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9 results

  • Chapter 2 - Two Kinds of Introspection
  • from Part I - Consciousness
  • Edited by Josh Weisberg, University of Houston
  • Book: Qualitative Consciousness
  • Published online: 06 October 2022
  • Print publication: 20 October 2022, pp 30-48
  • View extract

    Summary

    Qualitative consciousness is conscious experience marked by the presence of sensory qualities, like the experienced painfulness of having a piano dropped on your foot or the consciousness of seeing the brilliant reds and oranges of a sunset. Over his career, philosopher David Rosenthal has defended an influential theoretical approach to explaining qualitative consciousness. This approach involves the development of two theories – the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality-space theory of sensory quality. If the problem of explaining qualitative consciousness is divided into two more manageable pieces, the door opens to a satisfying explanation of what is seen by some to be an intractable explanatory puzzle. This interdisciplinary collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon themes inspired by Rosenthal’s work. The result is an exciting collection of new essays by philosophers and scientists, which will be of interest to all those engaged in consciousness studies.

  • Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences
  • Uriah Kriegel
  • Journal: Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 39 / Issue 4 / December 2009
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020, pp. 585-617
  • View extract

    John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call causal token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non-perceptual) experiences, which I will call temporal token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable.

  • Philosophy as Total Axiomatics: Serious Metaphysics, Scrutability Bases, and Aesthetic Evaluation
  • URIAH KRIEGEL
  • Journal: Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 2 / Issue 2 / Summer 2016
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 April 2016, pp. 272-290
  • View abstract

    What is the aim of philosophy? There may be too many philosophical branches, traditions, practices, and programs to admit of a single overarching aim. Here, I focus on a fairly traditional philosophical project that has recently received increasingly sophisticated articulation, especially by Frank Jackson (1998) and David Chalmers (2012). In Section 1, I present the project and suggest that it is usefully thought of as ‘total axiomatics’: the project of attempting to axiomatize the total theory of the world. In Section 2, I raise a problem for the project that I call the ‘problem of multiple axiomatizations’. I consider some initially alluring but ultimately unpromising approaches to this problem in Section 3. In Section 4, I defend a surprising approach to the problem, according to which competing axiomatizations of the total theory of the world are effectively evaluated for their aesthetic virtues.

  • Chapter 2 - Self-representationalism and the explanatory gap
  • Edited by JeeLoo Liu, California State University, Fullerton, John Perry, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Consciousness and the Self
  • Published online: 05 December 2011
  • Print publication: 17 November 2011, pp 51-75
  • View abstract

    Summary

    According to self-representationalism, a mental state is phenomenally conscious when it represents itself in the right way. The motivation for this view is a conception of phenomenal consciousness as involving essentially a subtle, primordial kind of self-consciousness. A consequence of this conception is that the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties is eo ipso an explanatory gap between self-consciousness and physical properties. This chapter first explains how self-representationalism can address this explanatory gap. It opens with a presentation of self-representationalism and the motivation for it. Then, it describes the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap. This approach is threatened by an objection to self-representationalism, raised by Levine, which the author calls the "just more representation" objection. Finally, the chapter shows how the self-representationalist might approach the objection.
  • Chapter 3 - Philosophical theories of consciousness: contemporary Western perspectives
  • from Part I - The cognitive science of consciousness
  • Edited by Philip David Zelazo, University of Toronto, Morris Moscovitch, University of Toronto, Evan Thompson, University of York
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness
  • Published online: 05 June 2012
  • Print publication: 14 May 2007, pp -
  • View extract

    Summary

    This chapter surveys current approaches to consciousness in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The five approaches discussed here include: mysterianism, dualism, representationalism, higher-order monitoring theory (HOMT), and self-representationalism. The chapter introduces a conceptual distinction between two kinds of mysterianism, an ontological one and an epistemological one. At the center of McGinn's theory is the concept of cognitive closure. Traditionally, approaches to the ontology of mind and consciousness have been divided into two main groups: monism and dualism. Most of the arguments that have been marshaled against representationalism are arguments by counter-example. HOMT tends to anchor consciousness in the operation of a monitoring device. One problem that does persist for the self-representational theory is the problem of animal consciousness. The ability to have self-representing states presumably requires all the conceptual sophistication that the ability to have higher-order monitoring states does, and perhaps even greater sophistication.