Because of high commodity prices, beginning in 2006, subsidies to farmers in the United States, the European Union, and Canada have been reduced significantly. However, significant losses have been experienced by the red meat sector, along with escalating food prices. Because of rising input costs, the “farm boom” may not be as great as first thought. Ethanol made from corn and country-of-origin labeling cloud the U.S. policy scene. Higher commodity prices have caused some countries to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers, resulting in freer commodity trade worldwide. Policymakers should attempt to make these trade-barrier cuts permanent and should rethink current policy legislation to deal with the possibility of a collapse of world commodity markets. Agricultural commodity prices have dropped significantly since early 2008.

This article updates and expands the literature on the impact of production quotas. Unlike many of the early studies, our focus is largely on the removal of production quota programs. We study cases wherein production quota programs have been eliminated and quota owners were compensated for their losses. Specifically, we examine (1) production quotas in both the absence and presence of trade, (2) production quota buyouts (three case studies), (3) sources of funding, and (4) general equilibrium considerations. A fifth section briefly discusses externalities, the interpretation of consumer surplus measures, and the nature of conducting economic analyses of addictive goods.

Using annual Japanese fresh fruit import data from 1971 to 1997, this study analyzes the import patterns of Japan's seven most popular fresh fruits by implementing and testing a general differential demand system that nests four alternative import demand specifications. When tested against the general system using the five-good case (bananas, grapefruits, oranges, and lemons and aggregating pineapples, berries, and grapes), the analysis rejects the Almost Ideal Demand System and National Bureau of Research specifications but does not reject Rotterdam and Central Bureau of Statistics models. When estimated using the six-good case (bananas, grapefruits, oranges, lemons, and pineapples and aggregating berries and grapes), the analysis rejects all specifications except the Rotterdam model.

The impact of the U.S. cotton policy depends on several interrelated factors: how input subsidies interact with producer price supports, producer price expectations, and the extent to which price supports are decoupled from production. Cotton subsidies have a direct impact on world cotton prices, depending on the extent to which price supports are coupled to production. At one extreme, there is a price impact of 12.4% when producers make decisions at the loan rate, but the average price impact is 20.9% when producers make decisions based on the target price. Results are presented for intermediate cases of decoupling.

Agricultural sales cooperative unions (ASCUs) in Turkey are heavily influenced by both domestic and international government policies. Both export taxes and import tariffs are used as policy tools to regulate cotton markets. Domestic price support programs, water subsidies, fertilizer subsidies, and credit subsidies have also been used as domestic policy tools. These types of subsidies are not uncommon among developing countries. This paper provides empirical estimates of the degree of economic inefficiency associated with government intervention in Turkish cotton markets. A two-region partial equilibrium model of cotton exports and imports is developed under the “small country assumption” to obtain empirical estimates of the deadweight welfare loss associated with these government subsidies. Although government intervention results in significant income distribution among the various cotton sectors within Turkey, the overall economic inefficiency of the redistribution is very low.

This article analyzes the impact of removing the U.S. tobacco program inboth a partial and general welfare economics framework. In apartial-equilibrium framework, a consumer tax-funded quota buyout can resultin producer gains, consumer losses, net losses resulting from higher prices,and deadweight losses. In a general-equilibrium framework, society can gainfrom the buyout resulting from considerable potential savings from reducedhealthcare costs attributable to a reduction in smoking. Additionally, wepresent a model that addresses the addictive qualities of tobacco whileconsidering the effects of the quota buyout. We also conclude that anotherpossible effect of the buyout is an increase in worker productivity becauseemployees who are able to quit smoking reduce the amount of smoking-relatedsick days taken.

We provide a theoretical and empirical comparison of two historic production quota buyouts: the 2002 US Peanut Quota Buyout and the 2004 US Tobacco Quota Buyout. Producer compensation under the US Peanut Quota Buyout came from the treasury while the US Tobacco Buyout was paid for by a consumer tax (i.e., tobacco tax). Given these two buyouts, an important question arises: How does the method of compensation affect distribution and efficiency? Producers, consumers, and society favor a treasury buyout (TB) for several reasons. Producers are compensated considerably more under a TB, consumers are not burdened with the charge of funding the buyout, and society does not face additional efficiency losses due to the buyout.

Benefit-cost (B/C) analysis must take into account the distributional effects from a policy or program change. To highlight this, we focus on the theory of production quota buyouts within a B/C framework. As an empirical application, we provide evidence on the distributional effects of the U.S. government buyout of the peanut program in 2002, where production quotas were key ingredients. Two approaches to producer compensation under the buyout are discussed: (1) value of quota approach and (2) gains from quota approach. In the peanut quota program buyout, the U.S. government chose the value of quota approach. Both consumers and producers were made better off as a result of the buyout, and there was a net gain in efficiency. If the government had chosen the gains from quota approach instead, government expenditures and producer gains would have been lower, and consumer benefits would have remained unchanged. Under either approach, the B/C ratios calculated for the government quota buyout are almost identical.