It is an honour to be invited to give this year’s Mackenzie Stuart Lecture. Jack Mackenzie Stuart was a distinguished graduate of this University and of ours in Edinburgh. As a member, and subsequently the President, of the Court of Justice of the European Communities he made a great contribution to the cause of European integration through implementing the laws of the Communities, subsequently the ‘European Union’. As well as performing the ordinary tasks of judging and also latterly of presiding over the Court’s business, he was an apparently tireless publicist for that cause throughout Europe, but most particularly at home in the UK. By seeking to make the work of his Court and the law it administered less mystifying to the ordinary citizen and to the lawyerly public, he made it also less threatening.

The occasion of the publication of a survey of jurisprudence teaching in the law schools of the United Kingdom is a good occasion for reflecting upon the point of jurisprudence teaching in a law school. There are indeed other good occasions for such reflection, and in fact this paper was initially prepared for such an other occasion. By the invitation of the Editor, it now appears in this Journal in revised form as an outrider to Barnett and Yach's survey ofjurisprudence teaching in the United Kingdom.

One cannot but compliment the authors on the thoroughness of their survey work and on the richness of detail of their report. This comment will not seek to rival that richness.

Both Dr Wilson and Dr Patricia White in another review have made sound and telling criticisms of my efforts in Chapter 2 of Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory at translating legal argument into the technical forms of logic. At the time of writing the book, I was apprehensive about the likely resistance at least of lawyers and law-students to any excessive resort to technicalities of symbolism; it therefore seemed wise to simplify matters by ignoring differenees between propositional logic and the logic of predicates and of relations, thc latter being at least ostensibly the more complex and difficult, albeit more rigorously fitted to the subject matter. I hoped that my perhaps unduly cryptic footnote 5 on page 28 (noted by Dr Wilson at her footnote 29) was a sufficient acknowledgment of the technical difficulties which I was thus sweeping under the carpet. Like Dr White, but unlike Dr Wilson, I took the view that my main point about the deductive character of the arguments I had in view was unaffected by the technical infelicity from a logician's point of view of my resort to the symbolic forms of propositional logic.