Ireland can claim to have a series of lengthy and important military cultures or traditions. The most obvious is, perhaps, what could be termed a republican military culture. This dates from the United Irishmen formed in the 1790s and inspired by the ideology of revolutionary France. The United Irishmen, who recruited amongst both Catholics and Presbyterians, were responsible for a series of localised risings in 1798, most notably in Counties Antrim, Down and Wexford, and for Robert Emmet’s rebellion of 1803 in Dublin. This republican military tradition can then be traced through the Young Ireland Rising of 1848, Fenian Rising of 1867, Easter Rising of 1916, the Irish War of Independence of 1919–21, the Irish Civil War of 1922–23 and later Provisional Irish Republican Army campaign of 1969–98. Almost as well known is what could be termed the ‘Wild Geese’ tradition. With the end of the Williamite Wars, with the Treaty of Limerick in 1692, and subsequent penal laws, Irish Catholics were prohibited from enlisting in the British army, due to fears of continued Jacobite sympathy. They were, however, able to enlist in ‘Irish Brigades’ in the French and Spanish armies. Only with the repeal of the penal laws regarding army enlistment and the decimation of the Irish Brigades during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars did this tradition fully end, though by the 1790s it is clear that very few of the rank and file in the Irish Brigade in the French army were actually Irish born. In terms of overseas service, one might also look to the large numbers of men of Irish birth who served in both the Union and Confederate armies during the American Civil War, those who served in the various South American wars of liberation of 1815–28, and the Irish battalion which served in defence of the Papal States in 1861. There was also a Protestant volunteering tradition, which might be traced back as far as the Ulster plantation of the early seventeenth century, when those granted lands under the plantation settlements were meant to bring in settlers from England and Scotland who would serve in a Protestant militia in time of war.

Claude John Eyre Auchinleck was born in Aldershot on 21 June 1884. He was the eldest son of Colonel John Claude Alexander Auchinleck, Royal Horse Artillery and Mary Eleanor, daughter of John Eyre. Claude Auchinleck, like many of the senior officers in the British army in the Second World War, most notably, Field Marshals Harold Alexander, Alan Brooke, John Dill and Bernard Montgomery, was from an Anglo-Irish gentry background, though the family's origins were in the village of Auchinleck in Ayrshire. Given the number of Anglo-Irish officers who reached high rank in the British army, there is a tendency to see the Anglo-Irish officer as over-represented. H. J. Hanham noted that, ‘In terms of officers per head the Church of Ireland … was presumably the most army-orientated denomination in the British Isles.’ Correlli Barnett believed that the Anglo-Irish were a British version of the ‘Prussian Junker class’. However, Nick Perry's careful study of this issue suggests that the Anglo-Irish gentry were as likely to be commissioned into the army as Scots gentry (40 per cent of male gentry of military age), whereas the English and Welsh figure stood at 30 per cent.

Claude Auchinleck himself, when relinquishing the colonelcy of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, which he held between 1941 and 1947, identified his Irish origins by stating, ‘My forefathers lived in Enniskillen and Fermanagh for very many years and this makes me all the prouder to have belonged to the regiment.’ In fact Auchinleck's father had equally firm roots in Counties Tyrone and Wexford and his mother's family came from Galway. Auchinleck's ‘Irishness’ can be questioned by the fact that the Irish Times, which had been the newspaper of the Anglo-Irish establishment, though it had moved far away from these origins by 1981, did not carry a full length obituary of him and the recently published Dictionary of Irish Biography does not devote an entry to him. T. G. Fraser's overstates the contrary interpretation by noting that, ‘Two things stand out from Auchinleck's background and early life: his sense of identity as an Ulsterman and his commitment to India.’

A consideration of Auchinleck's time as C in C Middle East must consider four aspects of his command, which are, of course, inter-related. The first concerns Auchinleck's relationship with Winston Churchill; this is difficult as Churchill communicated to Auchinleck as Churchill often failing to make it clear if he was acting solely as Prime Minister, as Prime Minster with the authority of the Cabinet and/or Chiefs of Staff behind him, as Minister of Defence or as trusted confidant. The second aspect of Auchinleck's command concerns his relationship with the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir John Dill and General Sir Alan Brooke. This, of course, is difficult to divide from Auchinleck's relationship with Churchill as, often, Auchinleck looked to Dill or Brooke to defend his position. Indeed, Auchinleck's problems in dealing with Churchill may, partly have stemmed from the fact that Auchinleck expected the CIGS to back him and defend his position as theatre and army commander, while the CIGS sometimes took on this role and sometimes tried to act as honest brokers between Churchill and Auchinleck. Auchinleck's relationship with Dill was closer than that with Brooke, but this, of course, was problematic in itself as Dill was not always well placed on how best to advise Auchinleck on how to deal with Churchill's demands, given his own difficult relationship with the Prime Minister. The third aspect of Auchinleck's command which comes through in these papers is concerned with the military appointments Auchinleck made, especially with regard to the command of Eighth Army. Auchinleck picked his own commanders, but sacking Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham was no easy task and Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie was probably not the right man for the job in that Auchinleck did not have complete confidence in him and Ritchie's subordinates did not easily accept his authority. More broadly, the papers show Auchinleck's wider decisions about staff and command appointments to have been, at times, less than inspired, particularly with respect to Major General Eric ‘Chink’ Dorman-Smith. Finally, the papers are revealing about the problems Auchinleck confronted as, effectively, a coalition commander, commanding British Dominion and Indian Army troops, Free French and Free Poles as well as British troops.

The campaign in Norway was beset with many problems from the outset and these are neatly revealed in the Auchinleck papers. Auchinleck’s position was, of course, a rather usual one, in that he was appointed to take command of an ongoing operation and, rather than being flown immediately to northern Norway, he was given time to make his own appreciation of the situation. Auchinleck's concerns about the attempt to capture Narvik and the military resources required to do this are clear; in particular he was clearly concerned about German air superiority and asked for a very large number of anti-aircraft guns, clearly believing that RAF support was inadequate [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 16]. It is also clear that the decision to capture and occupy Narvik was a political, rather than military one, with Narvik harbour having very limited strategic value [4, 5].

The confused system of command, which meant that there was no overall theatre commander, and the inability of Admiral Lord Cork and Major General Mackesy to work effectively together is very clear [6, 11, 12]. Similarly, Auchinleck was concerned at how he could establish his authority as an Allied commander, given the small number of British forces at his disposal [2, 5].

The forces, under Auchinleck's command, were a very mixed bag. He seems to have been impressed by the French troops and the 24th Guards Brigade contained some of the best units in the British army. However, he was less than impressed by the Independent Companies, which can be seen as the precursors of the Commandos. They were designed as specialist irregular units, able to engage in irregular warfare; though the fact that the area around Narvik was sparsely populated made any efforts to develop a guerrilla campaign, with local support, doomed to failure. These companies, each consisting of 20 officers and 270 other ranks, were recruited from throughout the TA in the UK; one company raised from each of the ten TA divisions (only five of these companies saw service in Norway). They had a high allocation of officers and each company included a doctor, demolition experts, a Norwegian interpreter and a mountain warfare officer from the Indian Army. They were wellequipped, with a higher than normal allocation of light machine guns, mortars and radios, and with specialist winter clothing, Alpine rucksacks and snow shoes.

Auchinleck, in command of 5 Corps and then Southern Command, was keen to instil in the troops under his command the idea that they were on active service and in the front line, defending, as they were, a long and vulnerable section of the South Coast of England [20, 27, 30]. Auchinleck summed up his own ideas on defence as the ‘offensive defensive’, which meant both that he wanted to fight a mobile war, but did not have enough transport to ensure mobility, and that he believed that the Germans would be considerably more difficult to defeat if they were allowed to establish a beach head and land heavy equipment [21, 22, 30].

Auchinleck was concerned at the disparities between the regular and Territorial troops under his command. These were seen throughout the army with some TA officers complaining that they were patronised by regulars to a much greater extent than that seen during the First World War. Auchinleck was not convinced that the standard of training of British regular troops was much better than that of the TA, but he did wonder why, if it was believed to be the case, the regulars were not broken up and dispersed amongst TA formations to provide a solid cadre [21, 23, 24]. By mid-August 1940 Auchinleck was developing interesting ideas about how officer–man relations could best be fostered in the new citizen army [26].

Auchinleck clearly felt that LDV and Home Guard units would be useful in defence, particularly in scouting and reconnaissance duties and in guarding lines of communication [22, 29]. However, he was concerned that if anti-tank emplacements were built incorrectly, they would serve to prevent the rapid movement of British reinforcements to launch a counter-attack [22]. Auchinleck was clearly drawn into some acrimonious correspondence regarding the appointment of senior officers in the Home Guard. This was seen most clearly in the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Turner as a Zone Commander in the Gloucestershire Home Guard [28]. Defending his decision over this appointment, Auchinleck was to explain, ‘I selected him after full consultation with, and with the concurrence of, the Duke of Beaufort, who is Lord Lieutenant of the County and the Area Commander, in whose good sense and sound judgement I have full confidence.

Auchinleck as C in C India was anxious to develop a programme which would modernise and expand the Indian Army. On his return to India, he was impressed by what had been achieved in his absence and believed that within seven months armoured units would be sufficiently developed to take the field [40]. The development of armoured forces was something Auchinleck was to return to [50, 57]. Auchinleck's desire to develop the Indian Army's AA capabilities, when the number of guns was limited is also evident [41]. Most surprising, in terms of modernisation, was Auchinleck's desire to develop a parachute brigade within the Indian Army. A lesser general might have concluded that the lack of aircraft, gliders or parachutes made this a pointless task [65, 66].

Auchinleck was keen to expand the recruiting base of the Indian Army far beyond that of the traditional martial races by resurrecting old regiments and forming new ones. In doing this he promoted the development of modern recruiting campaigns [43, 67]. He believed that expansion should go ahead, even if the British contingents normally supplied to each Indian Division were not forthcoming [68]. With regard to the martial races, Auchinleck also outlined the problems seen in the rapid expansion of the number of Gurkha battalions within the Indian Army, which led to serious shortages of officers and NCOs [41].

Auchinleck maintained his belief in the need to Indianise the officer corps of the Indian Army, but at the same time he was keen to obtain as many trained officers as possible from the UK and from British families living in India. Perhaps with memories of his own early career he did not want cadets coming from Britain to be put to the expense of equipping themselves with civilian clothes and he was concerned at the pay disparity between British and Indian officers serving in the Indian Army [40, 43]. He was particularly concerned at the lack of middle-ranking officers in the expanded Indian Army and resisted attempts to obtain such regular officers for irregular units being formed in Singapore [43]. Auchinleck also believed that a wartime spirit should be adopted by officers in India, insisting that all officers should wear uniform, and he was also keen to centralise all headquarters staff in Delhi [40, 59].