This chapter takes up the pursuit of the global war on terrorism, as the Pentagon deploys small teams of Special Operations Forces, who work with CIA professionals and State Department or Agency for International Development officials to contain the spread of terrorist groups in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. These mini-conflicts focus on counterterrorism operations where the US Green Berets or other SOFs work “by, with, and through” local partners to combat terrorists/insurgents fighting under the banner of Salafi jihadism. They train, mentor, and equip locally recruited fighters to act as force multipliers for the US detachments of between 500 and 700 personnel in each country. Underpinning this form of warfare are high-tech surveillance, along with airstrikes from drones, helicopters, and missiles. American forces have proven to be masters of eliminating key terrorist facilitators, bomb makers, and clerics who foment violent extremism. They have so far kept countries from being overrun by Islamist militants as partially took place in Syria and Iraq in 2014. While cost-effective in sparing America lives and financial expenditures, plus safeguarding the homeland and most allied countries from ravages of major terrorism, the small-footprint operations in remote non-Western lands have incurred rancor from journalists, pundits, and some elected officials. Presidents Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and now Joseph Biden have campaigned and made moves to pullout US forces from what are termed “forever wars.”

This chapter examines the 9/11 terrorist attack, invasion, regime change in Afghanistan, and the start of the Global War on Terrorism. To secure America from further terrorism, the George W. Bush government invaded the Taliban-ruled mountainous country to destroy Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network. US and NATO forces quickly toppled the Taliban and put al Qaeda to flight by using innovative tactics, anti-Taliban militias, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) The United States and its allies tried to create a democracy where chaos, decentralism, tribal rule, polarization, sectarianism, and a shattered state existed. They installed a democratic government with the help of the United Nations. Many Afghans joyously greeted the new tolerant order. By 2005, Taliban insurgents drifted back from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to raise havoc in rural Afghanistan. From the start, the Pentagon lacked adequate numbers of “boots on the ground” to carry out an effective occupation to ensure stability and security. Other problems plagued the pacification effort, including an ineffective overall nation-building blueprint. Decisively, the Bush administration took its eye off Afghanistan and reduced military and civilian resources for its nation-building endeavors, while it prepared for invasion of Iraq. By the time, George Bush left office in 2009, Afghan counterinsurgency was floundering.

After three decades of large-scale human-rights incursions, regime changes, democracy husbandry, and prolonged insurgencies, the United States faces a changed world landscape. No longer the sole superpower, it is confronted by a rising China and a resurging Russia, both of which envy and resent America’s influence, interference, and the imposition of its political values. The Pentagon, politicians, and the public are divided about the dilemma looming before the nation. One school of thought advocates abandoning the forever wars in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Africa, and Asia to concentrate on deterring China and Russia. This abandonment view also embodies the desire of some to take the cost savings from a reduced defense budget to fund domestic priorities. Others are fatigued by the wars. Another school contends that walking away from partners fighting terrorist networks would see a repetition of history in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and other places, where Salafi-jihads prevailed over time and then directed attacks beyond their borders. Therefore, America must continue to train, advise, and resource the small-footprint wars or risk another 9/11 attack, while it deters fresh threats.

This chapter takes up the “forever war” theme by returning to Iraq just prior to Obama’s troop pullout and to Afghanistan where he inherited a failing war. Coming into the White House, Obama fulfilled his campaign pledge to end Bush’s “dumb war” in Iraq but left the country vulnerable. The violence in the Syrian civil war attracted al Qaeda militants from Iraq. They formed the nucleus of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the most fearsome terrorist network in the world. ISIS seized land in Syria, invaded Iraq, and announced a caliphate. Obama answered Iraq’s pleas for help. US and allied airpower, along with SOF, turned the tide of battle. The Pentagon again used local allies; this time mostly Kurds who formed the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces. The SDF fought ISSI and the Damascus regime to carve out an enclave in Syria. Meanwhile in Afghanistan, Obama endorsed the Pentagon’s surge of troops to nearly 100,000 so as to exit the war as in Iraq. He changed course and stopped U.S. participation in combat roles in 2014. He decreased troops to around 8,000 before leaving office. At first Trump upped the troops and gave his generals greater freedom to act. Then, he, too, scaled them down to 2,500 in Afghanistan and Iraq, while negotiating with the Taliban to leave totally by May 1, 2021.

The Introduction sets the stage for the book by explaining the impact of Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 had on America’s role in the world. Without the perils posed by the USSR, the United States behaved as a liberal hegemon with little constraint. Inspired by Wilsonian idealism and its own post–World War II success, America tried to make the world a better place by militarily invading in a host of nations beset with civil wars, ethnic cleansing, brutal dictators, or devastating humanitarian conditions. It installed democracy and promoted human rights by force of arms for peace and US security interests. So, interventions, regimes, and insurgencies characterized the post–Cold War era. The 9/11 terrorism led America into large-scale incursions and occupations to secure its safety from further assaults by al Qaeda in Afghanistan and from phantom nuclear arms in Iraq. One difference between Cold War era and its immediate aftermath stemmed from the means used by Washington to rid itself of pesky dictators. Before the Berlin Wall disappeared the United States did not want to face a direct confrontation with a nuclear armed Soviet Union. So it turned to the CIA to remove anti-American strongmen in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile with covert operations. When CIA efforts failed to oust dictators after Soviet disappearance, Washington turned to military invasions.

Iraq’s brutal leader Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf regions for two decades. Soon after coming to power he went to war against Iran in 1980. The eight-year war drained both countries of lives and funds. In search of additional oil wealth, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 to replenish its treasury. President Bush ultimately decided to go to war to repel the Iraqi troops. He forged a multi-national, United Nations–backed coalition and won US congressional approval to expel Hussein’s Republican Guards. The Persian Gulf War featured advanced technological weaponry that utterly vanquished the Iraqi forces as in a Nintendo videogame. The short war contributed to the notion of a Revolution in Military Affairs that promised America easy victories. RMA proved to be no silver bullet against insurgents. The war deepened the Pentagon’s involvement in the Middle East. To protect the rebellious Kurds within Iraq, it established no-fly zones with airpower, which rained down missiles on Iraqi air defenses. This de facto war in the time of peace represented a new version of armed diplomacy. Critically, it set a precedent for future use of aerial drones (pilot-less aircraft) to strike at Islamist militants within countries not at war with the United States.

This chapter opens with a description of the de-militarization that America pursued after the USSR vanished. Rather than seeking to impose its will on other nations with near omnipotent power, America and its citizens looked forward to an era of peace and reduced military spending. Defense budgets, indeed, were slashed and the military was downsized by about 40 percent. Non-defense spending increased. Instead of hanging up its battle armor, Washington governments found employment in a series of armed interventions, regime changes, and eventually in bitter and bloody insurgences – all undertaken altruistically to make the world a better place. An early problem for the George H. W. Bush presidency came from Panama and its drug-dealing autocratic leader who thwarted a democratic election and threatened US passage through the Panamanian Canal. Bush tried to oust Manual Noriega with the CIA but it failed. So, he turned to the US Armed Forces, which invaded the Central American country, disposed of Noriega, and installed a democratic president. Operation Just Cause went well, except the Pentagon needed additional troops to stabilize and calm the country. This shortcoming was repeated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Post-conflict rioting, looting, and criminality took place among the Panamanian population. The transition back to Panamanian rule went smoothly, and America left the country within three months.

More than a decade after the Persian Gulf War, the United States went to war against Iraq for the second time. This conflict grew out of fear and distrust of Saddam Hussein’s suspected chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. A highly inaccurate intelligence assessment contributed to the fear of Iraq’s phantom WMD. Except for Britain, the permanent members of the Security Council opposed the war. George W. Bush put together a coalition of the willing to invade Iraq in 2003. The opening, conventional phase of the intervention went well with Baghdad seized in three weeks. But soon the Pentagon faced a raging insurgency in much of the country, which was divided along sectarian lines of the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects fighting each other while attacking the US and allied forces. The intractable insurgency proved complex and deeply rooted. By 2006, the Pentagon looked as it was headed toward defeat. Three factors contributed to a turnaround in its fortunes. Chief among these was the Awakening movement in which Sunni Arab tribal leaders crossed over to the American side because of their resentment of Salafi-jihadi militants. The Bush White House adopted a finely-tuned counterinsurgency strategy and surged 28,500 more troops into the fray. During the intense fighting, Bush pushed several elections and a constitution to entrench democracy. Gun battles and street bombings greatly subsided by the time Barack Obama withdrew all US combat troops in 2011.

This chapter chronicles military incursions on behalf of humanity into Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans twice to feed the starving, restore democracy, and rescue populations from annihilation. These altruistic missions, known as “military operations other than war,” or MOOTW (pronounced as “moot-wah”) were viewed skeptically by the traditionally minded Pentagon brass. They regarded MOOTW as a diversion from real soldiering. But troops died in them. George H. W. Bush committed US forces, under United Nations auspices, to Somalia so as to distribute food to the starving Somalis in their volatile and violent land. This humanitarian mission led to a bloody skirmish in Mogadishu during William J. Clinton’s presidency that politically humiliated America. Also in 1993, a military junta in Haiti ousted the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide. When desperate Haitians landed on American beaches, Clinton tried sanctions to restore Aristide. Then he militarily invaded the Caribbean nation to put defrocked Catholic priest back in power. Sobered by the “Mog” firefight, Clinton refused to help halt the bloodbath in Rwanda. He could not avoid the raging war in the Balkans to rescue Bosnian Muslims from Serbia in the worst conflict since World War II. In 1995, Washington corralled Britain, France, and other NATO members into bombing the Serbs and then occupying Bosnia to preserve the peace. Next, the tiny Muslim-dominated province of Kosovo erupted against its Serb overlords. A three-month sustained bombing campaign compelled Serbia to surrender.