To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This greatly expanded third edition provides a comprehensive overview of clinical psychopharmacology, incorporating the major advances in the field since the previous edition's publication. Renowned experts from psychiatry, pharmacy, and nursing have integrated basic science, psychopharmacology, and clinical practice throughout the book in order to provide a thorough basis for prescribing. It covers all key psychiatric drugs and disorders and includes the latest data on efficacy, safety and tolerability. Adopting a pragmatic approach to drug nomenclature, both Neuroscience-based Nomenclature (NbN) and older generic terminology are included in the text reflecting that clinicians are likely to use both systems. Many chapters refer to current National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines, making this a crucial resource. Edited by leading authorities in the field, Professor Peter M. Haddad and Professor David J. Nutt, Seminars in Clinical Psychopharmacology emphasises evidence-based prescribing with the aim of achieving better clinical outcomes for patients.
Despite the availability of more than 20 antiseizure drugs (ASDs) for the treatment of epilepsy, up to 30% of patients continue to experience disabling seizures and are classified as having medically refractory epilepsy (MRE).1 Some patients with MRE are candidates for resective surgery or other palliative interventions, such as disconnection therapies (callosotomy or subpial transections).2 Unfortunately, the majority of refractory patients are not candidates for these surgical options due to having multifocal epileptogenic foci, foci localized to an eloquent brain area or because the focus cannot be adequately localized.3,4 For some of these patients, stimulation therapy (also known as neuromodulation) is an alternative palliative treatment option. This chapter will review the different neuromodulation modalities that are available as adjunctive treatment of MRE. The impact of neuromodulation on sudden unexplained death in epilepsy (SUDEP) will be explored in the final section.
Psychosis is more prevalent among people in prison compared with the community. Early detection is important to optimise health and justice outcomes; for some, this may be the first time they have been clinically assessed.
Determine factors associated with a first diagnosis of psychosis in prison and describe time to diagnosis from entry into prison.
This retrospective cohort study describes individuals identified for the first time with psychosis in New South Wales (NSW) prisons (2006–2012). Logistic regression was used to identify factors associated with a first diagnosis of psychosis. Cox regression was used to describe time to diagnosis from entry into prison.
Of the 38 489 diagnosed with psychosis for the first time, 1.7% (n = 659) occurred in prison. Factors associated with an increased likelihood of being diagnosed in prison (versus community) were: male gender (odds ratio (OR) = 2.27, 95% CI 1.79–2.89), Aboriginality (OR = 1.81, 95% CI 1.49–2.19), older age (OR = 1.70, 95% CI 1.37–2.11 for 25–34 years and OR = 1.63, 95% CI 1.29–2.06 for 35–44 years) and disadvantaged socioeconomic area (OR = 4.41, 95% CI 3.42–5.69). Eight out of ten were diagnosed within 3 months of reception.
Among those diagnosed with psychosis for the first time, only a small number were identified during incarceration with most identified in the first 3 months following imprisonment. This suggests good screening processes are in place in NSW prisons for detecting those with serious mental illness. It is important these individuals receive appropriate care in prison, have the opportunity to have matters reheard and possibly diverted into treatment, and are subsequently connected to community mental health services on release.
The 2006 Lebanon War, also known as the Israel–Hezbollah War, posed a severe trial for the unarmed observers of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Untso) as well as for the armed troops of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil). The UN observers were at risk from the crossfire between the Israelis and the Hezbollah militia, and needed to determine whether it was preferable to stay in their bases and to continue to observe and report to their higher headquarters, or whether to make the perilous journey back to their slightly more secure headquarters and rear bases. The danger of remaining in their patrol bases was brought home by the destruction of one of them by bombs from an Israeli aircraft and the death of the four UN Military Observers (Unmos) in it. Four Australians Unmos were serving in southern Lebanon at that time and were closely involved in these events.
Lieutenant Jim Truscott, a 23-year-old officer from the Royal Australian Engineers, vividly recalled his introduction to his task of monitoring the activities of the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). The day after their arrival in Salisbury, he and Sergeant Peter King were deployed by British helicopter. ‘The pilot was positively nervous as he furtively looked for low-strung wires’, but Truscott and King were blissfully ignorant of the danger and enjoyed the ride until they found themselves ‘dumped in a paddock beside the little country town of Marandellas’. There was nothing more they could do but squat on their packs and wait until the Rhodesian unit they were responsible for monitoring arrived about an hour later. In the meantime, they mused as to whether they should load their weapons, despite orders to the contrary. When they were finally picked up, the vehicles practised their counter-ambush drills just before leaving the town. As Truscott wrote: ‘We simply looked at each other and our magazines never left our weapons for the next two months.’
‘The past week has marked one of the most difficult and potentially dangerous phases of the settlement in Rhodesia. Great forbearance – the more difficult after years of war – was called for from all sides.’ With these words, the interim Governor, Christopher Soames, opened a broadcast to the nation on the evening of 6 January 1980. In somewhat florid language, he continued by describing progress so far in dramatic terms as three acts: the withdrawal of the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF); the dispersal of members of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) ‘in small isolated groups scattered among the hills and in the middle of the veldt’; and finally the arrival at the Rendezvous Points and Assembly Places (APs), ‘in a trickle which has become a flood’, of thousands of members of the Patriotic Front (PF).
Like most of the other conflicts dealt with in this volume, that in Southern Rhodesia resulted from the process of decolonisation. Unlike Kashmir, Palestine and Cyprus, where the conflict was over control of a recently decolonised territory, in Southern Rhodesia (as in Indonesia in the 1940s) the conflict was between, on the one hand, a majority population seeking independence and, on the other, colonial masters determined to hang on at all costs. The situation differed from that in Indonesia in that the original colonising power, Britain, had more or less withdrawn from the situation, and for a decade and a half the colonialist fight had been carried on by the white minority they had left behind. But the similarities were strong, too.
On 3 December 1971, for the third time since the partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India went to war. In the words of the political scientist Sumit Ganguly, Pakistan’s pre-emptive air strikes on Indian air bases ‘failed miserably on all counts’. India retaliated with a combination of its own air strikes, naval bombardments, and land operations using tanks, artillery, paratroopers and six infantry divisions. The fighting, most of which took place in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh), showcased India’s military superiority over its neighbour and continued until 17 December when the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered a ceasefire. Pakistan’s President, Yahya Khan, recognising the resounding defeat of his forces, accepted the ceasefire, and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 ended.
On the heights of Tiberias in northern Israel, in October 1973 Joan Howard looked out of her lounge-room window and had a grandstand view of a war. Spread out far below her was Lake Tiberias, known in Israel as the Kinneret, the biblical Sea of Galilee. Close across the lake rose the equal heights of the Golan escarpment, the southern end of the Syrian territory that Israel had captured in 1967. At night she could see the flashes of artillery. During the day, ignoring the sirens that warned her to take shelter, she stood at the window watching air battles as Israeli jets flew low over her house to keep under the Syrian radar, fighting dogfights above the lake before swooping down over the Golan. She was close enough to see Syrian tank formations come over the ridge and fight their way down towards the lake before being halted by Israeli armour.
The Security Council resolutions of 25 August 1947 had set up (or at least foreshadowed) two UN bodies to assist with the Indonesian problem. Most immediately, noting that the Indonesian Republic had requested ‘a commission of observers’, the Council asked the countries that had ‘career consular representatives’ in Batavia to instruct them
to prepare jointly for the information and guidance of the Security Council reports on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947, such reports to cover the observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties. This group of consuls, representing Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, came to be known collectively as the Consular Commission. Their task was an immediate one: to report to the Council on the situation, and was to begin immediately.
On Christmas Eve, 1979, five young Australians shaved in the sea on a beach in Mauritius, in the calm dawn after a cyclone had trashed the island. They were members of the 150-strong Australian contingent on its way to Southern Rhodesia as part of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF). In Rhodesia they were to monitor a ceasefire at the end of a long and often brutal civil war, in preparation for elections that would lead to genuine majority rule for the first time in the country’s history. Nobody knew what awaited them in Rhodesia. They arrived at Mauritius, their last stopover en route, to find much of the area devastated and hotels rendered uninhabitable. Resourcefully they found other accommodation, washed in creeks and shaved in the ocean before flying on. It was all an adventure, but it could have seemed like an ill-omened prelude to a mission full of uncertainty.
The dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the United Nations’ longest running and among its most intractable problems, beginning in 1947 and still continuing more than 70 years later. Australia was involved in trying to resolve this dispute for almost half this time. As a fellow member of the Commonwealth, Australia had an early interest in contributing to diplomatic negotiations, and an Australian, Owen Dixon, was the first UN mediator. Another Australian, Major General Robert Nimmo, was appointed Chief Military Observer in 1950 and remained in the job for a further 15 years. Meanwhile, Australian military observers served in Kashmir (as Jammu and Kashmir were often described) for some 35 years until the Australian Government withdrew them in 1985. Also, between 1975 and 1979, Australia provided an aircraft with crew to support the UN observer mission. This chapter describes the early diplomatic efforts; later chapters are devoted to the observer mission and the Air Force contribution.
On the morning of Monday, 25 May 1964, following a ‘very pleasant, well organised and enjoyable’ flight, 38 Australian police stepped from their specially chartered Qantas Boeing 707, City of Brisbane, onto the tarmac at Nicosia International Airport, in the capital of Cyprus. It had been a long flight, ‘the longest [day] of my life’, wrote First Constable John Owens. Their landing had been delayed while the pilot ‘flew the length of the island several times’ waiting for the mist to lift. Finally on the ground at 7am, Owens recalled, ‘the Cyprus air was noticeably hot and moist – a marked contrast to the early morning frosts of Canberra, which we had left 24 hours before’.
The first 30 years of conflict between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbours was focused chiefly on Egypt, Jordan and Syria. But Egypt made peace with Israel in 1978 and Jordan in 1994, after a long period of de facto peace between the two countries; and although there has been no peace between Israel and Syria, and Israel still occupies a large part of the Syrian Golan, the area itself was generally quiet from 1974 to 2006 (when this history ends) and beyond. Instead, after the 1973 War, there was increased conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and vastly escalated conflict between Israel and its northern neighbour Lebanon. These conflicts were not unconnected, but this chapter looks in particular at the case of Lebanon.
By mid-1951, diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kashmir problem had dissolved. It was now up to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (Unmogip) to monitor the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in the hope that some further means of resolving the problem might eventuate. There was, however, no resolution, and the observers were still in place well into the twenty-first century. The Australians, who joined Unmogip in January 1952, were to play a major role in Kashmir until 1985, when the Australian Government withdrew its contingent.
The eleven months between the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 67 on 28 January 1949 and the formal transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949 presented the UN observers with new challenges. Ungoc had changed its name to Unci but, although there was no break in operations nor any change in organisation, clearly the situation was different now.