Yarkoni makes a number of valid points in his critical analysis of psychology, but he misses an opportunity to expose the root of its problems. That root is the poor practice around the derivation of explanatory constructs. We make comment on this with an example from behaviorist history and relate this to the recent discussion of scientific understanding in the philosophy of science.

In this commentary we outline perceptual control theory and suggest this as a fruitful way for Lee and Schwarz (L&S) to fully embody their account of cleansing behavior. Moreover, we take issue with the command control approach that L&S have taken seeing this as an unnecessary cognitive commitment within an embodied model of cleansing behavior.

Burkart et al. conflate the domain-specificity of cognitive processes with the statistical pattern of variance in behavioural measures that partly reflect those processes. General intelligence is a statistical abstraction, not a cognitive trait, and we argue that the former does not warrant inferences about the nature or evolution of the latter.

Lankford claims that suicide terrorists are suicidal, but that their suicidal tendencies are often frustrated by injunctive social norms. Martyrdom represents a solution, and terrorist organizations exploit this. In this commentary, we claim that this argument has not been fully made and that such ideation in itself does not explain a willingness to engage in punitive actions against an enemy. We suggest the psychology of kinship as a possible missing factor.

Smaldino's target article draws on and seeks to add to a literature that has partially rejected orthodox, gene-centric evolutionary theory. However, orthodox theory has much to say about group-level traits. The target article does not reference or refute these views, and provides no explicit arguments for this narrow approach. In this commentary we: (i) give two examples of topics that the target article might and probably should have discussed (cultural epidemiology and the psychology of individual differences); and (ii) argue that the orthodox approach has much more to say about the emergence of group-level traits than the target article recognises, or gives credit for.

Coall & Hertwig (C&H) demonstrate the importance of grandparents to children, even in low fertility societies. We suggest policy-makers interested in reproductive timing in such contexts should be alerted to the practical applications of this cooperative breeding framework. The presence or absence of a supportive kin network could help explain why some women begin their reproductive careers “too early” or “too late.”

Jablonka & Lamb (J&L) have presented a number of different possible mechanisms for finessing design. The extra-genetic nature of these mechanisms has led them to challenge orthodox neo-Darwinian views. However, these mechanisms are for calibration and have been designed by natural selection. As such, they add detail to our knowledge, but neo-Darwinism is sufficiently resourced to account for them.

Locke & Bogin (L&B) rightly point to the absence of ontogeny in theories of language evolution. However, they overly rely upon ontogenetic data to isolate components of the language faculty. Only an adaptationist analysis, of the sort seen in evolutionary psychology, can carve language at its joints and lead to testable predictions about how language works.

Schmitt has equivocated about the underlying psychology of sociosexuality, but from the data presented in the target article, it would appear that he has drawn out the underlying cognitive architecture. In this commentary, I describe this architecture and discuss two emerging hypotheses about heterosexual and homosexual male sociosexuality.

This commentary takes issue with Corballis's claim to have presented a falsifiable hypothesis. It argues that Corballis has instead presented a framework of weak inferences that, although unfalsifiable, might help to constrain future theory-building.

Andrews et al. present a form of instrumental adaptationism that is designed to test the hypothesis that a given trait is an adaptation. This epistemological commitment aims to make clear statements about behavioural natural kinds. The instrumental logic is sound, but it is the limits of our empirical imagination that can cause problems for theory construction.