A common strategy unites much that philosophers have written about the virtues. The strategy can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who suggested that human beings have a characteristic function or activity (rational activity of soul), and that the virtues are traits of character which enable humans to perform this kind of activity excellently or well. The defining feature of this approach is that it treats the virtues as functional concepts, to be both identified and justified by reference to some independent goal or end which they enable people to attain (human flourishing, rational perfection, participation in practices, ‘narrative unity’ in a life). Some recent philosophers seem to have hoped that by following this perfectionist strategy, we might attain a more convincing account of our moral practices than rule-based theories of ethics have been able to provide.

Oxyfluorfen (0.28, 0.42, 0.56, and 0.84 kg ai ha−1) under clear polyethylene film was evaluated for weed control, crop injury, and effects on yields in transplanted muskmelon, cucumber, and summer squash. Numerous narrowleaf and broadleaf weeds were effectively suppressed by 0.42 ha−1 of oxyfluorfen. Crop injury, occurring soon after transplanting, was reported in New York and North Carolina. Injury was usually transient, and injured crops frequently grew more vigorously than those grown on untreated black polyethylene mulch. Muskmelons were consistently the most tolerant of the three crops. At high rates, yields of squash and cucumber in 1988 were reduced in New York and North Carolina, respectively. In greenhouse studies, positioning the cotyledons under the polyethylene film caused greater injury in all three crops than when cotyledons remained above the plastic.

If there is room for a substantial conception of the will in contemporary theorizing about human agency, it is most likely to be found in the vicinity of the phenomenon of normativity. Rational agency is distinctively responsive to the agent's acknowledgment of reasons, in the basic sense of considerations that speak for and against the alternatives for action that are available. Furthermore, it is natural to suppose that this kind of responsiveness to reasons is possible only for creatures who possess certain unusual volitional powers, beyond the bare susceptibility to beliefs and desires necessary for the kind of rudimentary agency of which the higher animals are arguably capable.