In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar's caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.

Species richness of macrophytes of artificial and natural water bodies covering rivers, streams, canals and habitats with standing water was studied in two Central European biogeographical regions, Pannonian and Carpathian, represented by two model areas (the Borská nížina Lowland and the Turčianska Kotlina Basin). We found that: (i) the total number of macrophytes was higher in artificial water bodies compared to natural aquatic habitats in both regions and differences were statistically significant (P<0.05); and (ii) species richness of macrophytes is relatively low in both regions; slightly higher mean number was found in the Pannonian region (3.53) compared with the Carpathian region (3.06). Effects of environmental characteristics on species richness studied by generalized linear model (GLM) showed that explained variances of GLM were similar in both regions. The main drivers of the diversity pattern were those connected with the hydrology of water bodies, such as substrate characteristics and turbidity, less frequent were chemical characteristics, such as water conductivity and N-contents, whereas landscape characteristics manifested the smallest impact.

The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”

The imagery debate re-enacts controversies persisting since Descartes. The controversy remains important less for what we can learn about visual imagery than about cognitive science itself. In the tradition of Arnauld, Reid, Bartlett, Austin and Ryle, Pylyshyn's critique exposes notorious mistakes being unwittingly rehearsed not only regarding imagery but also in several independent domains of research in modern cognitive science.