This chapter considers the origin and evolution of English administrative law principles in Singapore. It discusses the reasons behind the initial adoption – almost wholesale – of English administrative law on Singapore’s independence. The chapter analyses how English administrative law principles of judicial review were used to maintain a predominantly “green light” approach to judicial review until very recently. However, since 2013, the courts have adopted a stronger and more involved approach to reviewing executive decision-making. This includes, expanding judicial review to areas of executive decision-making that were previously non-justiciable (for example, the exercise of clemency powers and decisions involving national security interests); incrementally removing restrictions on standing; questioning the validity of ouster clauses; and expanding the scope of substantive review. While these developments mirror those in the English context, the chapter looks at the reasoning and principles utilised by the Singapore courts to make these changes to their jurisdiction. It highlights how the courts have moved away from the use of English law or, indeed, other common law jurisdictions for inspiration. Instead, there is a strong emphasis on building autochthonous local lines of precedent that better reflect the constitutional and political environment of Singapore. An analysis of the courts’ reasoning shows how the recent assertion of a stronger role by the courts is not based on a distrust of public power (as is the case in other common law jurisdictions). Rather, the courts have stepped up the scope of their review because of a perceived need on the part of the courts to contribute, as a ‘co-equal’ participant, its’ unique institutional perspective on matters of governance and accountability. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the localised contours of the separation of powers doctrine that are likely to drive the future development of judicial review principles in Singapore.

The chapter starts with an evaluation of the role of the Constitution in the development of an autochthonous approach to judicial review of administrative action in India. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees citizens a ‘Fundamental Right’ to equality before law and equal protection of the law in. This has been interpreted to include protection from arbitrary state action. Therefore, anyone wanting to challenge administrative action in India can do so by challenging the ‘arbitrariness’ of a decision under Article 14 by way of writ petition to the High Court or Supreme Court. The chapter criticises the dominance of the ‘arbitrariness doctrine’ and the eclipse of grounds of judicial review available at common law. It will demonstrate that in many cases, the Supreme Court has offered little guidance on how to test for arbitrariness. In addition, the use of the writ petition to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts has led to serious problems for access to justice. Taking for granted that rolling back the doctrine would require massive constitutional change – both unlikely, and disruptive – the chapter makes two arguments for legal reform. The Supreme Court should use traditional common law grounds as a guide to when administrative action is arbitrary. The Supreme Court should also, it argues, emphasise the independent status of common law grounds, in order to promote access to justice: lower courts should decide administrative law claims on common law grounds, easing the burden on the over-stretched writ petition jurisdiction. There is precedent that supports both these moves, and there is reason to hope they mitigate the problems raised by the arbitrariness doctrine, with the added advantage of broadening the public law toolkit of courts and counsel.