To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter examines the Philippines’ government policy towards the South China Sea (SCS) dispute since 1995 in the context of bilateral relations with China as well as membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Specifically, it looks at how the country has managed its maritime dispute with China since the Mischief Reef incident in 1995 and the implications of the international court's ruling in July 2016 for its bilateral ties with China and ASEAN regional diplomacy, as well as its external defence posture. Using a neoclassical realist perspective, I argue that—despite the favourable ruling of the international court—the Philippines under the new administration of President Duterte still faces a number of challenges in managing its maritime conflict with China. These challenges include: difficulties in renormalization of relations with Beijing; the push for a regional Code of Conduct (COC) between China and the ASEAN in the SCS; and the dismal state of the Philippines’ external defence capability. This author also contends that, under new leadership, the Philippines should seriously consider embarking on developing selfreliance or self-help capability as part of its internal balancing strategy, which should have been the country's core defence strategy since 1992, to effectively protect its interests in the West Philippine Sea.
Self-help is fundamentally a principle of action in an anarchical system of states where each state actor is responsible for their own survival or security. Realists do not consider it prudent for states to rely on other states or institutions to ensure their security. While powerful states can pursue military or defence build-up when they feel threatened by other states, this may not be adequate for smaller states especially if they face a more powerful hegemonic state. To compensate, small states may resort to balance of power strategies by aligning with a more powerful state or forming alliances with other states to counter a perceived hegemony. From a neorealist perspective, states can pursue balance of power internally, by mobilizing internal resources to build economic and defence capability, and externally, by forming alliances or bandwagoning with other states. According to Waltz, power is a means to ensure a state's security and the concern of states is ultimately to maximize security.
The rejuvenation of Philippine–American security alliance in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States has created opportunities and expectations for both countries in their fight against international terrorism. For the Philippines, supporting Washington's war essentially opened channels for increased U.S. military assistance that enabled the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to gain the upper hand in its fight against local Islamist terrorist and secessionist groups led by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). On the other hand, the United States gained much more from the revived alliance because it was able to secure a mutual logistics accord that would enable it to use Philippine territory in its campaign against international terrorism. The security interests of the Philippines and the United States on the issue, however, are by no means absolutely mutual. This chapter examines the nature and dynamics of Philippine–American security relations since 11 September, and looks at the influence of political and economic factors in the domestic, regional, and international levels that continue to shape the Philippines’ policy of supporting the United States’ war against international terrorism.
Bilateral Alliance: An Overview
Philippine–American security relations, dormant since the removal of the U.S. military bases in Clark and Subic Bay in 1992, were reinvigorated following the tragic event of 11 September. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and U.S. President George W. Bush have both considered international terrorism as a serious threat to international security, and both leaders have pushed for closer military co-operation between their two countries in the fight against terrorism. However, the mutuality of Philippine and American security interests on this issue was complicated by domestic and external factors that to some extent have constrained their revitalized bilateral alliance, especially for the Philippines. For one, the deployment of a small contingent of U.S. forces in Mindanao, in February 2002, caused the re-awakening of anti-American sentiments among Filipino nationalist legislators and civil society groups — a kind of reverse déjà vu that preceded the closing days of American military presence in the country in the early 1990s.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.