This article explores one aspect of India’s attempts to address its access to justice dilemma through the establishment of district-level consumer fora. Data points are extracted from 1,400 cases nationwide to piece together a portrait of the input and output of these institutions. The data collected include: win/loss rates; time from filing to decision; presence of attorneys (and their effects on win/loss rates and time from filing to decision); amounts of damages and costs awarded; and types of cases filed. In the end, this sampling of cases, combined with observations and interviews, led to several broad conclusions—that access to justice is increased but not for the marginalized or poor; that the consumer fora are severely underused; and that they are highly localized institutions leaving significant discretion in the hands of forum Presidents to drive the process which greatly varies the effects on access to justice among districts.

Researchers use a variety of approaches in analyzing dispute processing outside of adversarial court proceedings. Some emphasize disputant decisionmaking, while others, who generally take a more critical view of these alternatives, approach dispute processing alternatives from the perspective of the state and its interests. In this article I use a third approach which focuses on the political behavior of actors involved in the organization, administration, and staffing of these alternative mechanisms. The approach is applied to a relatively new alternative to adjudication in the courts in India, the lok adalat.