This research communication reports the responses to supplementing dairy cattle with a hydrogenated fat-embedded calcium gluconate feed additive. The role of hindgut health in ruminant performance and wellbeing is an area of growing interest. Various prebiotic compounds have been used to promote lower gut health in various non-ruminant species. Calcium gluconate, a prebiotic compound, has previously been observed to increase milk fat yield when fed to ruminants in a form capable of resisting fermentation in the rumen, though the mechanism(s) behind this response remain unclear. The objective of this study was to compare the responses of lactating cattle to two different supplementation levels of a hydrogenated fat-embedded calcium gluconate (HFCG) product to evaluate a potential linear dose response. Forty-six lactating Holstein dairy cattle were used in a 3 × 3 replicated Latin square design with 28 d periods to evaluate a previously used dose of HFCG (approximately 16 g/d) with both a negative control and a dose of 25 g/d. Supplementation of multiparous animals with 16 g/d HFCG significantly (P < 0.05) increased milk fat yield and content relative to the negative control, and subsequently improved gross feed efficiency (P < 0.05); additionally, the presence of a potential non-linear dose response was observed for these parameters. Responses when supplemented with 25 g/d HFCG did not differ from the negative control. No production responses were observed in primiparous animals. The mode of action of HFCG, in addition to the potential differential response in primiparous animals remains unclear and warrants further investigation.

Une hypothèse fondamentale avancée par Searle et Vanderveken dans Foundations of Illocutionary Logic est que la force illocutionnaire est un élé;ment essentiel de la signification conventionnelle. La signification conventionnelle, qui est une propriété d'énoncé, s'oppose en gros ici à la signification intentionnelle, qui est une propriété prédiquée aux locuteurs. J'aimerais questionner certaines des motivations qui sont susceptibles de nous amener à accepter ce point de vue.

I submit what, I believe, is a fairly new definition of the nation, one which I call the sociopolitical conception. I try to avoid as much as possible the traditional dichotomy between the exclusively civic and ethnic accounts, and try to explain my reasons for doing so. I also adopt as a general framework a certain conceptual pluralism which allows me to use many different concepts of the nation. After that, I proceed by formulating some constraints on any acceptable new definition. My own sociopolitical conception is then finally introduced. The sociopolitical nation is a political community, most often composed, sociologically, of a national majority, national minorities, and individuals with other national origins. The concept of national majority is crucial for the account and refers to the largest sample in the world of a given population sharing a common language, history, and culture. National minorities are defined as extensions of neighbouring nations, while individuals of other national origins are those members of ethnic minorities that have come from immigration. There would be no sociopolitical nation if there were no national majority, but this is compatible with a pluricultural and multi-ethnic view of the nation, since the political community may also include national minorities and individuals with a different origin. I end the article by showing that this definition meets the constraints that were initially introduced.

Cet ouvrage de Pascal Engel doit être fortement recommandé pour plusieurs raisons. On est d'abord frappé par l'ampleur du travail accompli et l'étendue du domaine couvert. La documentation est fouillée, l'exposé est clair et un équilibre est toujours maintenu entre les questions générales et les questions de détail. Engel ne perd jamais de vue la perspective d'ensemble qu'il s'est donnée et qui concerne la nature de la logique, y compris lorsqu'il s'emploie à faire certaines nuances ou à proposer une distinction subtile. Il aurait été facile en pareille matière de proposer un mauvais choix de thèmes. Là encore, Engel s'est bien acquitté de sa tâche. On a affaire à un ouvrage dans lequel l'auteur va toujours droit à l'essentiel. Plusieurs sujets sont à peine effleurés, mais cette décision est très souvent heureuse puisqu'elle permet à l'auteur d'établir des liens entre des problématiques qui, de prime abord, semblent très éloignées les unes des autres. L'auteur fait montre d'un étonnant esprit de synthèse et plusieurs thèmes font, à ma connaissance, une première apparition dans la littérature philosophique francophone. Il s'agit donc d'une contribution à la philosophie de la logique qui mérite d'être signalée. On regrettera peut-être la présence d'un assez grand nombre d'erreurs typographiques (j'en ai rapidement relevées plus de cent cinquante). Dans la plupart des cas, il ne s'agit que de coquilles mais, dans d'autres cas, elles risquent de nuire à la compréhension du texte surtout lorsqu'elles interviennent dans des formules ou des définitions.

I argue first that there are many different concepts of the nation, and advocate a certain conceptual pluralism. I also argue that a population as a whole cannot constitute a nation unless it has a certain national consciousness. I then show that we must adopt a fundamental principle of tolerance. I also try to attend to the complexities of the relations between Quebec and Canada, and argue that different populations represent themselves as nations in different ways and with different concepts. I show that Quebec constitutes a nation within a nation. I then wonder what it would mean for Canadians to accept a Quebec nation. Finally, I try to explain why a very large proportion of the population of Quebec has increasingly been favourable to sovereignty, and favourable to making a partnership proposal to Canada.

There are nationalisms and nationalisms, and as nationalisms vary from barbarous and murderous to benign and, all things considered, perhaps desirable, so theories of nationalism vary from irrational or turgid metaphysical accounts to reasonable and carefully articulated and argued theories of nationalism. André Van de Putte has well described some of the former (without at all falling into that category himself) while David Miller, Yael Tamir, Geneviève Nootens, Ross Poole, and Robert X. Ware have carefully argued for some modest forms of nationalism, sometimes explicitly and sometimes only by implication. But there are also, as the reader will have seen, forcefully argued and systematic theories setting themselves against even the most sophisticated and plausible defences of nationalism. The articles of Harry Brighouse, Omar Dahbour, and Andrew Levine fall explicitly into that category and, we would argue, so does Allen Buchanan's carefully wrought article, though implicitly and by implication but not by programmatic intent.