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5 results

  • Chapter 21 - Situated Semantics

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 401-418

  • Summary

    This chapter sets out how an account of vision in which the world is considered to form an external memory allows for explanation of the experienced continuity of vision. It shows how the hypothesis of the world as an outside memory is supported by findings in the change and attentional blindness paradigms, as well as by the study of vision in action. The change blindness paradigm has generated much research and can be observed in a variety of situations (when the image change occurs during e.g. eye blinks). Further empirical confirmation of the idea that we do not continually represent the entire visual field in all its richness comes from the inattentional blindness paradigm. Data obtained by studying vision in natural conditions have highlighted features that are strongly supportive of the hypothesis of the world as an outside memory.

  • Relational priming: Obligational nitpicking

  • Varol Akman
  • Journal:
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 31 / Issue 4 / August 2008
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    29 July 2008, pp. 378-379

  • According to the target article authors, initial experience with a circumstance primes a relation that can subsequently be applied to a different circumstance to draw an analogy. While I broadly agree with their claim about the role of relational priming in early analogical reasoning, I put forward a few concerns that may be worthy of further reflection.