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This chapter compares and evaluates two theories of qualitative states that is, states that have a proprietary phenomenological dimension. The first theory is known as type materialism or the central state identity theory. The second theory is representationalism. The most compelling virtue of the central state theory is that it can do justice to the fact that qualitative phenomena appear to be perfectly correlated with cortical phenomena. According to the central state identity theory, all awareness of qualitative states takes the form of judgments and therefore necessarily involves conceptualization. The main virtue of representationalism is its account of qualitative awareness. This chapter focuses on the apparent virtues of the two theories with respect to each whether it in fact confers a decisive advantage on the theory that possesses it. It also focuses on paradigmatic qualitative state pain and considers additional examples on future occasions.