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The rocky shores of the north-east Atlantic have been long studied. Our focus is from Gibraltar to Norway plus the Azores and Iceland. Phylogeographic processes shape biogeographic patterns of biodiversity. Long-term and broadscale studies have shown the responses of biota to past climate fluctuations and more recent anthropogenic climate change. Inter- and intra-specific species interactions along sharp local environmental gradients shape distributions and community structure and hence ecosystem functioning. Shifts in domination by fucoids in shelter to barnacles/mussels in exposure are mediated by grazing by patellid limpets. Further south fucoids become increasingly rare, with species disappearing or restricted to estuarine refuges, caused by greater desiccation and grazing pressure. Mesoscale processes influence bottom-up nutrient forcing and larval supply, hence affecting species abundance and distribution, and can be proximate factors setting range edges (e.g., the English Channel, the Iberian Peninsula). Impacts of invasive non-native species are reviewed. Knowledge gaps such as the work on rockpools and host–parasite dynamics are also outlined.
This study used repeated measures data to identify developmental profiles of elevated risk for ADHD (i.e., six or more inattentive and/or hyperactive-impulsive symptoms), with an interest in the age at which ADHD risk first emerged. Risk factors that were measured across the first 3 years of life were used to predict profile membership. Participants included 1,173 children who were drawn from the Family Life Project, an ongoing longitudinal study of children's development in low-income, nonmetropolitan communities. Four heuristic profiles of ADHD risk were identified. Approximately two thirds of children never exhibited elevated risk for ADHD. The remaining children were characterized by early childhood onset and persistent risk (5%), early childhood limited risk (10%), and middle childhood onset risk (19%). Pregnancy and delivery complications and harsh-intrusive caregiving behaviors operated as general risk for all ADHD profiles. Parental history of ADHD was uniquely predictive of early onset and persistent ADHD risk, and low primary caregiver education was uniquely predictive of early childhood limited ADHD risk. Results are discussed with respect to how changes to the age of onset criterion for ADHD in DSM5 may affect etiological research and the need for developmental models of ADHD that inform ADHD symptom persistence and desistance.
Child conduct problems (CP) reflect a heterogeneous collection of oppositional, aggressive, norm-violating, and sometimes violent behaviors, whereas child callous–unemotional (CU) behaviors reflect interpersonal styles of interactions reflecting a lack of guilt and empathy as well as uncaring and shallow emotional responses to others. Taken together, high levels of child CP and CU behaviors are thought to identify a relatively homogenous group of children at elevated risk for persistent and more severe problem behaviors across childhood and into adulthood. Although a large body of research has examined the developmental etiology of CP behaviors, only recently has a developmental psychopathology approach been applied to early CU behaviors. The current study examines multiple levels of contextual influences during the first years of life, including family socioeconomic status, household chaos, and parenting behaviors, on CP and CU behaviors assessed during the first-grade year. Whereas previous studies found associations between parenting behaviors and child problem behaviors moderated by household chaos, the current study found no evidence of moderation. However, path analyses suggest that the associations between child CP and CU behaviors and the contextual variables of socioeconomic status (family income and parental education) and household chaos (disorganization and instability) were mediated by maternal sensitive and harsh–intrusive parenting behavior. Analyses are presented, interpreted, and discussed with respect to both bioecological and family stress models of development.
Using the Durham Child Health and Development Study, this study (N = 171) tested whether observed parenting behaviors in infancy (6 and 12 months) and toddlerhood/preschool (24 and 36 months) interacted with a child polymorphism of the brain-derived neurotrophic factor gene to predict oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) and callous–unemotional (CU) behaviors at age 3 years. Child genotype interacted with observed harsh and intrusive (but not sensitive) parenting to predict ODD and CU behaviors. Harsh–intrusive parenting was more strongly associated with ODD and CU for children with a methionine allele of the brain-derived neurotrophic factor gene. CU behaviors were uniquely predicted by harsh–intrusive parenting in infancy, whereas ODD behaviors were predicted by harsh–intrusive parenting in both infancy and toddlerhood/preschool. The results are discussed from the perspective of the contributions of caregiving behaviors as contributing to distinct aspects of early onset disruptive behavior.
Over the centuries, a great deal of poetry has been devoted to warfare and its practitioners. While the majority has tended to celebrate the heroism of men involved in conflict, a not insignificant part has condemned the carnage and futility, a condemnation that reached its height during the First World War in the works of such writers as Wilfred Owens, Siegfried Sassoon, and Robert Service.
During the Middle Ages, martial poetry followed both strains. Much of it emphasized the glory of combat, serving as the supreme tool for recalling honor and assigning shame earned on the battlefield. This was true of the most widely-recited works of the period, the great epics and chanson de geste, including Beowulf, the Song of Roland, the Tales of King Arthur, and the Poema del mio Cid, to name only the most prominent. All centered on human conflict and extolled the heroism of their protagonists. Poets, like the great troubadour, Bertran de Born (c. 1140–c. 1215), could look on war as a spectacle complete with “proud pavilions high … squadrons of armored chivalry … trumpets and tabors, ensigns and pennants.” To Born's mind, participants were expected to spill blood and engage in butchery in their pursuit of “death or victory.”
Byzantine military events in the early fourteenth century have captured the imagination of Western scholars for well over a century, thanks to the participation of Spanish mercenaries in the Catalan Company led by the flamboyant Roger de Flor. The important contribution to this military adventure made by another company of mercenaries composed entirely of Alans has been grossly underestimated when not totally ignored by both Western and Russian historians. Since the Alans were implicated in the disastrous defeat of the Byzantines in Anatolia as well as the first historical success of the Turkish leader Osman, eponymous founder of the Ottoman state, examining the specific role of these warriors may shed light on the military debacle that the Byzantines suffered at the hands of the Turks and Catalans in the first decade of the fourteenth century. Despite its importance, the military effectiveness of this company while contributing to the defense of the empire has never been examined in detail, so that the question remains: why did a Mongol-trained division of considerable military potential fail so spectacularly?
The appearance of the Alans in Byzantine service first attracted attention because scholars in Western Europe, especially Spain, have long been fascinated by the adventures of the Catalan Company, comparing its exploits in the East with those of Cortez and Pizarro in the Americas. Although composed of Aragonese, Calabrians, and Sicilians, it is usually referred to as the Catalan Company since most of the officers and men were from Catalonia.
The comprehensive breadth and scope of the Journal are to the fore in this issue, which ranges widely both geographically and chronologically. The subjects of analysis are equally diverse, with three contributions dealing with the Crusades, four with matters related to the Hundred Years War, two with high-medieval Italy, one with the Alans in the Byzantine-Catalan conflict of the early fourteenth century, and one with the wars of the Duke of Cephalonia in Western Greece and Albania at the turn of the fifteenth century. Topics include military careers, tactics and strategy, the organization of urban defenses, close analysis of chronicle sources, and cultural approaches to the acceptance of gunpowder artillery and the prevalence of military "games" in Italian cities. Contributors: T.S. Asbridge, A. Compton Reeves, Kelly DeVries, Michael Ehrlich, Scott Jessee, Donald Kagay, Savvas Kyriakidis, Randall Moffett, Aldo A. Settia, Charles D. Stanton, Georgios Theotokis, L.J. Andrew Villalon, Anatoly Isaenko.
[“I giochi militari e l'addestramento delle fanterie,” in Aldo A. Settia, Comuni in guerra. Armi ed eserciti nell'Italia delle città (Bologna, 1994), pp. 29–52]
Translated by Valerie Eads
The “Little Battles”
Italian communal armies were, as is well known, largely made up of infantry. Admittedly, the strength of these latter would have resulted more from numbers and determination than from combat experience; still, the term “infantry” properly means “a group of soldiers with a certain level of training and discipline,” two qualities that result only from some form of instruction. And yet, if we wish to develop at least a rough understanding of the military obligations of the mass of the population, of the armament the people had to provide for themselves, and of how it (the population) was mobilized to train for war – with the exception of some late provisions concerning marksmen – the sources as a rule are simply silent concerning training.
One can certainly maintain that economic reasons would have prevented regular exercises for the communal infantry in times of peace, but it is difficult to believe that all training would have taken place on the battlefield or in the course of the socio-political conflicts between milites and pedites. There is, however, a third possibility offered by certain war games – a sort of plebeian rival to the aristocratic tournaments – practiced specifically by those classes that furnished the infantry for the city militia.
In 1966, John R. Hale, following up an earlier essay, which had addressed in general the subject of warfare and public opinion during the fifteenth and sixteenth century, published an article focusing on the question of that same society's acceptance of early gunpowder weaponry. In this article, “Gunpowder and the Renaissance: An Essay in the History of Ideas,” Professor Hale concluded that although there were historical examples of societal acceptance of early guns, on the whole, the people of the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries had rejected this new military technology. In a time of scholarly protest against the war in Vietnam and a growing concern over the arms race of the Cold War, Hale found some solace in the fact that substantial literary evidence showed that the period of his research also had a large number of intelligentsia who criticized their kingdoms' weapons policies. And while, as he concludes, “by the early seventeenth century, ideals had given ground to the arguments of fact,” yielding to an increased use of and, equally, a growing complacency towards, gunpowder weapons, that period of intellectual fervor known as the Renaissance had at least held out a disdain for the killing power of the new weapons.
Sir John Radcliffe of Attleborough, Norfolk, had an admirable career as a soldier and administrator in the service of the Lancastrian kings of England. His assignments took him into all the dominions of the crown: Ireland, Wales, Normandy, and Gascony. While Sir John's life is of considerable interest in its own right, his career both exemplifies as well as personalizes the English military experience of his lifetime.
Sir John came from a landed family with Lancashire roots. He was the second son of James Radcliffe (d. 1410) and his wife Joan, daughter of Sir John Tempest of Bracewell, Yorkshire. Nothing has come to light on the early years of Sir John, but his career suggests that he was given a firm grounding in military, financial, and administrative matters. The first sure record of John Radcliffe is in a military context helping his king consolidate his hold upon the throne. Many years after the event, in 1429, it was noted that while an esquire (probably in the service of his father, James), John had participated in the battle of Shrewsbury on 21 July 1403. In that battle the first king of the Lancastrian dynasty, Henry IV, defeated a rebel force led by Henry Percy, known as Hotspur, the son of Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland. Six days after the battle, James Radcliffe was one of the men commissioned to gather forces from Lancashire and bring them to the king at Pontefract in Yorkshire.
The purpose of this study is to examine the military schemes of defense that were employed in the town of Southampton during the late medieval period, 1300–1500. In many ways this is the most basic and vital of the varied roles Southampton had as a military entity. If the town was incapable of protecting its own possessions and dependencies, it would be unable to fulfill its other military roles. Moreover, if the town was unable to defend the area it was expected to, that would represent a major vulnerability in the region and ultimately the kingdom. If, on the other hand, the townsmen of Southampton were able to fulfill this responsibility of self-protection, that would not only maintain their day-to-day activities but would also give the kingdom an important defense.
The protection of Southampton was actually a multi-tiered system of various parties and individuals. The townspeople of Southampton managed their own defense in two primary methods. First they created various plans to organize themselves for conflict, second they participated in the gathering and control of information. The town also fitted into a wider defense structure in the kingdom with various groups and individuals supporting it in this endeavor. This organization was at one point the basis of English defense though many questions remain unanswered. How did these defensive schemes develop in Southampton? Were these schemes created in response to or in preparation for dangers posed to the town?
“We learn from history that we do not learn from history”: this was the title of an address by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart on 3 May 1938 to the Manchester Luncheon Club at the Midland hotel. A major point he made, based on twenty years' of study of the records of the First World War, was:
pure documentary history seems to me akin to mythology. Many were the gaps to be found in official archives – tokens of documents destroyed later to conceal what might impair a commander's reputation … a general could safeguard the lives of his men as well as his own reputation by writing orders based on a situation that did not exist, for an attack that nobody carried out … I have wondered how the war went on at all when I have found how much of their time the commanders spent in preparing its history.
Liddell Hart's conclusions were based on abundant data which contradicted official documentation. He interviewed people who participated in battles, read the memoirs of politicians and army officers, compared archives, etc. All these are utterly irrelevant while dealing with medieval battles. In these cases, the only relevant part of Liddell Hart's assertion is that documentation is not reliable. In other words, fishing out facts from medieval records is almost impossible. Therefore, having independent data which may shed some light on events that took place during a battle might be an important contribution to its reconstruction and understanding.