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compares cosmopolitan versus communitarian issue positions by mass publics and elites across our study. We investigate whether there is an attitude gap between elites, who tend to adhere to cosmopolitan positions, and mass publics with more communitarian leanings. Contrasting mass opinion surveys with results from our own elite survey, we show that the mass-elite divide on globalization issues is indeed pervasive and found in all five countries of study. We consider both economic causes in the shape of diverging material interests and cultural ones, the latter pointing towards cultural capital and symbolic boundaries defining transnational cosmopolitan class consciousness. The results align more with the cultural than with the economic explanation. Political elites in the five countries display convergent cosmopolitan positions across issues as varied as international trade, climate change, migration and supranational integration. Mass publics are much more divided on these issues. Also, education alone does not explain the mass-elite gap because the elites are still significantly more cosmopolitan than highly educated members of mass publics, even within the same country.
“Globalization has transformed the inner workings of societies, and produced a new emerging cleavage between cosmopolitans and communitarians, affecting the working of our party system and democracy as a whole. The chapter summarizes the most crucial empirical findings of the book, moving from descriptive to more normative issues and asks: What does the struggle over borders mean for the quality of democracy? What understandings of democracy do the cosmopolitan and communitarian positions draw on? What are their flaws and virtues from a democratic point of view? Our core answer is the following: Both normative positions have become politically more prominent during the last decades of globalization, but both provide answers that exhibit considerable weaknesses when measured against the criteria of democratic quality. Nevertheless, both concepts have more room to forge compromises than the cosmopolitan and communitarian theoreticians themselves often assume. Cosmopolitan communitarianism or communitarian cosmopolitanism appear to represent the most promising compromises to overcome the democratic shortcomings of both pure narratives.”
compares cosmopolitan vs communitarian issue positions of national, European and global elites. It is important to go beyond the national elite focus since the prototypical members of a cosmopolitan elite are thought to be no longer attached to one national context but to have an entire region or even the ‘global village’ as their point of reference. Our empirical analysis supports this expectation: The positions of European-level elites turn out to be even more strongly cosmopolitan than those of national elites, which indicates that a particularly large gap exists between the cosmopolitanism of European elites and the more communitarian orientation of mass publics. Cultural explanations - measured by embeddedness in transnational networks - have the greatest explanatory power. Those elites who have more transnational contacts and travel experience are more cosmopolitan with regard to trade, immigration and supranational integration. However, economic explanations help us to explain within-elite variance in cosmopolitanism. In particular, we find that business and labour union elites diverge strongly in their positions on international trade and supranational integration.
This chapter presents the theoretical framework and research design of the book. Drawing on cleavage theory, we argue that the new fault lines around globalization can no longer be captured along the classic redistributional left-right axis. From debates in political philosophy, we infer a distinction between ‘cosmopolitans’, who advocate open borders, universal norms, and supranational authority, and ‘communitarians’, who defend border closure, cultural particularism and national sovereignty. We also distinguish two hybrid positions, which we label ‘liberal nationalism’ and ‘regionalism’. In terms of processes of social structuration underlying conflicts related to globalization, we distinguish three explanations: an economic one, centred around the differential materials costs and benefits for various collective actors; a cultural one, centred around access to transnational cultural capital and a political one that captures the differing degree to which actors have access to supranational forums of decision-making. Finally, we introduce the book’s research design, the rationale behind the choice of countries and issues, and the main methods used to investigate them.
offers a comprehensive analysis of political claims-making in the age of globalization, investigating issue positions of collective actors across countries and polity levels and distinguishing between economic, cultural and political dimensions of globalization. The cultural dimension is centred on migration, human rights and climate change, and the economic dimension is centred on international trade. Positions on political globalization vary between NAFTA members Mexico and the USA, where it is a trade issue, and EU members Germany and Poland, where it is part of the cultural dimension. Global actors (mostly NGOs and UN orgs) take cosmopolitan positions. Among domestic actors there is a marked differentiation between predominantly cosmopolitan executive and administrative state actors and experts, and legislative and civil society actors with more strongly communitarian leanings. On trade and regional integration issues, we find more classic economic-interest explanations. Here, labour unions and farmers are found on the communitarian side, whereas business associations and representatives of large firms strongly favour free international trade and regional integration.
Citizens, parties, and movements are increasingly contesting issues connected to globalization, such as whether to welcome immigrants, promote free trade, and support international integration. The resulting political fault line, precipitated by a deepening rift between elites and mass publics, has created space for the rise of populism. Responding to these issues and debates, this book presents a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of how economic, cultural and political globalization have transformed democratic politics. This study offers a fresh perspective on the rise of populism based on analyses of public and elite opinion and party politics, as well as mass media debates on climate change, human rights, migration, regional integration, and trade in the USA, Germany, Poland, Turkey, and Mexico. Furthermore, it considers similar conflicts taking place within the European Union and the United Nations. Appealing to political scientists, sociologists and international relations scholars, this book is also an accessible introduction to these debates for undergraduate and masters students.
If anyone still had any doubt, the euro crisis put the increasing politicization of the European Union (EU) and its policies in plain sight. Research on the Europeanization of public spheres had previously pointed out that if there is a European public sphere deficit, it certainly does not consist of a lack of media attention for European affairs (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2010a). However, high degrees of visibility and politicization alone are not sufficient to provide the communicative underpinnings for a viable European polity. If politicians and institutions in the EU or other member states appear only as targets of claims by domestic actors and never as speakers in their own right, then media consumers will never have a firsthand view of the opinions and arguments of actors beyond their own national boundaries; they will learn only how domestic actors view the outside world. Similarly, if domestic actors never appear as the targets of claims by actors from the European level or other member states, ordinary citizens will never hear the opinions and arguments that prevail among domestic actors in the critical light of opinions from beyond their own national boundaries. If this were the predominant shape that the politicization and increased visibility of European affairs takes, transnational public-opinion formation could not occur, a genuine understanding of the motivations and interests of nondomestic actors could not arise, and – consequently – there would be no basis for transnational consensus formation or solidarity. Politicization of Europe that takes such a nationally centered shape would not advance beyond the preceding era of depoliticized European politics behind closed doors, and it would have destructive rather than constructive impacts on the European project.
Despite the numerous studies about the Europeanization of public spheres that have appeared in recent years, we still lack a reliable answer to the question of the shape that the politicization of European affairs is taking. Is this politicization of the type that is an integral part of domestic politics and, therefore, a healthy sign of a normalization of European public debates? Or does politicization take the parochial shapes previously described and does it threaten rather than support further progress in European integration?
This book investigates an important source of the European Union's recent legitimacy problems. It shows how European integration is debated in mass media, and how this affects democratic inclusiveness. Advancing integration implies a shift in power between governments, parliaments, and civil society. Behind debates over Europe's 'democratic deficit' is a deeper concern: whether democratic politics can perform effectively under conditions of Europeanization and globalization. This study is based on a wealth of unique data from seven European countries, combining newspaper content analyses, an innovative study of Internet communication structures, and hundreds of interviews with leading political and media representatives across Europe. It is by far the most far-reaching and empirically grounded study on the Europeanization of media discourse and political contention to date, and a must-read for anyone interested in how European integration changes democratic politics and why European integration has become increasingly contested.
Ruud Koopmans, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Department of Migration, Integration, Transnationalization, Berlin (Germany),
Paul Statham, University of Bristol, Department of Sociology (Great Britain)
Chapter 1 has set the scene regarding the normative importance of a public sphere for the future of Europe. In this chapter, we lay out the general theoretical framework and design that informs and unites the chapters of this book into a collective body of research. Subsequent chapters are embedded in their own literatures and address specific research questions relevant to the key debates in their fields. However, such apparent pluralism does not mean that we have come to the table without a clear overall theoretical framework addressing key general research questions.