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Sphalerite is the main source of In – a ‘critical’ metal widely used in high-tech electronics. In this mineral the concentration of In is commonly correlated directly with Cu content. Here we use X-ray absorption spectroscopy of synthetic compounds and natural crystals in order to investigate the substitution mechanisms in sphalerites where In is present, together with the group 11 metals. All the admixtures (Au, Cu, In) are distributed homogeneously within the sphalerite matrix, but their structural and chemical states are different. In all the samples investigated In3+ replaces Zn in the structure of sphalerite. The In ligand distance increases by 0.12 Å and 0.09–0.10 Å for the 1st and 2nd coordination shells, respectively, in comparison with pure sphalerite. The In–S distance in the 3rd coordination shell is close to the one of pure sphalerite. Gold in synthetic sphalerites is coordinated with sulfur (NS = 2.4–2.5, RAu–S = 2.35 ± 0.01 Å). Our data suggest that at high Au concentrations (0.03–0.5 wt.%) the Au2S clusters predominate, with a small admixture of the Au+ solid solution with an Au–S distance of 2.5 Å. Therefore, the homogeneous character of a trace-element distribution, which is commonly observed in natural sulfides, does not confirm formation of a solid solution. In contrast to Au, the presence of Cu+ with In exists only in the solid-solution state, where it is tetrahedrally coordinated with S atoms at a distance of 2.30 ± 0.03 Å. The distant coordination shells of Cu are disordered. These results demonstrate that the group 11 metals (Cu, Ag and Au) can exist in sphalerite in the metastable solid-solution state. The solid solution forms at high temperature via the charge compensation scheme 2Zn2+↔Me++Me3+. The final state of the trace elements at ambient temperature is governed by the difference in ionic radii with the main component (Zn), and concentration of admixtures.
Taphonomic factors may significantly alter faunal assemblages at varying scales. An exceptional record of late Holocene (<4000 yr old) mammal faunas establishes a firm baseline to investigate the effects of scale on taphonomy. Our sample contains 73 sites within four contiguous states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois, USA) that transect a strong modern and late Holocene environmental gradient, the prairie–forest ecotone. We performed detrended correspondence (DCA) and non-metric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) analyses. Both DCA and NMDS analyses of the data sets produced virtually the same results, and both failed to reveal the known ecological gradient within each state. However, both DCA and NMDS analyses of the unfiltered multistate data set across the entire gradient clearly reflect an environmental, rather than taphonomic, signal. DCA tended to provide better separation of some clusters than did NMDS in most of the analyses. We conclude that a robust mammal data set collected across a strong environmental gradient will document species turnover without the removal of taphonomic factors. In other words, taphonomy exhibits varying scale-dependent effects.
Hill (Twin Research and Human Genetics, Vol. 21, 2018, 84–88) presented a critique of our recently published paper in Cell Reports entitled ‘Large-Scale Cognitive GWAS Meta-Analysis Reveals Tissue-Specific Neural Expression and Potential Nootropic Drug Targets’ (Lam et al., Cell Reports, Vol. 21, 2017, 2597–2613). Specifically, Hill offered several interrelated comments suggesting potential problems with our use of a new analytic method called Multi-Trait Analysis of GWAS (MTAG) (Turley et al., Nature Genetics, Vol. 50, 2018, 229–237). In this brief article, we respond to each of these concerns. Using empirical data, we conclude that our MTAG results do not suffer from ‘inflation in the FDR [false discovery rate]’, as suggested by Hill (Twin Research and Human Genetics, Vol. 21, 2018, 84–88), and are not ‘more relevant to the genetic contributions to education than they are to the genetic contributions to intelligence’.
The work was intended to explore the effect of the widely available cationic polymer polyethylenimine (PEI) on small diameter poly(ɛ-caprolactone) (PCL) blood vessel grafts. PEI was blended with PCL and electrospun into nanofibrous vascular scaffolds. The morphologies, wettabilities, mechanical properties, and biological activities of the PCL/PEI electrospun nanofibers were investigated. It was found that by increasing the content of PEI to 5% within the scaffolds, the fiber diameters decreased from 469.7 ± 212.1 to 282.5 ± 107.1 nm, the water contact angle was reduced from 126.6 ± 1.1° to 27.6 ± 3.9°, while the Young's modulus increased from 2.0 ± 0.2 to 4.1 ± 0.1 MPa, the suture retention strength increased from 4.2 ± 0.4 to 6.1 ± 0.7 N, and the burst pressure increased from 801.2 ± 14.1 to 926.2 ± 22.8 mmHg. The in vitro evaluations demonstrated that the nanofibers containing 2% PEI promoted the attachment and proliferation of human umbilical vein endothelial cells (HUVECs).
Since mid-2007 we have carried out a dedicated long-term monitoring programme at 15 GHz using the Owens Valley Radio Observatory 40 meter telescope (OVRO 40m). One of the main goals of this programme is to study the relation between the radio and gamma-ray emission in blazars and to use it as a tool to locate the site of high energy emission. Using this large sample of objects we are able to characterize the radio variability, and study the significance of correlations between the radio and gamma-ray bands. We find that the radio variability of many sources can be described using a simple power law power spectral density, and that when taking into account the red-noise characteristics of the light curves, cases with significant correlation are rare. We note that while significant correlations are found in few individual objects, radio variations are most often delayed with respect to the gamma-ray variations. This suggests that the gamma-ray emission originates upstream of the radio emission. Because strong flares in most known gamma-ray-loud blazars are infrequent, longer light curves are required to settle the issue of the strength of radio-gamma cross-correlations and establish confidently possible delays between the two. For this reason continuous multiwavelength monitoring over a longer time period is essential for statistical tests of jet emission models.
The case of East Kalimantan, namely a non-ethnically based call by a regional elite for a federal state, points to a major change in how the decentralized structuring of the Indonesian state needs to be discussed. In the past, issues of decentralization have been discussed in a “region versus centre” or “Java versus outer Islands” framework. While it is true that Kalimantan is an “Outer Island”, Amien Rais, first advocate of federalism, comes from Java and his party, while with strong support in Sumatra and elsewhere outside Java, also has a key support base on parts of the island of Java. The support for federalism in East Kalimantan has no real connection to identity or any aspect of geo-ethnic definition. Neither did any of Rais's justifications for federalism, nor later arguments favour decentralization.
The new situation that has arisen and continues to evolve does not pit outer regions against the centre but localism against national perspective. This is also consistent with the demands for decentralization which developed after 1999 from kabupaten and municipalities on the island of Java itself, even resulting in kabupaten splitting to form new ones. It reflects developments of contradictions more radical than those represented by the old region-versus-centre tensions. To the extent that some of the regional elites campaign for federalism or independence, and for greater and greater decentralization reflects a lack of interest among them in any perspective on national political or economic development. Federalists presented arguments that a federal state would not lead to a break-up of Indonesia. However, a break-up into several separate states is not the danger that is threatened by contemporary developments. It is rather a stagnation or disintegration of function of the national economy and political processes. Such a dysfunction, stagnation or disintegration relates not so much to the running of day-to-day state functions, but to solving national problems and fostering national development. There is a tension between national and local perspectives, embodied in the absence of a capacity to coordinate to achieve evenness among the country's heterogeneity and in the ideology of local ownership or priority of access to natural resources.
Approaches to Understanding Indonesian Politics and Decentralization
It is very possible that the next president of Indonesia will be a former mayor from a modest size Central Javanese city: Joko Widodo, the mayor of Solo from 2005 to 2012. He was elected to the position of Governor of Jakarta in 2012, with 38 per cent of the vote in the first round and 56 per cent of the vote in the second round. His opponent, Fauzi Bowo, was supported by President Yudhoyono and the coalition of ruling parties. Whether Widodo is indeed nominated by the party he joined in 2004, namely the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), and then wins or some other scenario evolves, his stakes in the race are high. In September 2013, at a national working conference of the PDI-P, chaired by party head Megawati Sukarnoputri, Widodo emerged as its “star”, with wide media discussion of his presidential prospects.
There is a kind of Jokowimania afoot.
How is it that a local furniture factory owner and local mayor, with no prior political record and no known views on most national issues, can rocket into this position? Has “desentralisasi” created a launching pad for a local politician to launch into national politics? This essay will argue that the rise of Jokowi and desentralisasi are connected, but not as cause and effect. It will argue that both are the results (effects) of other major changes, based in the political economy (the economic-based structure of political power). The essay will identify two major processes of change at work here.
The first of these processes has longer term origins: namely, the quantitative growth of the Indonesian economy as a nonindustrializing capitalist economy under authoritarian rule, resulting in a domestic capitalist class comprising a small number of politically protected big crony capitalists and a huge number of small, local capitalists. The inability to industrialize, due to the lack of any sizeable capital in the hands of either the state or private business at the time of independence in 1945 has, in turn, limited the post-independence capital accumulation, including since 1965. Neither the state nor Indonesian domestic capitalists have been able to develop late twentieth century scale industry anywhere near sufficient to begin to raise Indonesia's average labour productivity or general prosperity.
During the last fourteen years (1999–2013), budgetary authority for spending a significant portion of the national revenue for activities to be carried out by the local apparatus of Indonesian national ministries has been delegated to sub-provincial governments and parliaments, that is town municipalities and county districts, known as kabupaten. At the moment, the core amount is provided through the General Allocation Fund (DAU) which is set at least 26 per cent of Net Domestic Revenue. Regions with major natural resources that bring in foreign revenue also receive a percentage of those revenues, depending on the particular natural resource. There is also a provision for the special allocation of additional funds. This policy direction was also later strengthened by the introduction of direct elections for town mayors and county heads (bupati) as well as governors of provinces. The policies embodied in this new delegation of power, legalized by a series of laws after 2000, are known as the desentralisasi policies.
There can be little doubt that among Indonesian political scientists, and the few Indonesia specialists outside the country, desentralisasi has been one of the most written-about topics in recent scholarly literature on Indonesian politics. There is a plethora of Indonesian honours, masters and doctoral theses on this topic. In realpolitik terms, desentralisasi in and of itself has not brought about major changes in Indonesian politics. The policy has not brought about a change in direction, in terms of either economic or social strategy nor changed — as yet — the underlying character, outlook and activity of those who wield power in Indonesia or their subjects. However, as I have stated earlier, there is also no doubt that the coming of desentralisasi is a resultof two colossal changes in both the political and economic format of Indonesia: the end of authoritarian rule and of Suhartoist crony capitalism.
Reformasi and the Absence of Desentralisasi
Perhaps the best starting point for an analysis of the phenomenon of desentralisasi in Indonesia over the last decade is to note that advocacy for decentralization was completely absent within the movement against authoritarian rule that developed in the 1990s. While I will argue that in its current form, it is a result of the end of authoritarian rule, it was not a result intended by the forces that composed the pro-democracy movement.
The post-Suharto political economy, i.e., post-cronyism, has facilitated a decentralization (introduced during a period of technocratic interregnum under President Habibie and supported by international donor forces) that is set in an anational, political framework. This reflects the absence of any strong national, class-based, political agency that can assert its agenda nationally — whatever that might be. A weakened layer of ex-crony conglomerate capital, no longer protected by the military-backed centralistic Suharto regime, lost its ability to assert a clear national agenda over the plethora of small and medium capitalists operating at a local level, who themselves do not operate on a national scale or have a clear national development perspective. This has accentuated the dysfunctional aspects of decentralization, both in terms of capture of local government and corruption as well as inability to deal with the unevenness/heterogeneity/factor immobility of the archipelago. This weakness also makes it easier for international capital to assert its interests in the formulation of national economic policy. The inadequacy — or in some cases, the complete inability to formulate solutions or identify potential “solutional” trends in the available literature — reflects the absence of a focus on the question of social class and political agency. I hope this essay shows that an analysis which searches for trends that relate to such an agency will yield more explanatory and interesting results and point to the kind of further research agenda that may be useful.
"Decentralization is a major trend in Indonesia since the first decades of that nation under Sukarno and Suharto. Max Lane is justly treasured for illuminating those first decades, for example, through his translations of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, and his excellent book, Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto. Anyone who seeks insights into the current trend of decentralization, whether in Indonesia or other parts of the world, will find this work cogent."–James L. Peacock, Kenan Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill"This book opens up the discussion on the history and political economy of the new populist policies that seem to gain momentum in the face of the Indonesian elections. It also addresses questions pertaining to the problems and options related to popular aspirations within this context-all of which cannot be explained very well by any of the predominant theses on Indonesia, whether as an oligarchy or a democratically liberal but economically predatory country."–Professor Olle Törnquist, University of Oslo
In assessing the impact of desentralisasi, it can be viewed in at least two ways — as a manifestation of a change in the political balance flowing from changes in the political economy or as the implementation of a (technocratic) policy to improve economic and social development. The analysis in the previous two chapters presents the emergence of decentralization as primarily a manifestation of changes in the political side of the political economy. In an under-industrialized economy comprising a plethora of small- and medium-sized local capitalists and a tiny conglomerate sector (for the size of the country), the end of the crony regime and the consequent privileged position of crony capital has unleashed a dynamic giving more room to move for the smaller, local capitalists. This is the essence of desentralisasi. It is the basis for a more anational political format.
Perhaps anational is a difficult concept to use. The Indonesian nation, as a stable community inhabiting clear borders (though disputed in western Papua), with a common language, economic and cultural life, certainly continues to exist, even if with lowered expectations for itself than previously held. There is a national government which, despite desentralisasi, controls the majority of the nation's state revenues and sets the policy frameworks, in which local governments must operate. It is perhaps also further complicated by the dominance of classical liberal and neo-liberal economic policy thought in Indonesia, which emphasizes market mechanisms rather than intervention by the national state. This may not be so much a complicating factor, but rather a reinforcing factor. In the absence of a strong national social class providing direction for the nation, an ideology emphasizing a smaller role for the state finds a comforting environment at elite levels. The New Order government may have pursued an agenda which included prioritizing protecting the privileges of crony capitalists but the powerful character of the core military rule established in the 1960s and 1970s also meant that it could impose a national direction.
A primary thesis of this essay is that the sudden emergence of decentralization, seemingly out of nowhere (but actually initiated from within the technocracy) and its strong consolidation over the last ten years is a direct consequence of two interlinked phenomenon. Firstly, the end of crony capitalism. And secondly, in some ways more fundamentally, that Indonesia's general economic underdevelopment has not fostered the growth of a large, strong national capitalist class, i.e., a class with a strong presence throughout the country with a concomitant national perspective, even if one emphasizing its own interests. The inability of Indonesia to industrialize over the last fifty years has meant that most capitalists in Indonesia are small, local capitalists, orienting to limited local markets. The larger capitalists have either evolved as protected cronies, or in very specific market niches, which give limited political clout. And, for a country the size of Indonesia, this group is not only not made up of industrialists, but also small in number.
Conglomerate, Crony vis-à-vis Local Capital
Indonesia has a population of 240 million people, 80 per cent of the United States’ population size. It is likely that by 2050 Indonesia will have overtaken the population size of the United States. It is predicted to reach 450 million. Their gross domestic products (GDP) are, of course, very different from each other. The U.S. GDP for 2012–13 is US$15.7 trillion. Indonesia's GDP is just under US$900 billion. The U.S. per capita income for 2012–13 is close to US$50,000 whereas Indonesia's is US$3,500. It is not surprising that in economies which are so hugely different in scale, their capitalist classes are also very different in scale and nature. This class, to the extent it assumes the role of ruling class, may “rule” over a smaller economy than that of the United States but politically it has to manage a huge and complex country of 250 million people, heading to 450 million, with an island geography and massive issues of underdevelopment.
One way to get a picture of this is to compare the number of billionaires in each economy and also the nature of their enterprises. According to the Forbes listing, the United States has 442 billionaires to Indonesia's 25 billionaires. The majority of the Indonesian billionaires are listed by Forbes as being worth less than US$2 billion.