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With significant numbers of individuals in the criminal justice system having mental health problems, court-based diversion programmes and liaison services have been established to address this problem.
To examine the effectiveness of the New South Wales (Australia) court diversion programme in reducing re-offending among those diagnosed with psychosis by comparing the treatment order group with a comparison group who received a punitive sanction.
Those with psychoses were identified from New South Wales Ministry of Health records between 2001 and 2012 and linked to offending records. Cox regression models were used to identify factors associated with re-offending.
A total of 7743 individuals were identified as diagnosed with a psychotic disorder prior to their court finalisation date for their first principal offence. Overall, 26% of the cohort received a treatment order and 74% received a punitive sanction. The re-offending rate in the treatment order group was 12% lower than the punitive sanction group. ‘Acts intended to cause injury’ was the most common type of the first principal offence for the treatment order group compared with the punitive sanction group (48% v. 27%). Drug-related offences were more likely to be punished with a punitive sanction than a treatment order (12% v. 2%).
Among those with a serious mental illness (i.e. psychosis), receiving a treatment order by the court rather than a punitive sanction was associated with reduced risk for subsequent offending. We further examined actual mental health treatment received and found that receiving no treatment following the first offence was associated with an increased risk of re-offending and, so, highlighting the importance of treatment for those with serious mental illness in the criminal justice system.
The claims that learning systems must build causal models and provide explanations of their inferences are not new, and advocate a cognitive functionalism for artificial intelligence. This view conflates the relationships between implicit and explicit knowledge representation. We present recent evidence that neural networks do engage in model building, which is implicit, and cannot be dissociated from the learning process.
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the collapse of the USSR naturally provokes us to reflect on the course of Eurasian and world history in the post-communist era. Upon closer examination, however, it is not clear what significance the precise time span of two and a half decades has for the scientific study of political and institutional change. A review of the social science literature indicates that we are very far from having any consensual understanding of how long processes of regime evolution typically take—and thus, how to establish the relevant time span for judging the scientific accuracy of initial predictions about the outcomes of post-communist “transitions.” I argue that the first step in assessing the lessons of post-Soviet political change to date, from a social-scientific point of view, lies in defining the term “regime” more precisely, so that scholars can at least agree when one regime has ended and another begun. In this respect, Weberian sociological theory provides useful conceptual materials for a more general theory of “regime evolution” within which the empirical results of the first twenty-five years of post-Soviet change can be situated.
Stephen Hanson points out that there is little to no agreement among contemporary scholars concerning either the predictability of the Soviet collapse or its underlying causes; between the untenable determinism Cohen rightly attacks and Cohen’s own extreme “possibilism” are many quite sensible intermediate positions. Once this is recognized, the real question becomes at what point, exacdy, were Gorbachev's reforms of the Soviet system likely to lead to change of the system itself? But to answer that question requires both a more precise, contextual definition of “reform” and a more holistic understanding of the Soviet “system” than Cohen provides here.
Russia has long puzzled and surprised observers of international politics. For seven decades, Russia was at the center of a communist regime – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR – that competed with the United States for global supremacy (see Table 7.1 at the end of the chapter). After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia suffered a prolonged period of political, military, and economic decay. During the first two terms of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian economy rebounded strongly, but this growth was accompanied by a return to political authoritarianism. In 2008, Putin defied many analysts’ expectations by stepping down as president to make way for his protégé Dmitry Medvedev and becoming prime minister instead; Putin then turned the tables by returning as president for a third term in 2012. There is no consensus among specialists about how the former communist superpower became so weak so quickly; nor do scholars agree in their evaluations of Putin’s efforts to revive the country. Indeed, it seems that Russia simply does not fit conventional analytic categories.
In the previous chapter, we outlined our basic approach to comparative politics. In short, we see the world as made up of competing “regime types,” such as democracy, authoritarianism, fascism, and communism, which emerged in specific global and historical contexts and which shape domestic interests, identities, and institutions in particular ways. The success or failure of a given regime in one part of the world, in turn, can have dramatic effects on the global environment, influencing the domestic politics of other countries in powerful and sometimes surprising ways.
Any global order thus involves competition in world-historical space and time that affects the evolution of states. Here are the questions comparativists ask: What was the competitive international situation in which a state found itself when it attempted to modernize and industrialize? Who were its principal rivals and competitors among sovereign states? In other words, who developed first, had a head start, and could serve as a benchmark? And who developed later, had to play catch-up in order not to be left behind, and hence looked for negative and positive role models?
Twelve in-depth case studies of the EU and countries across the globe, written by the leading country specialists and combining insights of cutting-edge institutional analysis and deep study of national histories, explore how the concepts of interests, identities and institutions shape the politics of nations and regions. The country studies trace the global and historical contexts of political development and examine the diverse pathways that countries have taken in their quest to adapt to the competitive pressures of twenty-first-century globalization. These country studies constitute the overarching framework of the text, addressing the larger question, 'why are countries ruled and governed so differently?' Free of heavy-handed jargon, Comparative Politics inspires thought-provoking debate among introductory students and specialists alike, and encourages students to engage in real comparative analysis. In this new edition, all twelve country studies have been rewritten, and the first two theory chapters have been updated to reflect the latest research in the field.
Imagine that you could design the political order for a country of your choosing. Where would you start? Who would get to rule? What rules for political life would you choose? Could you make rules that would be fair to everyone? If not, whom would these rules favor and whom would they disadvantage? Would they be rules that even those at the bottom of the social order, the poorest and least powerful people, would agree to? What would be the procedures for changing the rules? These are difficult questions because to answer them in a meaningful way requires an understanding of why and how different countries of the world are governed differently. With so many choices to make, it is easy to see why the job of designing a constitution would be such a difficult one.
It could, however, be made easier. One might start by evaluating the existing possibilities as exemplified by the various forms of government in the states of the world. The state is an organization that possesses sovereignty over a territory and its people. Yet, within our world of states, no two are ruled in exactly the same way. Why should this be the case? Why are societies run, and political orders designed, in so many different ways? What consequences do these differences hold for a people’s well-being?