Diquat2+ (1, 1’-ethylene-2, 2’-dipyridinium ion) and paraquat2+ (1, 1’-dimethyl-4, 4’-di-pyridinium ion) were competitively adsorbed by Na-saturated kaolinites, smectites and expanded and collapsed vermiculites. The relative preference for one or the other cation varied with the surface charge densities of the adsorbents and the location of the adsorption site, i.e. internal or external. Minerals with high surface charge exhibited preference for diquat whereas minerals with low surface charge preferred paraquat. Expanded vermiculites preferentially adsorbed diquat on internal surfaces. Collapsed vermiculites generally showed a preference for paraquat. Smectites and kaolinites preferentially adsorbed paraquat.

Surface charge densities of the layer silicates vs. the relative preference for diquat revealed two linear relationships, one for internal adsorption and one for external adsorption. Internal adsorption was characterized by a strong preference for paraquat on low-charged smectites, a relative decreasing preference for paraquat with higher-charged smectites, and a strong preference for diquat on high-charged expanded vermiculites.

Preferential adsorption for paraquat by kaolinite was quite similar to adsorption of paraquat on the external sites of vermiculites. There was no apparent relationship between competitive adsorption and surface charge density of kaolinite.

The COVID-19 has had major direct (e.g., deaths) and indirect (e.g., social inequities) effects in the United States. While the public health response to the epidemic featured some important successes (e.g., universal masking ,and rapid development and approval of vaccines and therapeutics), there were systemic failures (e.g., inadequate public health infrastructure) that overshadowed these successes. Key deficiency in the U.S. response were shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) and supply chain deficiencies. Recommendations are provided for mitigating supply shortages and supply chain failures in healthcare settings in future pandemics. Some key recommendations for preventing shortages of essential components of infection control and prevention include increasing the stockpile of PPE in the U.S. National Strategic Stockpile, increased transparency of the Stockpile, invoking the Defense Production Act at an early stage, and rapid review and authorization by FDA/EPA/OSHA of non-U.S. approved products. Recommendations are also provided for mitigating shortages of diagnostic testing, medications and medical equipment.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, many areas in the United States experienced healthcare personnel (HCP) shortages tied to a variety of factors. Infection prevention programs, in particular, faced increasing workload demands with little opportunity to delegate tasks to others without specific infectious diseases or infection control expertise. Shortages of clinicians providing inpatient care to critically ill patients during the early phase of the pandemic were multifactorial, largely attributed to increasing demands on hospitals to provide care to patients hospitalized with COVID-19 and furloughs.1 HCP shortages and challenges during later surges, including the Omicron variant-associated surges, were largely attributed to HCP infections and associated work restrictions during isolation periods and the need to care for family members, particularly children, with COVID-19. Additionally, the detrimental physical and mental health impact of COVID-19 on HCP has led to attrition, which further exacerbates shortages.2 Demands increased in post-acute and long-term care (PALTC) settings, which already faced critical staffing challenges difficulty with recruitment, and high rates of turnover. Although individual healthcare organizations and state and federal governments have taken actions to mitigate recurring shortages, additional work and innovation are needed to develop longer-term solutions to improve healthcare workforce resiliency. The critical role of those with specialized training in infection prevention, including healthcare epidemiologists, was well-demonstrated in pandemic preparedness and response. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the need to support growth in these fields.3 This commentary outlines the need to develop the US healthcare workforce in preparation for future pandemics.

Throughout history, pandemics and their aftereffects have spurred society to make substantial improvements in healthcare. After the Black Death in 14th century Europe, changes were made to elevate standards of care and nutrition that resulted in improved life expectancy.1 The 1918 influenza pandemic spurred a movement that emphasized public health surveillance and detection of future outbreaks and eventually led to the creation of the World Health Organization Global Influenza Surveillance Network.2 In the present, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed many of the pre-existing problems within the US healthcare system, which included (1) a lack of capacity to manage a large influx of contagious patients while simultaneously maintaining routine and emergency care to non-COVID patients; (2) a “just in time” supply network that led to shortages and competition among hospitals, nursing homes, and other care sites for essential supplies; and (3) longstanding inequities in the distribution of healthcare and the healthcare workforce. The decades-long shift from domestic manufacturing to a reliance on global supply chains has compounded ongoing gaps in preparedness for supplies such as personal protective equipment and ventilators. Inequities in racial and socioeconomic outcomes highlighted during the pandemic have accelerated the call to focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) within our communities. The pandemic accelerated cooperation between government entities and the healthcare system, resulting in swift implementation of mitigation measures, new therapies and vaccinations at unprecedented speeds, despite our fragmented healthcare delivery system and political divisions. Still, widespread misinformation or disinformation and political divisions contributed to eroded trust in the public health system and prevented an even uptake of mitigation measures, vaccines and therapeutics, impeding our ability to contain the spread of the virus in this country.3 Ultimately, the lessons of COVID-19 illustrate the need to better prepare for the next pandemic. Rising microbial resistance, emerging and re-emerging pathogens, increased globalization, an aging population, and climate change are all factors that increase the likelihood of another pandemic.4

The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology in America (SHEA) strongly supports modernization of data collection processes and the creation of publicly available data repositories that include a wide variety of data elements and mechanisms for securely storing both cleaned and uncleaned data sets that can be curated as clinical and research needs arise. These elements can be used for clinical research and quality monitoring and to evaluate the impacts of different policies on different outcomes. Achieving these goals will require dedicated, sustained and long-term funding to support data science teams and the creation of central data repositories that include data sets that can be “linked” via a variety of different mechanisms and also data sets that include institutional and state and local policies and procedures. A team-based approach to data science is strongly encouraged and supported to achieve the goal of a sustainable, adaptable national shared data resource.

Tight focusing with very small f-numbers is necessary to achieve the highest at-focus irradiances. However, tight focusing imposes strong demands on precise target positioning in-focus to achieve the highest on-target irradiance. We describe several near-infrared, visible, ultraviolet and soft and hard X-ray diagnostics employed in a ∼1022 W/cm2 laser–plasma experiment. We used nearly 10 J total energy femtosecond laser pulses focused into an approximately 1.3-μm focal spot on 5–20 μm thick stainless-steel targets. We discuss the applicability of these diagnostics to determine the best in-focus target position with approximately 5 μm accuracy (i.e., around half of the short Rayleigh length) and show that several diagnostics (in particular, 3$\omega$ reflection and on-axis hard X-rays) can ensure this accuracy. We demonstrated target positioning within several micrometers from the focus, ensuring over 80% of the ideal peak laser intensity on-target. Our approach is relatively fast (it requires 10–20 laser shots) and does not rely on the coincidence of low-power and high-power focal planes.

Structural and diffraction criteria for distinguishing between t-1M, c-1M, m-1M, and 3T illite varieties are described. The t-1M illite corresponds to a one-layer monoclinic structure with vacant transsites. The c-1M illite has vacant cis-octahedra forming one of two symmetrically independent point systems; the other cis-octahedra as well as the trans-octahedra are occupied; and the m-1M illite corresponds to the structure in which cations are statistically distributed over available trans- and cis-sites. For t-1M, c-1M, and m-1M, the values of |c cos β/a| are equal to 0.39–0.41, 0.29–0.31, and 0.333, respectively. Application of these criteria demonstrates that illite samples described in the literature as the 3T polytype usually are c-1M instead. The relatively common occurrence of c-1M illite in association with t-1M and 2M1 polytypes has been recognized in illite from hydrothermal alterations around uranium deposits located in the Athabasca basement (Saskatchewan, Canada). The c-1M illite from these deposits was previously described as 3T one.

We evaluated diagnostic test and antibiotic utilization among 252 patients from 11 US hospitals who were evaluated for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pneumonia during the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron variant pandemic wave. In our cohort, antibiotic use remained high (62%) among SARS-CoV-2–positive patients and even higher among those who underwent procalcitonin testing (68%).

Diagnosing the evolution of laser-generated high energy density (HED) systems is fundamental to develop a correct understanding of the behavior of matter under extreme conditions. Talbot–Lau interferometry constitutes a promising tool, since it permits simultaneous single-shot X-ray radiography and phase-contrast imaging of dense plasmas. We present the results of an experiment at OMEGA EP that aims to probe the ablation front of a laser-irradiated foil using a Talbot–Lau X-ray interferometer. A polystyrene (CH) foil was irradiated by a laser of 133 J, 1 ns and probed with 8 keV laser-produced backlighter radiation from Cu foils driven by a short-pulse laser (153 J, 11 ps). The ablation front interferograms were processed in combination with a set of reference images obtained ex situ using phase-stepping. We managed to obtain attenuation and phase-shift images of a laser-irradiated foil for electron densities above ${10}^{22}\;{\mathrm{cm}}^{-3}$. These results showcase the capabilities of Talbot–Lau X-ray diagnostic methods to diagnose HED laser-generated plasmas through high-resolution imaging.

Testing of asymptomatic patients for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (ie, “asymptomatic screening) to attempt to reduce the risk of nosocomial transmission has been extensive and resource intensive, and such testing is of unclear benefit when added to other layers of infection prevention mitigation controls. In addition, the logistic challenges and costs related to screening program implementation, data noting the lack of substantial aerosol generation with elective controlled intubation, extubation, and other procedures, and the adverse patient and facility consequences of asymptomatic screening call into question the utility of this infection prevention intervention. Consequently, the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) recommends against routine universal use of asymptomatic screening for SARS-CoV-2 in healthcare facilities. Specifically, preprocedure asymptomatic screening is unlikely to provide incremental benefit in preventing SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the procedural and perioperative environment when other infection prevention strategies are in place, and it should not be considered a requirement for all patients. Admission screening may be beneficial during times of increased virus transmission in some settings where other layers of controls are limited (eg, behavioral health, congregate care, or shared patient rooms), but widespread routine use of admission asymptomatic screening is not recommended over strengthening other infection prevention controls. In this commentary, we outline the challenges surrounding the use of asymptomatic screening, including logistics and costs of implementing a screening program, and adverse patient and facility consequences. We review data pertaining to the lack of substantial aerosol generation during elective controlled intubation, extubation, and other procedures, and we provide guidance for when asymptomatic screening for SARS-CoV-2 may be considered in a limited scope.