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Objective: To investigate the effects of methylphenidate on long-term executive and neuropsychological functioning in children with attention problems following TBI, as well as the relationship between methylphenidate associated changes in lab-based neuropsychological measures of attentional control, processing speed, and executive functioning and parent- or self-report measures of everyday executive functioning. Method: 26 children aged 6–17 years, who were hospitalized for moderate-to-severe blunt head trauma 6 or more months previously, were recruited from a large children’s hospital medical center. Participants were randomized into a double-masked, placebo-controlled cross-over clinical trial. Participants completed a comprehensive neuropsychological battery and parent- and self-report ratings of everyday executive functioning at baseline, and at 4 weeks and 8 weeks following upward titration of medication to an optimal dose or while administered a placebo. Results: Methylphenidate was associated with significant improvements in processing speed, sustained attention, and both lab-based and everyday executive functioning. Significant treatment-by-period interactions were found on a task of sustained attention. Participants who were randomized to the methylphenidate condition for the first treatment period demonstrated random or erratic responding, with slower and more variable response times when given placebo during the second period. Conclusion: Results indicate that methylphenidate treatment is associated with positive outcomes in processing speed, sustained attention, and both lab-based and everyday measures of executive functioning compared to placebo group. Additionally, results suggest sustained attention worsens when discontinuing medication. (JINS, 2019, 25, 740–749)
Incidence of human yersiniosis in New Zealand has increased between 2013 and 2017. For surveillance and outbreak investigations it is essential that an appropriate level of discrimination between pathogenic Yersinia enterocolitica isolates is provided, in order to support epidemiological linking of connected cases. Subtyping of 227 Y. enterocolitica isolates was performed using a range of different typing methods, including biotyping, serotyping and seven loci multiple-locus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA). In addition, core genome single-nucleotide polymorphism (core SNP) analysis and multi-locus sequence typing were performed on a subset of 69 isolates. Sixty-seven different MLVA types were identified. One MLVA profile was associated with an outbreak in the Bay of Plenty region, supported by epidemiological data. Core SNP analysis showed that all the outbreak-related isolates clustered together. The subtyping and epidemiological evidence suggests that the outbreak of yersiniosis in the Bay of Plenty region between October and December 2016 could be attributed to a point source. However, subtyping results further suggest that the same clone was isolated from several regions between August 2016 and March 2017. Core SNP analysis and MLVA typing failed to differentiate between Y. enterocolitica biotype 2 and biotype 3. For this reason, we propose that these biotypes should be reported as a single type namely: Y. enterocolitica biotype 2/3 and that the serotype should be prioritised as an indicator of prevalence.
Communism has already invaded China, and the alarming extent and success of the invasion is far too seldom realized. A communized China would constitute a problem for Europe and America beside which other questions would pale into insignificance.
1933, as Japan withdrew from the League of Nations
The military eclipse of civil authority marked a return to the pre-Meiji Restoration balance between civil and military institutions. During the shogunates, the army had ruled. But army rule was a throwback to a system no longer adequate to navigate the problems Japan faced. Its modern army missed the strategic advantages conferred by an island location to misidentify Japan as a continental, not a maritime, power. This led to a succession of errors of commission: the universal answer to problems in China became escalation. This produced a protracted war for control of the Asian mainland that need never have been fought. There were better ways to achieve the policy objective of restoring domestic prosperity and maintaining Japan as a great power.
The Sino-Japanese conflagration that broke out in 1931 ignited an accumulation of highly combustible grievances. World War I had destroyed the European political system and the Great Depression had destroyed the global economic system. Both the Great War and the Great Depression were of unprecedented scale. Botched military strategy in the former followed by botched economic strategy in the latter put Fascism and Communism on the march as the only two political systems apparently capable of restoring economic health. As the countries of the world tried to navigate these turbulent uncharted waters, they became increasingly focused on their own dire situations and ever less cognizant of the equally dire situations of their neighbors. This blinded them to the interests of others and to the likely countermeasures to their own policy choices. Escalation became the name of the game.
Army leaders, their many civilian supporters, and the Japanese public perceived no alternative to an aggressive foreign policy in China in order to overcome the Great Depression and to counter Russian territorial and ideological expansion. They faced an intractable dilemma: good citizenship in the prevailing global order promised economic disaster with the collapse of international trade caused by Western protectionism.
It is certain that the situation in Asia will grow steadily worse in the future … and we must make preparations for another war within the next ten years.
General Yamagata Aritomo, April 1895, at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War
In less than twenty years Japan has acquired the knowledge it has taken us centuries to learn.
George H. Rittner, Impressions of Japan, 1904, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War
At the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, General and soon-to-be Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, chief architect of the Japanese war plans, predicted another war over northeastern Asia within the decade. Although Yamagata could not have anticipated the precise circumstances of the Boxer Uprising in China, the Russo-Japanese War came right on schedule. The Boxers were the terrorists of their day. Their revulsion against Western culture and outrage at Western intrusions in their homeland coalesced into a movement to expel all Westerners from China and to kill the stragglers. As part of their rebellion, they tore up much of the Manchurian railway system laid at such great expense by Russia. To defend its investments, in 1900 Russia occupied all of Manchuria, the very area that Japan intended to become the core of its empire. Yamagata also could not have anticipated the Russian failure to honor its international commitments to withdraw these troops once order had been restored, but he clearly foresaw the general outlines of Russian and Japanese foreign policy that put them on a collision course. At issue: which empire would dominate Korea and Manchuria?
Yamagata also could not have anticipated that the young tsar, who assumed the throne upon the sudden death of his forty-nine-year-old father in 1894, would become captivated by the idea of empire in the Orient as the path to greatness or that a group of irresponsible noblemen with ambitious but unlikely plans to make money in the East would successfully brief the plan to the impressionable twenty-six-year-old Nicholas II. The irresponsible noblemen had a passion for redundant timber concessions along the Yalu river, in precisely the territory deemed vital by Japan's leaders for their country's national security. Russia, forested from East and West, had no need for more wood, let alone more wood in inaccessible locations.
Those who excite the public by claims of victory, just because the army has captured some out-of-the-way little area, do so only to conceal their own incompetence as they squander the nation's power in an unjustifiable war.
Lieutenant General Ishiwara Kanji, architect of the invasion of Manchuria in 1931
Botched war termination in regional wars usually produces one of two outcomes: either the war protracts when the weaker belligerent launches an insurgency with economy-killing and budget-busting consequences for the counterinsurgent or the war escalates when an interested third party intervenes on the opposing side. The most common way to avoid such unpleasant eventualities is to offer peace terms generous relative to the military disposition of forces. The need to offer a generous peace is particularly important for the invading power because the value of victory is usually considerably higher for those living in theater than for those intervening from afar. This means a greater likelihood for those in theater to endure high costs and protraction. As a testament to Japan's strategy, it produced both a nationwide insurgency and multiple great-power allies for Chiang Kai-shek.
Prior to Pearl Harbor, Japan had suffered 600,000 casualties in China, a sunk cost of stupendous proportions that its leaders found difficult to justify to the Japanese people. Japan's situation was reminiscent of great powers in World War I that were equally incapable of reassessing the flawed military strategies that consumed the lives of a generation of young men. So the old men kept applying greater doses of the same tried and trashed remedies, rather than own up to their enormous failures.
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 offered Japan hope in the form of a perceived window of opportunity, akin to the ones the Meiji generation had so successfully seized in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. With the fall of France in June 1940, Japan pressured Britain to close the Burma Road in July, putting Chiang Kai-shek in his worst situation since the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. German control of continental Europe promised open season in Asia for Japan to liberate by conquest the colonies that others could no longer defend. An Asia-wide empire, the Imperial Japanese Army hoped, would justify the sunk costs in China.
The Japanese experience of war from the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century presents a stunning example of the meteoric rise and shattering fall of a great power. As Japan modernized and became the one non-European great power, its leaders concluded that an empire on the Asian mainland required the containment of Russia. Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) but became overextended in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45), which escalated, with profound consequences, into World War II. A combination of incomplete institution building, an increasingly lethal international environment, a skewed balance between civil and military authority, and a misunderstanding of geopolitics explains these divergent outcomes. This analytical survey examines themes including the development of Japanese institutions, diversity of opinion within the government, domestic politics, Japanese foreign policy and China's anti-Japanese responses. It is an essential guide for those interested in history, politics and international relations.
[Japan] prospers when she allies with such naval powers as the Anglo-Saxon Britain and the United States, but must trudge a road of hardship when she allies with continental powers.
Hirama Yōichi, historian, Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Alliance Choice and the Fate of a Nation, 2000
Imperial Japan fought two pairs of wars. In the first pair, Japan co-operated with maritime powers to work in concert with their preferred maritime global order based on the maritime commons, international law, and international commerce – all common, not exclusive, places, rules, and activities. In the second set of wars, Japan allied with the continental powers, bent on imposing a continental order based on exclusive spheres of influence, each operating under different rules. Imperial Japan flourished under the former and perished under the latter.
The maritime world order is positive-sum. For all its many flaws, it is the only world order that benefits all who join because its laws and institutions are designed to promote economic growth in order to create wealth. The common rules protect the weak from the strong and thus incentivize the weak to join. The aggregate power of the many then dwarfs the strength of even the greatest continental power. Continental world orders – the world of traditional empires that flourished prior to the Industrial Revolution – are zero-sum at best and more typically negative-sum, given all the fighting over the spheres of influence. The motivating goals are the confiscation of territory and wealth, but the wars entail damage to both, producing a negative sum. The continental paradigm characterized the preindustrial world when land was indeed the source of wealth because agriculture was the primary economic sector. After the Industrial Revolution, trade, industry, and service became the primary economic sectors, so land was no longer the ultimate source of power, money was. Money bought armies. And money came mainly from industry, commerce, and service.
Japan was not geographically situated to become a great land power. Seas separated it from military theaters so under all circumstances, except an invasion of the home islands, it operated on extended lines. It lacked the natural resource endowment necessary to conduct war: iron and energy.
Most people are surprised … while possessing as she does some of the finest types of modern warships, the Chinese army is still in many respects absolutely what it was three hundred years ago – merely an armed undisciplined horde.
Sir Robert Hart (1835–1911), inspector general, Imperial Maritime Customs for China (1863–1908), interview in 1892
With passionate effort the Japanese have ransacked the Western world for its treasures of knowledge, and have vigorously applied what they have learned.
The Times, London, 1894, on the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War
Japan westernized, China did not, and there were consequences. Although in the eighteenth century the ruling Manchus had created the richest empire in human history and the second-largest in Chinese history, by the nineteenth century they were on the decline just as Japan began its ascent and the West had reached its stride. An unprecedented wave of internal rebellions wracked China followed by a succession of regional wars. In this period, China's government had great difficulty setting feasible strategic goals and then matching a grand strategy to secure them. In contrast, Japan's leaders laid plans to use the window of opportunity between treaty revision and the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway to pre-empt Russia by seizing Korea from a failing China. While Japanese leaders’ stated goals emphasized the restoration of order and the protection of Japanese nationals in Korea, their much more important unstated goals concerned the larger issue of the regional balance of power, which they intended to overturn at Chinese and Russian expense.
Underlying and Proximate Causes
Wars arise from underlying and proximate causes. The underlying causes are the tinder composed of the belligerents’ mutually exclusive objectives, while the proximate causes serve as the lit match of immediate grievances setting off the conflagration. Many people identify the last proximate cause as the reason for the outbreak of hostilities, when in fact it is just the last in a long succession that finally ignited the accumulation of underlying tensions. Although a specific event may trigger hostilities, it occurs against a backdrop of issues setting the belligerents at cross-purposes. These underlying causes constitute the real reasons for war, not the headline-grabbing provocations.
The average Westerner … was wont to regard Japan as barbarous while she indulged in the gentle arts of peace: he calls her civilised since she began to commit wholesale slaughter on Manchurian battlefield.
Okakura Kakuzō (1862–1913), philosopher, art critic, in reference to the Russo-Japanese WarThe Book of Tea (1906)
During two periods in the last century and a half, Japan has been governed by extraordinary generations of leaders, whose choices brought their citizens prosperity and their country the accolades of the world. They were the Meiji generation, which transformed Japan in the late nineteenth century into the first modern, non-Western great power, and the post-World War II generation, which transformed Japan after the disastrous Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45) into an economic powerhouse soon emulated by all of its neighbors. These two generations bookend the narrative told here of a meteoric rise ending in a shattering fall encompassing all of Asia and destroying imperial Japan. It is a story beginning with brilliance and ending in tragedy.
Few nations have solved the conundrum of economic development. Yet the Japanese in the late nineteenth century became experts at economic development and their story has much to offer others concerning both the prerequisites and the pitfalls of transforming a traditional society into a modern country. Japanese leaders modernized and westernized their homeland in order to defend against the predations of increasingly intrusive Western powers. From 1894 to 1945, they fought a series of three wars to contain the march of Russian imperialism into Asia that became the march of Communist imperialism post-1917. While their strategy delivered rapid economic development and victory in the first two conflicts, the third war escalated into a global war that destroyed imperial Japan and produced mayhem on a scale unprecedented for humankind. Although the goal to become and remain a great power had not changed, the conflicts produced antithetical outcomes. The question is, why?
Traditionally, governments have wielded power through the creation of large armies to dominate citizens and neighbors, but since the Industrial Revolution, this approach has yielded low standards of living and often only fleeting military triumphs.
I believe few countries’ politicians’ lives are in such danger as ours are in Japan … Military men are fond of saying, “We risk our lives for society.” … [M]ilitary men, particularly those of higher rank … have few opportunities to die in war … Looking back, I think one can safely say that since the Restoration there have hardly been any politicians equivalent to four-star generals and field marshals who have not become targets of assassins.
Ozaki Yukio (1858–1954), Diet member from 1890 to 1954, Cabinet minister
The Industrial Revolution brought trade of global scope and wealth of unimaginable scale. It heralded an incoming maritime world order, which gradually supplanted the outgoing continental world order of empires underlying so many great civilizations. Formerly, land had been the currency of power. It produced the agricultural commodities to be sold and the peasant conscripts to field mass armies. In the nineteenth century, commerce became the juggernaut of wealth creation, which in turn underwrote high standards of living and expensive ambitions, armaments, and allies. The Meiji generation lived at the transition between two global orders but they charted a course to the outgoing one, then at high tide, because they and so many others did not yet apprehend the incoming one just beyond the horizon. It is only with the perspective provided by long retrospect that such tectonic changes become clearer. At the time, people saw great change but not its cumulative direction.
Continental and maritime powers face different security problems that have far-reaching military, economic, and political ramifications. Continental powers border on their historic enemies, which pose their most lethal national security threats. The more numerous the potentially dangerous neighbors, the more difficult the problem of national security becomes. Continental powers require large standing armies to ward off neighboring threats. They do so often by deploying their armies to dominate surrounding buffer zones, which over time become national territory so that the army assumes a crucial domestic garrisoning function. Large standing armies also tend to have a palpable presence in the capital, where they often exercise great political influence. They tend to support economic policies that fund the army, produce conscripts, and efficiently exploit buffer zones for military purposes; as a result, they often favor extensive state planning.
The foetal mammary gland is sensitive to maternal weight and nutrition during gestation, which could affect offspring milk production. It has previously been shown that ewes born to dams offered maintenance nutrition during pregnancy (day 21 to 140 of gestation) produced greater milk, lactose and CP yields in their first lactation when compared with ewes born to dams offered ad libitum nutrition. In addition, ewes born to heavier dams produced greater milk and lactose yields when compared with ewes born to lighter dams. The objective of this study was to analyse and compare the 5-year lactation performance of the previously mentioned ewes, born to heavy or light dams that were offered maintenance or ad libitum pregnancy nutrition. Ewes were milked once per week, for the first 6 weeks of their lactation, for 5 years. Using milk yield and composition data, accumulated yields were calculated over a 42-day period for each year for milk, milk fat, CP, true protein, casein and lactose using a Legendre orthogonal polynomial model. Over the 5-year period, ewes born to heavy dams produced greater average milk (P=0.04), lactose (P=0.01) and CP (P=0.04) yields than offspring born to light dams. In contrast, over the 5-year period dam nutrition during pregnancy did not affect average (P>0.05) offspring milk yields or composition, but did increase milk and lactose accumulated yield (P=0.03 and 0.01, respectively) in the first lactation. These results indicate that maternal gestational nutrition appears to only affect the first lactational performance of ewe offspring. Neither dam nutrition nor size affected grand-offspring live weight gain to, or live weight at weaning (P>0.05). Combined these data indicate that under the conditions of the present study, manipulating dam weight or nutrition in pregnancy can have some effects of offspring lactational performance, however, these effects are not large enough to alter grand-offspring growth to weaning. Therefore, such manipulations are not a viable management tool for farmers to influence lamb growth to weaning.
A high proportion of piglets fail to adapt to the changing composition of their diet at weaning, resulting in weight loss and increased susceptibility to pathogens. Polyamines are present in sow milk and promote neonatal maturation of the gut. We hypothesised that oral spermine and spermidine supplementation before weaning would increase piglet growth and promote gastrointestinal development at weaning. In Experiment One, one pair of liveweight (LW)-matched piglets per litter from first and third lactation sows received 2 ml of a 0 (Control) or 463 nmol/ml spermine solution at 14, 16, 18, 20 and 22 days of age (n=6 piglets/treatment per parity). Villus height and crypt depth in the duodenum and jejunum were measured at weaning (day 23 postpartum). In Experiment Two, piglets suckling 18 first and 18 third lactation sows were used. Within each litter, piglets received 2 ml of either water (Control), 463 nmol/ml spermine solution or 2013 nmol/ml spermidine solution at 14, 16, 18, 22 and 24 days of age (n=54 piglets/treatment per sow parity). Piglets were weighed individually at 14, 18, 24 (weaning) and 61 days of age. In Experiment One, oral spermine supplementation resulted in a 41% increase in villus height, a 21% decrease in crypt depth and 79% decrease in the villus height : crypt depth ratio compared with control piglets (P<0.01). In Experiment Two, spermine and spermidine-supplemented piglets suckling first lactation sows grew faster (P<0.05) between days 14 and 18 postpartum than control piglets: 0.230±0.011 and 0.227±0.012 v. 0.183±0.012 kg/day, respectively. Spermine supplementation tended (P<0.1) to increase piglet LW gain from weaning to day 37 post-weaning compared with control piglets (0.373±0.009 v. 0.341±0.010 kg/day). In conclusion, spermine supplementation increased villus height at weaning, and appears to have the potential to improve the pre- and post-weaning growth of conventionally weaned piglets.