This squib challenges Patterson & Caponigro's (2015, this journal) claim that there are few acceptable free relative clauses with who. We show that free relatives with who are generally acceptable when they are ‘transparent’ free relatives or complements of a copula, and add further nuance to their findings concerning how the degree of acceptability of free relatives with who varies according to positional factors.

This paper looks at how to measure the tradeoffs in monetary terms that the public is prepared to make with respect to adoption of different community policing options. The approach advanced is a discrete choice experiment in which survey respondents face different policing options which can be described by a set of attributes ranging from costs to outcomes. The main contribution of this paper is to show how to go beyond the usual characterization of the monetized benefits of reducing the level of a specific type of crime to asking the question of whether those benefits differ depending on how that outcome is achieved.

Considerable interest has focused on the possible existence of an environmental Kuznets curve, whereby pollution first increases but later falls with increasing income. Empirical studies have concentrated on a wide spectrum of countries and run into inevitable problems of data comparability and quality. We avoid these problems by looking at seven types of air emissions across the 50 US states and find all seven pollutants decrease with increasing per capita income. We also find strong evidence of heteroscedasticity with respect to the income–emissions relationship: lower-income states display much greater variability in per capita emission levels than higher-income states. Additionally, we look at the best measured of these emissions, air toxics, for the period 1988–94. Using a simple sign test, we find support for the notion that an increase in income is associated with a decrease in per capita emissions. However, the change in emissions appears to be unrelated to the magnitude of the change in income. We do find, though, that the reduction in per capita emissions is increasing both in terms of the 1988 level of per capita emissions and income. Possible implications of these results for the development process are discussed.

We suggest a method for estimating a political representative's personal ideology and its effect on his or her voting decisions. The current practice of using the ratings of a pressure group such as Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) as a proxy for personal ideology is shown to have a number of theoretical and interpretive flaws. Our technique uses the residuals from two regression equations to provide answers to two questions: Is there a systematic ideological component to the voting behavior of political representatives after taking account of other political determinants, and if a systematic ideological component exists, is it possible to determine its role in voting on particular issues? The technique developed and the currently accepted practice are compared using votes on labor issues as an empirical example.