Chapter 4 replies to the argument that international courts who decide important policy decisions take them off the public agenda and therefore stifle public debate. The chapter explains that an international judgment is often just the entry point into a public discussion and a dialogue with the relevant authorities. In fact, the ensuing public deliberation may be superior to what would happen absent international courts' intervention. International courts shift the discussion from interests and naked power to rights, and they change the social settings in a way that processes and disseminates information well to wider segments of the public. International courts create friction with the executive, guide the legislator, and can help the national judiciary, all leading to a more vibrant debate. Finally, international courts provide numerous lawyers with vital training that they can use to better the public discourse.

Chapter 7 concludes the book by providing a wider theoretical perspective on the intervention of international courts in domestic affairs. First, the chapter compares established theories of domestic judicial review to the insights this book developed on "international judicial review" – namely intervention by international courts. The literature on domestic judicial review is rich and often inspiring, but international courts face special circumstances that make drawing comparisons with domestic judicial review a complicated undertaking. Finally, to elaborate on the special conditions faced by international courts, the chapter outlines the characteristics of the global arena today: a complicated network with links that cut across national boundaries and formal hierarchies.

Chapter 5 is focused on the risk of capture of international courts by NGOs. The chapter reviews the advantages and disadvantages of NGO involvement in international courts' proceedings either as direct applicants, through filing amicus curiae briefs, or informally. Different procedures are recommended for different international courts depending on their circumstances. The second part of the chapter is focused on the reputational sanctions NGOs can create after an international court issues its judgment. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative empirical research I conducted and on insights from Social Network Analysis, the chapter argues that international courts can create conditions in which NGOs process shaming information accurately.

Chapter 1 is the introduction to the book. The chapter starts by presenting the main arguments posed by commentators against intervention of international courts in domestic affairs. It continues with a comprehensive overview of the arguments in the following chapters. Later, the chapter fleshes out the policy implications of the book and demonstrates how the combination of arguments in different chapters can help make policy choices that can determine when international courts should intervene.

Chapter 2 addresses the legitimacy of intervention by international courts – unelected international bodies – in the decisions of democratically elected domestic officials. The chapter starts by delineating the commitment of international courts to the text of treaties that regulate their jurisdiction. It continues by explaining when expansive interpretation of these treaties is legitimate because the process of negotiation or revision of treaties gives certain countries an unjustified power to limit the treaty obligations of all member countries. Finally, the chapter explains that even if a country fully controls its treaty obligations it may not properly represent the interests of all parties affected by the treaty because of so-called democratic failures, justifying the use of expansive interpretation by international courts.

Chapter 3 targets another challenge to international courts' intervention: the argument that international courts do not make better decisions than national bodies. The chapter identifies a set of circumstances in which international courts, solely because of their institutional position and regardless of the proficiency of their judges, are actually able to make better decisions than national courts. The core of the argument is the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which suggests that a majority decision within a group is likely to be superior to the decision of each individual decision-maker, provided that each decision-maker decides independently. If national judges try to learn from comparative law, they violate the independence condition because they learn from courts who followed other courts instead of deciding independently. If, instead, national courts decide independently and an international court follows the majority position – as the European Court of Human Rights does when it uses the Emerging Consensus doctrine – the decisional benefit of the Jury Theorem is fully realized.

Chapter 6 faces the final challenge to international courts' intervention, the fear that their intervention would lead to bad outcomes because it would change the incentives of relevant parties. It is true that domestic officials operate under the shadow of potential international intervention and this may give them bad incentives. The chapter demonstrates how the rules of admissibility used by international criminal tribunals can affect the incentive of national authorities on the one hand and individuals on the other hand. Understanding the interaction of officials on several levels helps to determine which rule of admissibility, complementarity or primacy, will lead to greater deterrence of international crimes. These admissibility rules can also determine the willingness of countries to submit to the jurisdiction of international courts, to begin with.