheap talk’ theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations.
One of the epic national narratives of modernization and development in China is the story of Beidahuang (‘Great Northern Wilderness’) in the country’s northeast. The term ‘Beidahuang’ refers originally to state-sponsored campaigns, starting in the 1950s, that involved the enlistment of tens of thousands of People’s Liberation Army soldiers, educated youth, and Communist Party cadres. Their task was to transform the vast northeast ‘wasteland’ into productive farmland that would feed the nation while securing the nation’s borders with Russia. This article examines the significance of Beidahuang as a feature of the environmental discourse in China’s northeast borderlands, focusing on the first decade of the twenty-first century when the Chinese state was establishing more systematic measures for addressing environmental concerns. In the context of the northeast borderland, the massive deforestation that resulted from the socialist campaigns to transform ‘wasteland’ into productive farmland has left a controversial legacy for regional elites grappling with the Party leadership’s turn towards environmental conservation as an emerging political priority. This article suggests that the ongoing importance of the ‘Great Northern Wilderness’ in the Chinese cultural imagination has shaped the ways in which regional elites frame environmental issues in relation to economic development, nationalism, and border relations with Russia.
Much ink has been splashed on the ideological, conceptual, and practical challenges that China’s state capitalism has posed to global trade rules. There is a growing perception that the current international trade rules are neither conceptually coherent nor practically effective in tackling China’s state capitalism. This perception has not only led to the emergence of new trade rules in regional trade agreements, but also culminated in the US-China trade war, only further aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic. This Article contributes to the debate of what trade rules may be needed to counteract China’s state capitalism by unpacking the black box of China’s state capitalism. Based on an analysis of the nature of China’s state capitalism, this Article provides a preliminary evaluation of current trade rules taken to counteract China’s state capitalism, in particular the new rules in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and explain why they are unlikely to be successful.
China’s participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been a rollercoaster of milestones and frictions. China has emerged as a leading trading nation, which has contributed to the expansion of world trade. Some of its trading partners, however, and most vocally the United States, complain that China has reached its new status by eluding its WTO commitments. Under President Trump, the United States reacted strongly against China, almost bringing the WTO (but not China!) to its knees. These actions have been criticized in different ways: Some underline their unilateral character (and the ensuing legal issues they raise), whereas others focus on the regime-neutrality of the WTO, which should, in principle, be able to accommodate Western liberal democracies, developing countries, and socialist countries like China equally. In this short Article, we argue that staying idle is no solution to the China issue and that addressing it through unilateral actions is no solution either. Both approaches would only deepen the current WTO crisis. In our view, the only viable solution for the WTO system requires adding new disciplines to the existing multilateral rules.
A great deal of international and domestic conflict is driven by feelings of humiliation. But what does political humiliation consist of? In this chapter I argue that a key part of political humiliation involves the sense of being replaced. After looking at several case studies including the rhetoric used by ISIS recruiters, the rise of revanchist Russian and Chinese foreign policies, and the language deployed by white supremacists to frame and justify their grievances, I point to some features of the sense of replacement. These include the loss of status and perceived break of a promise or denial of an entitlement – both coupled with a reactionary brand of nostalgia that aims to return the world to how things were before these losses occurred. Part 1 introduces the idea of humiliation in international and domestic conflict. Part 2 uses four case studies to suggest that replacement is key in making sense of political humiliation. Part 3 offers several reasons why it’s particularly important to understand the dynamics of replacement.
What motivates states’ choice of social classification? Existing explanations highlight scientific beliefs of modern states or social engineering by ideological regimes. Focusing on the initial state-building period of two Communist regimes, China and North Korea, this article complements the existing literature and suggests that social classification reflects three missions of political leaders: regime distinction, governance, and power consolidation. Population categories are created to distinguish the new government from the old, to selectively provide welfare, and to attack political opponents. The varying weight of the missions and their manifestation in social classification depend on new ruling elites’ cohesion and past experiences. This comparative historical analysis sheds light on the rise of political chaos in China and the personalistic dictatorship in North Korea in the 1970s.
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has received global attention since 2017 due to China’s massive crackdown on Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the region. Since 2017–2018, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s crackdown on Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has become unprecedented in its scope and intensity. Reports on the CCP’s highly repressive strategies in that region led to a formal expression of concern by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in August 20181 and several legislative hearings in the United States.2 In 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on three officials, including Chen Quanguo, who are in charge of the Xinjiang’s recent development and a major economic and paramilitary organization, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (known as bingtuan), accusing it of “facilitating widespread abuses against Uighur Muslims.”3
Asian Americans play a prominent role in the state surveillance story, because Asian Americans play an ambiguous role in both international relations and domestic race relations.4 Although people of Asian descent have been arriving in the Americas since before the Civil War – Asian soldiers fighting on both sides of the internecine conflict – Asian immigrants and their American-born descendants, whatever their formal status and however assimilated, have been portrayed as “sojourners” only temporarily resident in the United States and likely to return to a homeland to which they have remained stealthily loyal.5 The persistent theme has been that Asians are inassimilable into American society, whether by biology, culture, or their own collective choices. The assumption that it is contradictory to be both Asian and American has been used, explicitly and implicitly, to justify discrimination against Asian Americans.
The narrative that banks, government departments and state-owned enterprises are the foremost protagonists in shaping China's outbound capital flows has been a commonplace view. This article seeks to expand the focus to include other under-scrutinised players: lawyers. With reference to exporting industries (such as shipping and natural gas), this article explains how lawyers – in tandem with China's governmental and judicial organs – have shifted from enabling outflows to postponing them, as a result of China's Covid-19 force majeure regime. Even with capital on pause, Covid-19 has also kept lawyers busy, prompting them to think about how to maximise their firm's proximity to the clients they have and to new clients that they want to win. Accordingly, this article also provides an overview of the techniques used by predominantly Anglo-American law firms to gain access to new legal markets during Covid-19, with a view to winning more work from Chinese capital-exporters and their foreign counterparties.
This article addresses two interrelated questions pertaining to the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) attempt to internationalize the Chinese currency – the renminbi (RMB). First, what is the historical rationale of RMB internationalization, and what are its implications? Second, how does the rationale for, and implications of, RMB internationalization distinguish this process from the emergence of the US dollar as the global reserve currency? The article proceeds by framing the RMB internationalization process as a historical palimpsest that emerges from three critical moments following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It then assesses their collective global historical significance through a comparison with the rationale and effects of dollar internationalization. Through foregrounding the domestic and global path-dependence of the RMB’s historical evolution, the article argues that RMB internationalization does not constitute a rupture in global historical terms by challenging the dollar’s global reserve currency status; rather, it paradoxically consolidates a dollar-centric global monetary system because the CPC is committed to sustaining the Mao-era (1949-76) legacy of absolute macroeconomic control.
Although the North Atlantic was plunged into crisis in the early 1970s, radicals proved unable to seize the opportunity as they entered a crisis of their own. In France, to a degree unparalleled elsewhere, prominent former radicals not only disavowed anti-imperialist internationalism but rallied behind the rival human rights internationalism. In so doing, they brought with them a set of experiences, which strengthened human rights activism. Despite their fading fortunes, and the growing strength of their rivals, radicals struggled to reinvent anti-imperialist internationalism. But they found themselves trapped in an uphill battle facing one obstacle after another. One of the most devastating blows was the internecine war between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Revolutionaries in all three countries had developed a revolutionary strategy based in Leninism, joined hands in the struggle against imperialism, and claimed they were transitioning to communism together. Now they slaughtered each other in the name of national self-determination. Although the Third Indochina War did not destroy radicalism, it severely destabilized radical politics. While much of this failure can be traced to deeper histories of colonialism, imperialism, and American intervention in the region, revolutionaries, and the ideas that guided them, played a role as well. In this context, the idea of the right of nations to self-determination specifically, and the Leninist problematic more generally, suffered a terrible blow. The horrific events in Southeast Asia deepened the gnawing crisis of Leninism, which would ultimately bring down the project of anti-imperialist internationalism as such, creating a perfect opportunity for the rival human rights internationalism to take the stage.
Three decades after 1989, historical materials are now available for understanding the Tiananmen protests in a new light. In a play-by-play account of the elite politics that led to the military crackdown, Yang Su addresses the repression of the protest in the context of political leadership succession. He challenges conventional views that see the military intervention as a necessary measure against a revolutionary mobilization. Beneath the political drama, Deadly Decision in Beijing explores the authoritarian regime's perpetual crisis of leadership transition and its impact on popular movements.
Drawing on 1,384 notifications, this chapter demonstrates increased nominal support concentrated among few members that has declined as a percentage of world agricultural value of production, with a shift toward relatively more support by developing country members. Trade-distorting Art. 6 support, subject to limit or exempt, has declined even nominally, while rising in China and India. There is a substantial shift toward green box support that accounts in recent years for nearly 80% of all support, with China accounting for over 40% of these expenditures. Given the exemptions and unused space for support subject to limits, the Agreement has not required members to lower their distortionary support. It has, however, provided guidance to policy evolution and a basis for benchmarking members’ support decisions. The trends and levels of Art. 6 and green box support reflect both members’ policy changes and continuing differences in their chosen support measures.
This chapter deals with Germany’s perspective on and activities in the United Nations and other international organisations. The first part deals with Germany’s involvement in a UN Security Council reform, Germany failing to integrate climate security into the work of the Security Council and Germany’s position that the UN headquarters must be accessible to all member States. Germany’s take on Security Council Resolution 2510 (2020) will be criticised. It will be assessed why Germany opposes the US interpretation of Security Council Resolution 2331 (2015). Germany’s position on civil society briefers to the Security Council, Germany accusing Russia and China of obstructing the implementation of resolutions, Germany’s difficulties as chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee, Germany’s membership of the Economic and Social Council and criticism against Germany for its handling of the Afghanistan file in the UN General Assembly is also addressed. Russia’s and China’s criticism of the German Security Council membership and reviews of the German membership will also be examined. The second part encompasses Germany’s position on youth participation in international organisations.
East Asia had incorporated Western music well before dodecaphony was introduced. Its foray into atonality and dodecaphony is unsurprising. Japan, as the first country to fully embrace Westernisation, played a major role. Developments of dodecaphony in China and Korea were connected to Japan through an active network of ideas, print media, and movement of people in the region. Despite their shared resources, however, wars and politics determined whether or not (and when) composers in different East Asian countries had the liberty to explore dodecaphony. China was close to developing dodecaphonic compositions before being stopped after the founding of Communist China in 1949. The post-Mao introduction of dodecaphony, led by Luo Zhongrong, was a late ‘arrival’. Japanese composers’ initial enthusiasm for dodecaphony did not gain in significance. Yoritsune Matsudaira and Joji Yuasa were representative. In Korea, led by Isang Yun and Sukhi Kang, serialism was employed thoughtfully by several generations of composers throughout their creative output.