Three Generations of Peace Studies in South Asia

Peace Studies in South Asia as a discipline continues to be dominated by Security Studies where peace is considered as only an outcome of the balance of power between the parties involved in conflicts. Every such outcome for obvious reasons is contingent, because the balance that is achieved may be disturbed or even set aside once any of the parties has its reasons to do so. A party might in such cases think that it gains by being engaged in conflict or even simply allowing it to continue, instead of working for peace. Peace thus conceived as a strategic balance of power is precarious and constantly threatened by the spectre of conflict and war. A large part of the established academia in South Asia continues to be influenced by studies of this genre.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, a new generation of studies conducted mostly in the conflict areas of South Asia – particularly in India – seems to have marked a paradigmatic shift in the understanding of Peace Studies (Samaddar 2004, Das 2005, Banerjee 2008, Singh 2009). Peace, according to this new paradigm, is sought to be understood independently of its opposite, i.e. conflict – not so much as absence or deferral of conflict by obtaining an albeit contingent balance of power, but its preemption and in cases where complete preemption is not possible, at least their resolution – both preemption and resolution in a way that simultaneously establish such universal principles as rights, justice and democracy. The parties involved in the conflict may not necessarily develop a stake in the resolution of conflicts that at the same time also establishes such universal principles.

Elections in large-sized states are universally accepted as the watchword of democracy. A country that does not hold periodic elections and removes its rulers from power through the instrumentality of elections based on universal adult franchise does not qualify as democratic under the present circumstances. The paper argues that the institution of elections – widely held as the lifeblood of democracy under modern conditions whether in India or elsewhere – is produced through what Giorgio Agamben calls ‘a state of exception’ while paradoxically ‘safeguarding’ it. As he puts it:

Viewed in this light, it is a study not so much of elections being the illuminated face of our democracy but of the dark face that is hidden by it. Yet the very suspension of electoral rules and norms makes the conduct of ‘normal’ elections possible, gives credence to them as an institution and thereby strengthens the foundations of our democracy. The term ‘suspension’ is used here in three relatively distinguishable senses of the sovereign state deciding first not to apply the laws, rules and norms that it has otherwise set for itself, second, to apply them in a way that infringes on what Montesquieu calls, the ‘spirit’ of laws and third, that disarticulates the moral community.

Although forced migration in India is usually divided into two broad types – internal and external, depending on the territorial expanse within which it occurs, we propose to concentrate more on the first type for reasons not beyond our comprehension.

First, while the problem of immigration from across the international borders has been a topic of frequent discussion and responsible for sparking off many a nativist outburst in different parts of India, the issue of internal displacement has assumed alarming proportions especially in recent years, but has hardly received any attention worth its name in popular circles. There is no denying the fact that the issue of internal displacement is yet to acquire the kind of legal standing – whether national or international, that is usually accorded to the external one – particularly of the refugees. Secondly, whereas India's role as a refugee receiving country has been widely acclaimed both within the country as well as abroad, her role in generating refugees has been of marginal significance compared to that of some of her next-door neighbours. This, however, does not leave any room for complacence, and the pressures on the state to adopt certain pre-emptive and corrective measures are now formidable. […] Thirdly, it is difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to make a watertight distinction between these two types for much of what we call, internal displacement is externally induced and has international spillovers at least in the neighbouring regions.

Although in common parlance victims of forced displacement are often clubbed together as a single and monolithic category, there are significant variations in the nature and extent of victimhood suffered by them. Thus, the victims of development induced displacement constitute a category separate in many ways from those who have been displaced as a result of say, interethnic conflicts and violence. The first category of victims may have lost their homes or cultivable lands but may continue to subscribe to the same development paradigm and view displacement as one of its necessary costs that one should bear albeit with great pain, in the collective interest of the nation. The same person on the other hand, may look upon ethnic violence as simply macabre and senseless and hence detrimental to the nation and its development. It could as well be the other way round. One who finds ethnic violence as an inevitable and unavoidable means of asserting one's identity is unlikely to discover any virtue in the development of the nation as a vibrant, multicultural entity. The graded nature of victimhood therefore should not escape our notice.

COMMUNICATING RIGHTS CLAIMS

Accordingly, their rights can hardly be of one and the same type. One wonders whether it will ever be possible for us to evolve an agenda of rights common to all of them.