Medieval Christian writers maintained that the union between a man and a woman resembled that between God or Christ and human beings in salient and consequential respects. They posited such resemblances not only to shed light on the divine–human relationship but also to support moral claims about the estate of marriage and to show how marrying was one of the sacraments of the Church.

My purpose in this essay is to survey the different ways in which medieval authors made such comparisons, to reflect on how they conceived and spoke about them, and to ask how the three modes of comparison were related to each other. Was there a common denominator or essence? Today, we regard all three as forms of symbolism. Is that their common essence? If so, what do we mean by ‘symbolism’? To keep a necessarily large survey within practical limits, I shall not consider comparable symbolism in visual art or in ritual. Nor shall I consider such kindred discursive comparisons as that between marriage and a bishop's union with his diocese.

Analytical and Interpretive Tools

Although our primary task as interpreters of medieval Christian texts is to explicate the underlying medieval rationale, and not to impose an extraneous rationale of our own, the medieval authors were not always as forthcoming as we might wish.

Hailing from North Africa, Lactantius was an imperial professor of Latin rhetoric, a position that brought him to the courts of the emperors Diocletian and Constantine. This chapter explores themes in his Divine Institutes that bear on his legal thought. In addition to setting out Lactantius’s conception of religious tolerance and its influence on the emperor Constantine’s religious policy, the chapter considers the role of “divine law” in Lactantius’s work. He found the first two principles of divine law in Matt 22:36–40 and considered them equivalent to pietas and aequitas in Cicero’s thought. Just as Roman citizens were defined by their access to Roman law, so adherence to divine law, for Lactantius, constituted both Christian and Roman identity. After Augustine of Hippo rejected Lactantius’s suggestion that the law of the state could be a faithful image of the divine law, Western medieval scholars largely ignored the legal thrust of Lactantius’s arguments. Nevertheless, his advocacy of religious tolerance gained currency in recent times, when the Second Vatican Council embraced it.

Christian leaders and scholars during the first millennium in the West were preoccupied with written norms and corrective practices. Law (lex) during this era needs to be understood in a broader normative context. This introductory chapter provides historical and historiographical background to the specialized chapters that follow, explores the notions of lex, ius, norma, regula, and canon, and proposes an overarching schema of four normative fields, as understood by authors of the period: laws, canons, penitential prescriptions, and monastic rules, with their corresponding normative practices and textual compilations. The legal status of conciliar canons and papal decretals during this era is problematic. Although scholars today usually construe these as constituting a body of law, Isidore of Seville did not, and authors of the era usually treated laws (leges) and canons as distinct but complementary categories. The final section of the chapter examines this problem, proposing several fields of inquiry that would shed light on it, and suggesting that canonical collections, as a genre, were practical but not attached to any particular application.

Christian leaders and scholars during the first millennium in the West were preoccupied with written norms and corrective practices. Law (lex) during this era needs to be understood in a broader normative context. This introductory chapter provides historical and historiographical background to the specialized chapters that follow, explores the notions of lex, ius, norma, regula, and canon, and proposes an overarching schema of four normative fields, as understood by authors of the period: laws, canons, penitential prescriptions, and monastic rules, with their corresponding normative practices and textual compilations. The legal status of conciliar canons and papal decretals during this era is problematic. Although scholars today usually construe these as constituting a body of law, Isidore of Seville did not, and authors of the era usually treated laws (leges) and canons as distinct but complementary categories. The final section of the chapter examines this problem, proposing several fields of inquiry that would shed light on it, and suggesting that canonical collections, as a genre, were practical but not attached to any particular application.