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38 results

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Quantum Gravity in a Laboratory?

Quantum Gravity in a Laboratory?
  • Nick Huggett, Niels Linnemann, Mike D. Schneider
  • Published online:
    03 July 2023
    Print publication:
    03 August 2023
  • The characteristic – Planck – energy scale of quantum gravity makes experimental access to the relevant physics apparently impossible. Nevertheless, low energy experiments linking gravity and the quantum have been undertaken: the Page and Geilker quantum Cavendish experiment, and the Colella-Overhauser-Werner neutron interferometry experiment, for instance. However, neither probes states in which gravity remains in a coherent quantum superposition, unlike – it is claimed – recent proposals. In essence, if two initially unentangled subsystems interacting solely via gravity become entangled, then theorems of quantum mechanics show that gravity cannot be a classical subsystem. There are formidable challenges to such an experiment, but remarkably, tabletop technology into the gravity of very small bodies has advanced to the point that such an experiment might be feasible in the near future. This Element explains the proposal and what it aims to show, highlighting the important ways in which its interpretation is theory-laden.

Beyond Spacetime
  • The Foundations of Quantum Gravity
  • Edited by Nick Huggett, Keizo Matsubara, Christian Wüthrich
  • Published online:
    24 April 2020
    Print publication:
    14 May 2020
  • One of the greatest challenges in fundamental physics is to reconcile quantum mechanics and general relativity in a theory of quantum gravity. A successful theory would have profound consequences for our understanding of space, time, and matter. This collection of essays written by eminent physicists and philosophers discusses these consequences and examines the most important conceptual questions among philosophers and physicists in their search for a quantum theory of gravity. Comprising three parts, the book explores the emergence of classical spacetime, the nature of time, and important questions of the interpretation, metaphysics, and epistemology of quantum gravity. These essays will appeal to both physicists and philosophers of science working on problems in foundational physics, specifically that of quantum gravity.

  • The (A)temporal Emergence of Spacetime

  • Nick Huggett, Christian Wüthrich
  • Journal:
    Philosophy of Science / Volume 85 / Issue 5 / December 2018
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 1190-1203
    Print publication:
    December 2018

  • This article examines two cosmological models of quantum gravity (from string theory and loop quantum gravity) to investigate the foundational and conceptual issues arising from quantum treatments of the big bang. While the classical singularity is erased, the quantum evolution that replaces it may not correspond to classical spacetime: it may instead be a nonspatiotemporal region that somehow transitions to a spatiotemporal state. The different kinds of transition involved are partially characterized, the concept of a physical transition without time is investigated, and the problem of empirical incoherence for regions without spacetime is discussed.

  • Deriving General Relativity from String Theory

  • Nick Huggett, Tiziana Vistarini
  • Journal:
    Philosophy of Science / Volume 82 / Issue 5 / December 2015
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 1163-1174
    Print publication:
    December 2015

  • Weyl symmetry of the classical bosonic string Lagrangian is broken by quantization, with profound consequences described here (along with a review of string theory for philosophers of physics). Reimposing symmetry requires that the background space-time satisfy the equations of general relativity: general relativity, hence classical space-time as we know it, arises from string theory. We investigate the logical role of Weyl symmetry in this explanation of general relativity: it is not an independent physical postulate but required in quantum string theory, so from a certain point of view it plays only a formal role in the explanation.

  • Essay Review: Physical Relativity and Understanding Space-Time

  • Nick Huggett
  • Journal:
    Philosophy of Science / Volume 76 / Issue 3 / July 2009
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 404-421
    Print publication:
    July 2009

  • The two books discussed here make important contributions to our understanding of the role of spacetime concepts in physical theories and how that understanding has changed during the evolution of physics. Both emphasize what can be called a ‘dynamical’ account, according to which geometric structures should be understood in terms of their roles in the laws governing matter and force. I explore how the books contribute to such a project; while generally sympathetic, I offer criticisms of some historical claims concerning Newton, and argue that the dynamical account does not undercut ontological issues as the books claim.

  • Groups in Mind

  • David Hilbert, Nick Huggett
  • Journal:
    Philosophy of Science / Volume 73 / Issue 5 / December 2006
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 765-777
    Print publication:
    December 2006

  • Both Henri Poincaré and (more recently) Roger Shepard have argued that the geometry and topology of physical space are internalized by the mind in the form, not (or not only) of a Euclidean manifold, but in terms of the group of rigid Euclidean transformations. Since this issue can have bearing on various metaphysical and epistemological questions, we explore the different reasons they offer for holding this view. In this context, we show how most commentators misunderstand Poincaré's ‘heated sphere/plate’ model and introduce Shepard's ideas to the philosophy of science community.

  • 13 - Quarticles and the identity of indiscernibles

  • Edited by Katherine Brading, Wolfson College, Oxford, Elena Castellani, Università degli Studi, Florence
  • Book:
    Symmetries in Physics
    Published online:
    08 October 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2003, pp 239-249

  • Summary

    Introduction

    In sections 6 and 7 of their paper in this volume, French and Rickles raise the question of the logical relations between the indistinguishability postulate (IP) and the various senses in which particles might fail to be individuals. In section 6 they refer to the convincing arguments of French and Redhead (1988) and of Butterfield (1993) that IP does not logically entail non-individuality, understood several ways – even though, as all seem to concede, there is something perverse about taking bosons and fermions to be individuals. Going the other way, the possibility of IP violating ‘quons’ (Greenberg, 1991) shows that if non-individuality is taken to mean the absence of continuous distinguishing trajectories, characteristic of standard quantum mechanics (QM), then non-individuality does not entail IP. Nor, as French and Rickles point out, do substance or haecceity views of individuality.

    But what if we conceive of individuality in terms of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII)? First, French and Redhead (1988) and Butterfield (1993) have given theorems showing that bosons and fermions violate PII, while the former have also demonstrated violations of PII in the case of a certain paraparticle state. But these cases, as I will explain (and as French and Rickles point out), cover just a very few of the possible kinds of quantum particles, and so for each kind the question arises as to whether it violates PII.

  • 15 - Mirror symmetry: what is it for a relational space to be orientable?

  • Edited by Katherine Brading, Wolfson College, Oxford, Elena Castellani, Università degli Studi, Florence
  • Book:
    Symmetries in Physics
    Published online:
    08 October 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2003, pp 281-288

  • Summary

    Introduction

    I want to take issue with the definition of enantiomorphy that Pooley gives in his paper in this volume. His account goes something like this:

    1. (a) Suppose that the relationist has an account of the dimensionality of space, according to which space is n-dimensional.

    2. (b) The relations – especially the multiple relations – between the parts of a body determine whether it is geometrically embeddable in n-dimensional spaces that are either (only) orientable or (only) non-orientable.

    3. (c) Then ‘an object is an enantiomorph iff, withrespect to every possible abstract [n]-dimensional embedding space, each reflective mapping of the object differs in its outcome from every rigid motion of it.’

    This account depends on the truth of (b). Suppose that a body were embeddable in both orientable and non-orientable spaces of n dimensions. Then it might fail to be an enantiomorph, not because any of its possible reflections in physical space was identical to a rigid motion of the body, but because in some abstract space a reflection and a rigid motion of its image are identical. Pooley (in note 14) makes this point, but claims that the burden of proof falls on the opponent of his account to show that (b) is false.

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