German army traditionally stressed the personal factor and therefore the importance of the second command task, selecting the right men. Operated the ‘seniority tempered by merit’ principle for appointing and promoting officers, based on a carefully structured though flawed confidential reporting system. Continuous but not always successful efforts during the war to select good and weed out unsuitable commanders and general staff officers. Limits on ability to post officers freely, especially because of the constraints on and conservatism of the Military Cabinet running the system. Suggestions that function automatically overrode rank at best oversimplified. Always the possibility of friction in such cases, illustrating the effect of personal factors such as reputation, honour, ambition, pay and strain. Personal relationships, sometimes developing into networks and cliques, interacted with objective professional considerations and influenced the conduct of operations as well as the subsequent historiography. Two case studies illustrate these factors.

The German army viewed war as the realm of constant uncertainty. Reducing this was the third command task, principally through intelligence on the enemy and information on German troops (Chapter 6). By 1917, loss of the initiative and the need to deploy scarce resources efficiently had boosted German military intelligence’s importance. Its dense network of sources. Poor integration and frequent squabbles between intelligence producers, but also effective informal co-operation, including extensive use of civilians. The tiny Intelligence Department in OHL (Supreme Army Command) produced all-source assessments used extensively by decision-makers, but performance on total war political and economic requirements was inadequate despite recruitment of high-level agents.

Case study of German intelligence’s mixed performance in spring 1917. Good intelligence played a central role in the German victory over the French assault by enabling timely concentration of forces; but uncertainty about British plans was a major factor in delaying defensive preparations, leading to the initial defeat at Arras.

Recaps why 1917 Entente spring offensive a good case study of German command, and derivation of the command tasks. Sums up findings on the patchy fulfilment of the tasks. Shows why they apply to German command throughout the First World War and beyond; draws parallels with British and French experience.

The German army which emerges was neither a picture of military excellence nor a gang of incompetents. Analysing its command tasks and their fulfilment produces a more rounded and more humanly recognisable picture of German command and of the army as an institution. This helps understand better their contribution to Germany’s ability to hold out for four years. In early 1917, the army was flawed and under increasing strain, but still able to think and operate effectively. It remained too formidable an opponent for the Entente to defeat despite their numerical and material superiority.

Despite the Western Front’s reputation for stagnation, the armies there strove for tactical, technological and organisational advantage. Learning was the fourth command task, and the chapter describes both how and what the German army learned about combined arms battle, the key to tactical success. By mid-1916, it had fallen behind the enemy. Evolution of doctrine to remedy this, resistance to it and measures to overcome the resistance. Case study on converting the doctrine into reality by training of command teams and formations.

Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of German combined arms performance in the spring fighting. Different lessons learned and OHL’s more directive approach when updating doctrine to prevent chaos. Positive reputation of the doctrine but important tactical defects persisted. Strong evidence from this period both for and against the German army as a learning organisation: this ambivalence an important cause of uneven success converting learning into improved performance.

The German army recognised before 1914 the importance of communication to the third command task, reducing uncertainty, and evolved organisational, personal and technical means to handle it. Realities of battle in 1917 confirmed some pre-war ideas and disproved others. Headquarters expanded and were forced to the rear by firepower. Bureaucratic burden continually increased despite attempts to reverse it and partly because of failure to adopt modern methods of information handling. Personal contact remained essential to command, though 1917 conditions made it more difficult. The same conditions led to ever-greater reliance on technical communications means and organisations, which were continually developed. Performance of the communications system in the spring fighting was at least adequate, including because of the attackers’ slow tempo. Subsequent developments of doctrine and organisation. Unstoppable growth of bureaucracy and linked problem of falsified reporting were danger signals that the urge to reduce uncertainty had got out of hand.

Introduces the book as an empirical case study of the 1917 Entente spring offensive which analyses five key command tasks to illustrate the story of the German army in the First World War. Situates the book in the debate about how Germany was able to hold out for four years. Explains the significance of the offensive and its defeat for Germany, Britain and France at each level of war – grand strategic, strategic, operational and tactical.

Reviews scholarship on the offensive and German command, then explores German thinking on command from Moltke the Elder to 1917 and the linked question of the army’s ability to adapt. Emphasises its unresolved dichotomy between modernity and conservatism. Outlines modern thinking on command. Draws all this together to deduce the army’s five command tasks, explores the sources for analysing them and demonstrates the new insights into the German army and First World War produced by this approach.

Traditional principles studied in this chapter – mission command (decentralisation) and partnership between a commander and his chief of staff – are seen as a special characteristic of German command. Part of the mechanism for handling the first command task, co-ordinating a mass army. Why mission command’s implementation was limited in Western Front conditions, and how granting autonomy of action could go badly wrong. Lack of trust in subordinates, risk aversion, the growing complexity of battle, shortages of manpower and matériel and good communications led to increased micro-management.

Mission command linked to the partnership between a commander and his chief staff officer, the command team. Composition, strengths and weaknesses of the commander and general staff officer cadres. Great efforts to create effective command teams: reasonably successful in terms of their duration, less so in the vital combined arms balance required by modern battle. General staff officers increasingly influential, but commanders remained important.

The first command task involved control as well as decentralisation. Chapter explains the military organisation which exerted control and implemented the two further traditional principles involved, establishing a point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) and maintaining the chain of command. Describes the roles of the four levels of command covered by the book, army groups, Armies, corps and divisions, focusing on often-misunderstood changes brought about by the strain of modern battle.

Case study illustrates the difficulties and successes of implementing the Schwerpunkt and chain of command principles as the German army prepared for the Entente offensive. Concluding section links organisational change in 1917 to pre-war thinking on command and stresses the difficulty of striking the right balance between the two elements of the first command task, decentralisation and control. Outcome depended on the complex interplay of principles, formal organisational responsibilities, events and in particular personal factors.