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110 results

Page 1 of 6

Divine Guidance

Divine Guidance
  • Moral Attraction in Action
  • Paul K. Moser
  • Published online:
    15 September 2022
    Print publication:
    20 October 2022
  • If God exists and is perfectly good, God tries to guide people. A twofold question then arises: How does God (try to) guide people, and to what end? Problems of divine guidance for humans, according to this volume, are real and serious, but they are manageable once we clarify the kind of God at issue. According to the volume's main thesis, if God has a perfect moral character accompanied by certain redemptive purposes for humans, the puzzling nature of divine guidance for them need not preclude the reality of such guidance. It is, this volume contends, a live option for God to guide or lead humans toward goodness, even if the leading is not fully explainable by humans. The voluntary moral attraction of cooperative humans by divine goodness is central to divine guidance, and it can illuminate the kind of evidence to be expected from God.

  • God de re et de dicto: Kierkegaard, faith and religious diversity

  • Paul K. Moser
  • Journal:
    Scottish Journal of Theology / Volume 74 / Issue 2 / May 2021
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 May 2021, pp. 135-146
    Print publication:
    May 2021

  • In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, writing as Johannes Climacus, famously distinguishes two kinds of religiousness, kind A and kind B. He claims that, even though kind A is basic to kind B, including as represented in Christian religious commitment, kind A both has God ‘in its ground’ and ‘can be present in paganism’ that is atheist or agnostic. This apparent conflict calls for a resolution, if kind A is to be coherent. This article offers a new resolution with a familiar distinction between God de re and God de dicto, even though interpreters have overlooked the importance of this distinction for understanding Kierkegaard. In addition, the article contends that this distinction is supportable from Kierkegaard's own writings, even though he himself did not draw it explicitly. The article also explains the importance of the distinction for understanding Kierkegaard on religious diversity in intellectual content. It proposes that it enables Kierkegaard to offer a compelling position on such diversity, given his understanding of God's perfectly good character and activity.

  • Introduction

  • Edited by Paul K. Moser, Loyola University, Chicago, Chad Meister
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Companion to Religious Experience
    Published online:
    20 June 2020
    Print publication:
    16 July 2020, pp 1-22

  • Summary

    The Introduction identifies some important questions about religious experience, and it considers Tolstoy's position that relates religious experience to the meaning of human life. It also comments on the relation between religious experience and evidence for God's existence and on the bearing of science on religious experience. In addition, it looks at the bearing of religious disagreement on religious experience. Finally, the Introduction offers summaries of the book's chapters.

The Cambridge Companion to Religious Experience
  • Edited by Paul K. Moser, Chad Meister
  • Published online:
    20 June 2020
    Print publication:
    16 July 2020
  • For centuries, theologians and philosophers, among others, have examined the nature of religious experience. Students and scholars unfamiliar with the vast literature face a daunting task in grasping the main issues surrounding the topic of religious experience. The Cambridge Companion to Religious Experience offers an original introduction to its topic. Going beyond an introduction, it is a state-of-the-art overview of the topic, with critical analyses of and creative insights into its subject. Religious experience is discussed from various interdisciplinary perspectives, from religious perspectives inside and outside traditional monotheistic religions, and from various topical perspectives. Written by leading scholars in clear and accessible prose, this book is an ideal resource for undergraduate and graduate students, teachers, and scholars across many disciplines.

  • On Basic Knowledge Without Justification

  • Paul K. Moser
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 15 / Issue 2 / June 1985
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 305-310

  • Recently Robert Almeder has invoked Aristotle's celebrated regress argument to argue for the existence of basic knowledge that does not require the satisfaction of any justification condition. After outlining Almeder's argument, I shall show why it ultimately fails.

    Aristotle's regress argument in Book I of the Posterior Analytics is basically that because we have inferential knowledge, we must also have non-inferential knowledge. Aristotle plausibly assumes that to know the conclusion of an argument on the basis of its premises, one must know its premises. But he notes that if knowledge of any premise requires knowledge of some other proposition, then knowing any proposition would require knowledge of each member of an infinite regress of propositions. According to Aristotle, we cannot know each member of such a regress, but we do have some inferential knowledge; consequently there must be some basic, non-inferential knowledge, i.e., knowledge that does not depend for its justification on inferential relations to other known propositions.

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