Healthcare workers (HCW) are at increased risk of infection during pandemics. HCW personal protective equipment (PPE) use has been shown to lower infection rates among HCW and patients. However, low compliance and misuse are frequent. Since future outbreaks are unavoidable, this issue needs to be addressed.

A validated questionnaire was distributed to 617 HCWs (nurses and physicians) in 21 hospitals and 40 primary care clinics in Israel at the peak of the A/H1N1 pandemic.

PPE confidence was higher among HCWs with higher tested and self-perceived knowledge. Confidence was also higher among nurses compared with physicians and among employees in hospitals compared with those in primary care clinics. Experience treating A/H1N1 patients was related to higher self-perceived knowledge and PPE confidence.

High levels of PPE knowledge were significantly correlated to HCWs’ confidence in PPE and may help increase PPE usage and reduce absenteeism. (Diaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2014;0:1-8)

Terrorist attacks have occurred in Tel-Aviv that have caused mass-casualties.The objective of this study was to draw lessons from the medical response to an event that occurred on 19 January 2006, near the central bus station, Tel-Aviv, Israel. The lessons pertain to the management of primary triage, evacuation priorities, and rapid primary distribution between adjacent hospitals and the operational mode of the participating hospitals during the event.

Data were collected in formal debriefings both during and after the event. Data were analyzed to learn about medical response components, interactions, and main outcomes. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic AnalysiS Through—Components, Interactions and Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

A total of 38 wounded were evacuated from the scene, including one severely injured, two moderately injured, and 35 mildly injured. The severe casualty was the first to be evacuated 14 minutes after the explosion. All of the casualties were evacuated from the scene within 29 minutes. Patients were distributed between three adjacent hospitals including one non-Level-1 Trauma Center that received mild casualties. Twenty were evacuated to the nearby, Level-1 Sourasky Medical Center, including the only severely injured patient. Nine mildly injured patients were evacuated to the Sheba Medical Center and nine to Wolfson Hospital, a non-Level-1 Trauma Center hospital. All the receiving hospitals were operated according to the mass-casualty incident doctrine.

When a mass-casualty incident occurs in the vicinity of more than one hospital, primary triage, evacuation priority decision-making, and rapid distribution of casualties between all of the adjacent hospitals enables efficient and effective containment of the event.

The classical doctrine of mass toxicological events provides general guidelines for the management of a wide range of “chemical” events. The guidelines include provisions for the: (1) protection of medical staff with personal protective equipment; (2) simple triage of casualties; (3) airway pro-tection and early intubation; (4) undressing and decontamination at the hos-pital gates; and (5) medical treatment with antidotes, as necessary. A number of toxicological incidents in Israel during the summer of 2005 involved chlo-rine exposure in swimming pools. In the largest event, 40 children were affected. This study analyzes its medical management, in view of the Israeli Guidelines for Mass Toxicological Events.

Data were collected from debriefings by the Israeli Home Front Command, emergency medical services (EMS), participating hospitals, and hospital chart reviews. The timetable of the event, the number and severity of casualties evacuated to each hospital, and the major medical and logistical problems encountered were analyzed according to the recently described methodology of Disastrous Incident Systematic Analysis Through-Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR).

The first ambulance arrived on-scene seven minutes after the first call. Emergency medical services personnel provided supplemental oxygen to the vic-tims at the scene and en route when required. Forty casualties were evacuated to four nearby hospitals. Emergency medical services classified 26 patients as mild-ly injured, 13 as mild-moderate, and one as moderate, suffering from pulmonary edema. Most children received bronchodilators and steroids in the emergency room; 20 were hospitalized. All were treated in pediatric emergency rooms. None of the hospitals deployed their decontamination sites.

Event management differed from the standard Israeli toxico-logical doctrine. It involved EMS triage of casualties to a number of medical centers, treatment in pediatric emergency departments, lack of use of protec-tive gear, and omission of decontamination prior to emergency department entrance. Guidelines for mass toxicological events must be tailored to unique scenarios, such as chlorine intoxications at swimming pools, and for specific patient populations, such as children. All adult emergency departments always should be prepared and equipped for taking care of pediatric patients.

Crowd control is essential to the handling of mass-casualty incidents (MCIs).This is the task of the police at the site of the incident. For a hospital, responsibility falls on its security forces, with the police assuming an auxiliary role. Crowd control is difficult, especially when the casualties are due to riots involving clashes between rioters and police. This study uses data regarding the October 2000 riots in Nazareth to draw lessons about the determinants of crowd control on the scene and in hospitals.

Data collected from formal debriefings were processed to identify the specifics of a MCI due to massive riots. The transport of patients to the hospital and the behavior of their families were considered.The actions taken by the Hospital Manager to control crowds on the hospital premises also were analyzed.

During 10 days of riots (01–10 October 2000), 160 casualties, including 10 severely wounded, were evacuated to the Nazareth Italian Hospital. The Nazareth English Hospital received 132 injured patients, including one critically wounded, nine severely wounded, 26 moderately injured, and 96 mildly injured. All victims were evacuated from the scene by private vehicles and were accompanied by numerous family members. This obstructed access to hospitals and hampered the care of the casualties in the emergency department. The hospital staff was unable to perform triage at the emergency department's entrance and to assign the wounded to immediate treatment areas or waiting areas. All of the wounded were taken by their families directly into the “immediate care” location where a great effort was made to prioritize the severely injured. In order to control the events, the hospital's managers enlisted prominent individuals within the crowds to aid with control. At one point, the mayor was enlisted to successfully achieve crowd control.

During riots, city, community, and even makeshift leaders within a crowd can play a pivotal role in helping hospital management control crowds. It may be advisable to train medical teams and hospital management to recognize potential leaders, and gain their cooperation in such an event. To optimize such cooperation, community leaders also should be acquainted with the roles of public health agencies and emergency services systems.

Medical systems worldwide are facing the new threat of morbidity associated with the deliberate dispersal of microbiological agents by terrorists. Rapid diagnosis and containment of this type of unannounced attack is based on the knowledge and capabilities of medical staff. In 2004, the knowledge of emergency department physicians of anthrax was tested. The average test score was 58%. Consequently, a national project on bioterrorism preparedness was developed. The aim of this article is to present the project in which medical knowledge was enhanced regarding a variety of bioterrorist threats, including cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax, botulinum, and smallpox.

In 2005, military physicians and experts on bioterrorism conducted special seminars and lectures for the staff of the hospital emergency department and internal medicine wards.Later, emergency department senior physicians were drilled using one of the scenarios.

Twenty-nine lectures and 29 drills were performed in 2005.The average drill score was 81.7%.The average score of physicians who attended the lecture was 86%, while those who did not attend the lectures averaged 78.3% (NS).

Emergency department physicians were found to be highly knowledgeable in nearly all medical and logistical aspects of the response to different bioterrorist threats. Intensive and versatile preparedness modalities, such as lectures, drills, and posters, given to a carefully selected group of clinicians, can increase their knowledge, and hopefully improve their response to a bioterrorist attack.

A mass-casualty incident (MCI) can occur in the periphery of a densely populated area, away from a metropolitan area. In such circumstances, the medical management of the casualties is expected to be difficult because the nearest hospital and the emergency medical services (EMS), only can offer limited resources.When coping with these types of events (i.e., limited medical capability in the nearby medical facilities), a quick response time and rational triage can have a great impact on the outcome of the victims. The objective of this study was to identify the lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist attack that occurred on 05 December 2005, in Netanya, a small Israeli city.

Data were collected during and after the event from formal debriefings and from patient files. The data were processed using descriptive statistics and compared to those from previous events. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

Four victims and the terrorist died as a result of this suicide bombing. A total of 131 patients were evacuated (by EMS or self-evacuation) to three nearby hospitals. Due to the proximity of the event to the ambulance dispatch station, the EMS response was quick.The first evacuation took place only three minutes after the explosion. Non-urgent patients were diverted to two close-circle hospitals, allowing the nearest hospital to treat urgent patients and to receive the majority of self-evacuated patients. The nearest hospital continued to receive patients for >6 hours after the explosion, 57 of them (78%) were self-evacuated.

The distribution of casualties from the scene plays a vital role in the management of a MCI that occurs in the outskirts of a densely populated area.Non-urgent patients should be referred to a hospital close to the scene of the event, but not the closest hospital.The nearest hospital should be prepared to treat urgent casualties, as well as a large number of self-evacuated patients.

Mildly injured and “worried well” patients can have profound effects on the management of a mass-casualty incident. The objective of this study is to describe the characteristics and lessons learned from an event that occurred on 28 August 2005 near the central bus station in Beer-Sheva, Israel. The unique profile of injuries allows for the examination of the medical and operational aspects of the management of mild casualties.

Data were collected during and after the event, using patient records and formal debriefings.They were processed focusing on the characteristics of patient complaints, medical response, and the dynamics of admission.

A total of 64 patients presented to the local emergency department, including two critical casualties. The remaining 62 patients were mildly injured or suffered from stress. Patient presentation to the emergency department was bi-phasic; during the first two hours following the attack (i.e., early phase), the rate of arrival was high (one patient every three minutes), and anxiety was the most frequent chief complaint.During the second phase, the rate of arrival was lower (one patient every 27 minutes), and the typical chief complaint was somatic. Additionally, tinnitus and complaints related to minor trauma also were recorded frequently.

Psychiatric consultation was obtained for 58 (91%) of the patients. Social services were involved in the care of 47 of the patients (73%).Otolaryngology and surgery consultations were obtained for 45% and 44%, respectively. The need for some medical specialties (e.g., surgery and orthopedics) mainly was during the first phase, whereas others, mainly psychiatry and otolaryngology, were needed during both phases. Only 13 patients (20%) needed a consultation from internal medicine.

Following a terrorist attack, a large number of mildly injured victims and those experiencing stress are to be expected, without a direct relation to the effectiveness of the attack. Mildly injured patients tend to appear in two phases. In the first phase, the rate of admission is expected to be higher. Due to the high incidence of anxiety and other stress-related phenomena, many mildly injured patients will require psychiatric evaluation. In the case of a bombing attack, many of the victims must be evaluated by an otolaryngologist.

Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) can occur outside of major metropolitan areas. In such circumstances, the nearest hospital seldom is a Level-1 Trauma Center. Moreover, emergency medical services (EMS) capabilities in such areas tend to be limited, which may compromise prehospital care and evacuation speed. The objective of this study was to extract lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist event that occurred in the marketplace of a small Israeli town on 26 October 2005. The lessons pertain to the management of primary and secondary evacuation and the operational practices by the only hospital in the town, which is designated as a Level-2 Trauma Center.

Data were collected during the event by Home Front Command Medical Department personnel. After the event, formal and informal debriefings were conducted with emergency medical services personnel, the hospitals involved, and the Ministry of Health.The medical response components, interactions (mainly primary triage and secondary distribution), and the principal outcomes were analyzed.The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

The suicide bomber and four victims died at the scene, and two severely injured patients later died in the hospital. A total of 58 wounded persons were evacuated, including eight severely injured, two moderately injured, and 48 mildly injured. Forty-nine of the wounded arrived to the nearby Hillel Yafe Hospital, including all eight of the severely injured victims, the two moderately injured, and 39 of the mildly injured. Most of the mildly injured victims were evacuated in private cars by bystanders.

Five other area hospitals were alerted, three of which primarily received the mildly injured victims. Twodistant, Level-1 Trauma Centers also were alerted; each received one severely injured patient from Hillel Yafe Hospital during the secondary distribution process.

Emergency medical services personnel were able to treat and evacuate all severely and moderately injured patients within 17 minutes of the explosion. A total of 12 of the 21 ambulances arriving on-scene within the first 20 minutes were staffed by emergency medical services volunteers or off-duty workers.

When a mass-casualty incident occurs in a small town that is in the vicinity of a Level-2 Trauma Center, and located a >40 minute drive from Level-1 Trauma Centers, the Level-2 Trauma Center is a critical component in medical management of the event. All severely and moderately injured patients initially should be evacuated to the Level-2 Trauma Center, and given advanced, hospital-based resuscitation. The patients needing care beyond the capabilities of this facility should be distributed secondarily to Level-1 Trauma Centers.To alleviate the burden placed on the local hospital, some of the mildly injured victims can be evacuated primarily to more distant hospitals.The ability to control the flow of mildly injured patients is limitedby the large percentage of them arriving by private cars. The availability of emergency medical services in small towns can be augmented significantly by enrolling off-duty emergency medical services workers and volunteers to the rescue effort. Level-2 hospitals in small towns should be prepared and drilled to operate in a “selective evacuation” mode during mass-casualty incidents.

A mass toxicological event (MTE) caused by an act of terrorism or an industrial incident can create large numbers of ambulatory casualties suffering from mild intoxication, acute stress reaction (ASR), and exacerbation of chronic diseases or iatrogenic insult (such as atropine overdose). The logistical and medical management of this population may present a challenge insuch a scenario. The aim of this article is to describe the concept of the Israeli Home Front Command (HFC) of a “Mild Casualties Center” (MCC) for a chemical scenario, and to analyze the results of two large-scale drills that have been used to evaluate this concept.

Two large-scale drills were conducted. One MCC drill was located in a school building and the second MCC drill was located in a basketball stadium. These medical centers were staffed by physicians, nurses, and medics, both military (reservists) and civilian (community, non-hospital teams). Two hundred simulated patients entered the MCC during each of the drills, and drill observers assessed how these patients were managed for two hours.

Of the casualties, 28 were treated in the “medical treatment site”, 10 of which were relocated to a nearby hospital. Only four casualties were treated in the large “mental care site”, planned for a much higher burden of “worried well” patients. Documentation of patient data and medical care was sub-optimal.

A MCC is a logistically suitable solution for the challenge of managing thousands of ambulatory casualties. The knowledge of the medical team must be bolstered, as most are unfamiliar with both nerve gas poisoning and with ASR. Mild casualties centers should not be located within hospitals and must be staffed by non-hospital, medical personnel to achieve the main task of allowing hospital teams to focus on providing medical care to the moderate and severe nerve gas casualties, without the extra burden of caring for thousands of mild casualties.

Quarantelli established criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of disaster management.

The objectives of this study were to analyze the response of the healthcare system to the Tsunami disaster according to the Quarantelli principles, and to validate these principles in a scenario of a disaster due to natural hazards.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Home Front Command Medical Department sent a research team to study the response of the Thai medical system to the disaster. The analysis of the disaster management was based on Quarantelli's 10 criteria for evaluating the management of community disasters. Data were collected through personal and group interviews.

The three most important elements for effective disaster management were: (1) the flow of information; (2) overall coordination; and (3) leadership. Although pre-event preparedness was for different and smaller scenarios, medical teams repeatedly reported a better performance in hospitals that recently conducted drills.

In order to increase effectiveness, disaster management response should focus on: (1) the flow of information; (2) overall coordination; and (3) leadership.

On 26 December 2004 at 09:00 h, an earthquake of 9.0 magnitude (Richter scale) struck the area off of the western coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, triggering a Tsunami. As of 25 January 2005, 5,388 fatalities were confirmed, 3,120 people were reported missing, and 8,457 people were wounded in Thailand alone. Little information is available in the medical literature regarding the response and restructuring of the prehospital healthcare system in dealing with major natural disasters.

The objective of the study was to analyze the prehospital medical response to the Tsunami in Thailand, and to identify possible ways of improving future preparedness and response.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Home Front Command Medical Department sent a research delegation to study the response of the Thai medical system to the 2004 earthquake and Tsunami disaster. The delegation met with Thai healthcare and military personnel, who provided medical care for and evacuated the Tsunami victims. The research instruments included questionnaires (open and closed questions), interviews, and a review of debriefing session reports held in the days following the Tsunami.

Beginning the day after the event, primary health care in the affected provinces was expanded and extended. This included: (1) strengthening existing primary care facilities with personnel and equipment; (2) enhancing communication and transportation capabilities; (3) erecting healthcare facilities in newly constructed evacuation centers; (4) deploying mobile, medical teams to make house calls to flood refugees in affected areas; and (5) deploying ambulance crews to the affected areas to search for survivors and provide primary care triage and transportation.

The restructuring of the prehospital healthcare system was crucial for optimal management of the healthcare needs of Tsunami victims and for the reduction of the patient loads on secondary medical facilities. The disaster plan of a national healthcare system should include special consideration for the restructuring and reinforcement prehospital system.

Large-scale, terrorist attacks can happen in peripheral areas, which are located close to a country's borders and far from its main medical facilities and involve multi-national casualties and responders. The objective of this study was to analyze the terrorist suicide bombings that occurred on 07 October 2004, near the Israeli-Egyptian border, as representative of such a complex scenario.

Data from formal debriefings after the event were processed in order to learn about victim outcomes, resource utilization, critical events, and time course of the emergency response.

A total of 185 injured survivors were repatriated: four were severely wounded, 13 were moderately injured, and 168 were mildly injured. Thirty-eight people died. A forward medical team landed at the border town's airport, which provided reinforcement in the field and in the local hospital. Israeli and Egyptian search and rescue teams collaborated at the destruction site. One-hundred sixty-eight injured patients arrived at the small border hospital that rapidly organized itself for the mass-casualty incident, operating as an evacuation “staging hospital”. Twenty-three casualties secondarily were distributed to two major trauma centers in the south and the center of Israel, respectively, either by ambulance or by helicopter.

Large-scale, terrorist attacks at a peripheral border zone can be handled by international collaboration, reinforcement of medical teams at the site itself and at the peripheral neighboring hospital, rapid rearrangement of an “evacuation hospital”, and efficient transport to trauma centers by ambulances, helicopters, and other aircraft.