I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify some parts of my argument that is afforded by the comments of Charles Donahue and Patrick Wormald. I should say at the outset that I am not seeking to propose a monocausal explanation of the origins of the generalized use of jury trial at common law, whether a “stirps” or a “smoking gun” (Donahue), or to exclude altogether the relevance of Anglo-Saxon practice or strong government (Wormald)—though I am pretty skeptical of the specific Carolingian-Norman lineage proposed by Brunner.

The origins of trial by jury have been the subject of an extensive debate. The traditional approach to the creation of the “palladium of liberty” saw the jurors as lay judges and located their origins in the lay judges of Anglo-Saxon England, continuing through the survival of the “ancient constitution.” An alternative approach, that of Heinrich Brunner, found wide acceptance from the end of the last century and until recently. Brunner detected the origins of the jury in fiscal inquiries imposed by strong monarchs, reversing the constitutional politics of the older view. At present, the wheel has turned back toward judicial character and origins in general early medieval practice. The purpose of this article is to take a new look at the issue by approaching it from a different angle: the requirement that jurors should come de vicineto, from the locality. This approach has produced the following observations.