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Nosocomial outbreaks caused by Salmonella are rare. We describe the investigation and control of a cluster of novel extended-spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL) Salmonella enterica serotype Isangi in a hospital in southeastern Michigan.
An epidemiologic investigation, including case-control study, assessment of infection control practices and environmental cultures, was performed to identify modes of transmission. Healthcare workers (HCWs) exposed to case patients were screened. Strain relatedness was determined using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE); ESBL confirmation was conducted using real-time PCR. Control measures were implemented to prevent further transmission.
Between September 2 and October 22, 2015, 19 surgical patients, including 10 organ transplant recipients and 1 HCW, had positive S. Isangi cultures. Of these case patients and HCW, 13 had gastroenteritis, 2 had bacteremia, 1 had surgical-site infection, and 4 were asymptomatic. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) showed 89.5% similarity among the isolates in these cases. Isolates with resistant-phenotypes possessed plasmid-mediated CTX-M15 ESBL. A total of 19 case patients were compared with 57 control participants. Case patients had significantly higher odds of exposure to an intraoperative transesophageal (TEE) probe (adjusted odds ratio 9.0; 95% confidence interval, 1.12–72.60; P=.02). Possible cross-transmission occurred in the HCW and 2 patients. Cultures of TEE probes and the environment were negative. The outbreak ended after removal of TEE probes, modification of reprocessing procedures, implementation of strict infection control practices, and enhanced environmental cleaning.
We report the first nosocomial ESBL S. Isangi outbreak in the United States. Multiple control measures were necessary to interrupt transmission of this gastrointestinal pathogen. Exposure to possibly contaminated TEE probes was associated with transmission. Periodic monitoring of reprocessing procedures of TEE probes may be required to ensure optimal disinfection.
To demonstrate that nosocomial transmission of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) can be terminated and endemicity prevented despite widespread dissemination of an epidemic strain in a large tertiary-care referral hospital.
Two months after the index case was detected in the intensive care unit, 68 patients became either infected or colonized with an epidemic strain of vanB vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium despite standard infection control procedures. The following additional interventions were then introduced to control the outbreak: (1) formation of a VRE executive group; (2) rapid laboratory identification (30 to 48 hours) using culture and polymerase chain reaction detection of vanA and vanB resistance genes; (3) mass screening of all hospitalized patients with isolation of carriers and cohorting of contacts; (4) environmental screening and increased cleaning; (5) electronic flagging of medical records of contacts; and (6) antibiotic restrictions (third-generation cephalosporins and vancomycin).
A total of 19,658 patient and 24,396 environmental swabs were processed between July and December 2001. One hundred sixty-nine patients in 23 wards were colonized with a single strain of vanB vancomycin-resistant E. faecium. Introducing additional control measures rapidly brought the outbreak under control. Hospital-wide screening found 39 previously unidentified colonized patients, with only 7 more nonsegregat-ed patients being detected in the next 2 months. The outbreak was terminated within 3 months at a cost of $2.7 million (Australian dollars).
Despite widespread dissemination of VRE in a large acute care facility, eradication was achievable by a well-resourced, coordinated, multifaceted approach and was in accordance with good clinical governance.
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